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Abstract        
Attention and memory can increase the saliency of information in accordance 
with task goals (Driver, 2001; Pashler & Sutherland, 1998; Reinecke, Rinck, & Becker, 2006; 
Vuilleumier, 2005).  Self-relevance of stimulus materials may be an important factor, both 
in attention and memory. However, there is, as yet, no clear consensus on the 
mechanisms underlying this. For example, it is unclear if the benefit of self-relevance on 
attention and memory is because of positive emotional value linked to the self or if self-
relevance and emotion are two separate processes. This thesis independently assessed 
the contributions of self and emotional processing on attention and memory.  
The experiments use a modified version of a paradigm developed by Sui, He and 
Humphries (2012). These experiments arbitrarily assigned visual information as being self-
related or not self-related.  Furthermore, the emotional valence of these stimuli is also 
varied. The studies explored whether the emotionality and self-relevance influence 
memory for the presented materials and whether they do so independently or 
interactively. The studies explored the effects of emotional self-relevance on attention 
and memory using a combination of behavioural and neurophysiological methods. The 
findings of this thesis support previous research on the benefits of self-relevance, on both 
attention (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; Sui, Sun, Peng, & Humphreys, 2014; Wang, 
Humphreys, & Sui, 2016) and memory (M. A. Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Kelley et al., 
2002; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). The results also showed that emotion has similar effects 
on attention and memory as self-relevance does.  
This thesis has shown that the underlying processes of self and emotion are 
distinct (Experiment 1). However, this thesis has also shown in a novel way that emotional 
self-relevant information is processed more efficiently than either emotion or self-
vi 
 
relatedness alone (Experiment 2). In other words, self-relevance and emotion can interact 
and together increase the saliency of emotional self-related memories (Experiment 6). 
The results also revealed that, though self-related information is processed faster and 
more efficiently, this was only in terms of the faster rate of learning for self-related 
information compared to other-related information. When given enough repetitions, 
non-self-related information can achieve a similar level of memorability, given sufficient 
exposure (Experiment 3, and Experiment 4). Nonetheless, the richer information linked to 
self-related events means that all things being equal, such information will tend to 
produce more stable memories over time (Experiment 5), which results in faster forgetting 
of other-related information compared to self-relevant information.  
These findings are further supported by the Electroencephalogram (EEG) research 
of this thesis. In particular, early N100 responses were found to be enhanced for self-
related items during the matching task. In memory, the late positive parietal components 
linked to recollection were more enhanced for self-related information also. Overall, the 
EEG results support the suggestion that self-related information has attentional priority 
and, consequently, is encoded into memory more efficiently than other-related 
information.  
Fundamentally, this thesis has shown that attention prioritises self-relevant 
information over information unrelated to the self. Moreover, it showed that self-
relevance interacts with emotion, and in doing so ensures enriched and therefore, more 
salient memories. This thesis is the first to show that prioritised (emotional) self-relevant 
information is recalled more often as well, when compared to information unrelated to 
the self. The importance of this interaction between emotion and self-relevance is 
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Chapter 1:     
Review of Self & Emotion   
“For whatever we lose (like a you or a me) 
it's always ourselves we find in the sea.” (E. E. Cummings, 1958). 
Aims of the Thesis 
The above quote from ‘Maggie and Milly and Molly and May’ by E. E. Cummings 
(1958) is a light-hearted poem reflecting on how our identity shapes what we see. The 
author of this thesis takes the more literal meaning: no matter what we do, we always 
look for things relevant to ourselves and our goals. The question of how people process 
information relevant to ourselves; how it affects attention and memory, is the core subject 
of this thesis.  
 The work in this thesis takes a neurocognitive approach. The core question 
concerns the sensory input from our surroundings and how this information is attended 
to and later retrieved from memory. Information in our environment is rarely of equal 
importance to us. Depending on the context, certain types of information will often stand 
out (i.e. is more salient to us) whereas other information is less distinct. Many factors 
influence the saliency of perceived information.  
For instance, physically contrasting stimuli will stand out from other stimuli. An example 
of this would be a red letter amongst black letters, like the red letter T in this sentence 
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994). Also, some information is directly relevant 
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because it is potentially rewarding (Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 
2009), more threatening (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994), or merely novel or unexpected 
(Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). As could be gleaned from the first paragraph, events 
and things related to the self are one way to potentially increase the saliency of 
information. Furthermore, perceived information is rarely devoid of emotion, and as will 
be explained later, emotion too can increase the saliency of perceived information. For 
this reason, this thesis will examine the relationship between self-related processing and 
emotion.  
The principal aim of this thesis is to investigate the influence of emotional self-relevant 
information on attention and memory processes. This thesis uses a cognitive (neuro) 
scientific approach involving analysis of behavioural and EEG data. This data is derived 
from a series of experiments that manipulate the self-relevance and emotional content 
of presented stimuli.  
 The next few paragraphs will first try to operationally define what is meant by ‘self’ 
and ‘emotion’, in how they are used in the context of this thesis. In order to turn these 
concepts into measurable and easily manipulable entities, it is necessary to give a rather 
narrower definition of these terms than how they might be thought of in every day 
vernacular speech. This chapter will then review relevant literature on the influence of self 
and emotion on attention and memory. Finally, this chapter will state the research 
questions of this thesis, and provide an overview of how the subsequent chapters will 
address these research goals.  
Self-relevant information       
 Self-relevant information is the crucial concept of this thesis. It refers to 
information vital to one’s identity (e.g. one’s face, or name) as opposed to information 
not relevant or inessential to one’s sense of self (e.g. a stranger’s face, someone else’s 
name). However, this is an inadequate definition. It largely defines the concept in terms 
of what it is not, rather than what it is. To get a proper definition of self-relevance we first 
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need to tackle the question of what is meant by ‘self’. This is arguably one of the 
slipperiest and most abstract terms in Psychology, yet at the same time the sense of self 
is something which is part of everyday experience. Therefore, this section will explain how 
cognitive psychology has tried to define the notion of self and how this thesis specifically 
considers the notion of self and its arguable different manifestations.  
Cognitive psychology has often tried to define the ‘self’ in terms of the sense of ownership 
or self-as-object (Brown, 2014; James, 1890; Kim & Johnson, 2010; Northoff, 2011; Sui & 
Gu, 2018). This thesis follows in this tradition.  
To define ‘self’ in this way concurs several advantages. It is something which is easily both 
measured (by asking people if they view something belongs to them) and experimentally 
manipulated (by telling people that something belongs to you). This is also a very 
ubiquitous definition: Every person will have experienced a sense of ownership over 
something, one which is not shared with others. ‘Other’ in this case can be convenient 
defined as being everything that is neither the self nor part of the self and is the opposite 
of the self. The notion of ‘other’ provides a natural comparison condition from which to 
judge the effects of self in cognitive processing.  
It should be noted that this operational definition avoids any kind of theoretical claim 
about what the self is. Before we turn to this in detail the discussion here will first give a 
flavour of the complex and different ways in which ‘self’ has been characterised in 
Psychology. Two distinct ways the ‘self’ has been described are the ‘self as identity’; and 
the ‘self as an object’. Indeed, this division led James (1890) to suggest the use of ‘I’ and 
‘me’ as labels which differentiate between the two elements. Evidence suggests that this 
distinction between ‘I’ and ‘me’ is not just a mere linguistic one, but a distinction between 
two ‘types’ of self. Brown (2014) provided the example of the statement: “I see me”. Here, 
the ‘I’ is part of your identity, an awareness that you see something. The ‘me’ in this 
context is that which is seen as an object of your attention. It illustrates the self as our 
awareness that we exist separately from others, and capable of our own will (‘I’), and the 
self as an object in our attention and memory (‘me’). However, the way the self as an 
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object is studied in psychology wildly differs and a further operationalisation of the 
concept is needed.  
When a person is talking about themselves, they talk about their ‘me’. For 
example, you can recount what you have been doing today and how you are feeling. 
Recounting your day or feelings would not only require an awareness that you exist 
separately from others (“I”), but you would need to be able to see yourself as an object 
(“me”) in order to describe what happened to you. Furthermore, if someone asked who 
you are, you would be able to describe yourself using traits and characteristics you 
believe comprise your identity. James (1890) made a distinction between several types of 
selves that make up the ‘me’: the social self; the material self; and the spiritual self. These 
three concepts will be briefly explained below. 
The social self is a perspective of self in terms of how others identify us. It is argued 
that it is the social self which is the driving force which leads to specific behaviours of 
what is socially acceptable. The social self tends to involve an individual in relation to 
other things or people. For instance it can be the “me” as a father or mother, as a student, 
a friend, as a member of group or even a nation. With each social identity, it is argued, 
comes a different self (Hornsey, 2008). For example, the way people behave is different 
when they are just a friend, compared to when they are a father1.  
The material self is often expressed using the pronoun ‘ mine’ or ‘my’ and focusses 
on the body or the extended self (Rosenberg, 1979). For example, people talk about “my 
body”, or “my house”. Brown (2014) makes an interesting point in highlighting James’ 
(1890) work on how possessions can become a part of the self and are incorporated into 
the self. Often the value of an item is not its intrinsic worth but how important it is to its 
owner.  
                                              
1 Social self or social identities is attempted to be explained by Social Identity Theory (SIT, Turner & Oakes, 
1986). The main tenet of SIT is that there are multiple selves that influence behaviour. The social identity is 
derived from a group or groups a person identifies with. A complete review of SIT is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. See Rupert Brown, (2000) for an extensive of SIT.  
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 The material self is argued to be linked closely to the notion of a spiritual self. This 
latter concept is the total sum of everything we view as being “my” or “mine”, without it 
being a physical entity or social identity. In other words, the spiritual me are the things 
we think about ourselves, how we feel, and what we think we can do. For example, people 
talk about “my” skills, feelings, interests, motives, traits, opinions, and so forth. Brown 
(2014) refers to these spiritual selves as personal identities.   
 It is generally viewed that these distinct types of ‘selves’ do not exist in isolation 
but together form a single coherent self. This is reflected by the narrative self (Gallagher, 
2000; McAdams, 1996). The narrative self is considered to be a natural consequence of 
being a fairly intelligent user of language. Language is a fundamental part of who we are. 
Through language, we can connect all our experiences and thoughts over time. In doing 
so, it is argued, we create our sense of self. Episodic memory (discussed in more detail 
later) is vital to create this narrative self.  With episodic memory, we remember events 
that happened to ourselves and use the different ‘stories’ to form one coherent (possibly 
partly fictional) narrative of the self (Gallagher, 2000). The narrative self explains how the 
self is defined by merging our spiritual, social and material selves into one entity. 
However, the narrative self is almost a side-effect from the interaction between our 
general language skills and our episodic memory. Moreover, in episodic memory events 
related to the self are already conveniently stored for us to create our narratives. How 
then is it first determined when something is self-related? Potentially this means that a 
more simple or primitive form of self must exist also.  
 This ‘primitive’ form of the self is referred to as the minimal self and is not 
concerned with self-reflection or storytelling such as elaborate narratives. The minimal 
self is closely associated with the material self. It differs in being more focussed with the 
here and now and is not concerned with time or conscious awareness.  The minimal self 
is the immediate sense of self that is not just the domain of intelligent life (Gallagher, 
2000). With the minimal self, an individual can know if they are responsible for the sensory 
consequence of an action (‘I moved my arm’) or if the sensory consequence is initiated 
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by someone, or something, else. This is called the sense of agency (Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 2000). Knowing that it is your arm that moves is a sense of ownership (material 
self), which is achieved via a comparison of a predicted state with an intended state, 
allowing attenuation of self-generated sensory signals.  
 In healthy individuals, the difference between agency/ownership and the minimal 
self would probably be negligible (Gallagher, 2000). However, the two things can 
dissociate under some circumstances. If observers misattribute agency and ownership 
then the process can go wrong. This can lead to unusual perceptions. For instance a 
person might still claim that his arm is moving but he is not doing the moving (loss of the 
sense of agency), or a person might claim that he is moving the arm but that it is not his 
arm (Spence et al., 1997). This dissociation shows that it is possible to disrupt the process 
of forming a ‘me’ and that a minimal self does not require an elaborate narrative.  
 The type of self that is of most interest to this thesis, is the primitive minimal self.  
However, how the minimal self and the narrative self are connected is by-and-large an 
open question in the existing literature. However, Sui and Humphreys (2015b) see the self 
as a ‘hub’ that binds together different pieces of information from different sources and 
modalities.  In this way, the ‘integrative self’ of Sui and Humphreys might be ideally placed 
to connect the primal minimal self with the self-reflecting qualities of the narrative self. 
This is precisely what a recent paper by Sui and Gu (2018) suggested. The authors 
propose a neural framework of the self as an object, built on the idea of an integrative 
self. This neural network of the self will be explained in more detail later in this chapter. 
Briefly put, the neural network on processing the self as an object consists of three major 
components: a core self-system involved in internal self-related information processing 
and other-related judgements; a cognitive control system related to processing external 
information; and a salience node which is related to the processing of emotional and 
reward stimuli. These three nodes are interconnected and together process information 
related to the self.  
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  To summarise, the self as studied in this thesis will reflect processes associated 
with the ‘minimal self’. As will become apparent in the paragraphs on attention and 
memory, the minimal self can be studied by linking stimuli to inherently self-related items. 
Examples of these are one’s face or name, or by linking items to the self via instructions 
or making self-judgements (e.g. by telling the participants they own the items). The aim 
is to compare the influence of self-related items with the influence of items not related 
to the self (e.g. the memorability of self- versus other-related items).  
 A second key concept in this thesis to be operationalised is emotion. The next 
section introduces the notion of emotion from a Psychological perspective, and how it is 
considered in this thesis. The main reason for including emotion as a topic of study is that 
previous research has attempted to explain self-relevant information processing as an 
emotional process (Brédart, Delchambre, & Laureys, 2006; McNeill, 2000). Information 
relevant to the self is rarely without emotion in natural settings.  However, research has 
shown that emotion and self are two separate processes, which will be illustrated later. 
The experiments described here aim to further examine the role between emotion and 
the self in attentional and mnemonic processing, albeit with the self as the main topic of 
interest. Emotion will be briefly explained and operationally defined in the next 
subsection. 
Emotion and Emotional information 
 Emotion is either a temporary state elicited by a specific event or thought which 
is temporary or emotion is a trait which is long lasting and can describe an individual’s 
tendency or nature (Cattell & Scheier, 1961; Izard, 2013).  This thesis considers emotions 
temporary states that can last for a few moments and are not traits in the sense that it 
defines an individual. Furthermore, there is a distinction between positive and negative 
emotions.2 Research describes positive or negative emotions in terms of positive or 
                                              
2 Traditionally it is argued there are six basic emotions that people can recognise: surprise; happiness; sadness; fear; disgust; and 
anger (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). These six basic emotions were identified in two literature reviews on emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1975; 
Fridlund, Ekman, & Oster, 1987), which focussed on identifying separate emotional facial expressions. These reviews found that 
regardless of culture, there is an agreement across observers that these emotions are reflected in distinct facial expressions. 
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negative ‘valance’. Of course, emotions do not just vary in valence. For instance, emotions 
also differ in intensity, a component of emotion referred to as ‘arousal’ (Kensinger & 
Corkin, 2004). The emotional strength of a stimulus can vary per individual and situation 
but can be always be described in terms of valence and arousal. Furthermore, depending 
on the valence (either positive or negative), the same emotional information can affect 
people differently (Chen & Bargh, 1999).  
 For example, in their experiment Chen and Bargh (1999) asked participants to 
classify emotional words as quickly as possible by pulling a lever backwards (towards 
themselves) for perceived positive words and a push the lever forward (away from 
themselves) if the participants believed the word was negative. For half of the participants 
these instructions were reversed. The results showed that participants were affected 
differently by positive versus negative emotions. Pulling the lever backwards towards 
oneself was facilitated for positive words compared to pulling the lever backwards for 
negative words. Similarly, participants were faster in pushing the lever away from 
themselves with negative words when compared to positive words. Chen and Bargh 
(1999) concluded that positive and negative words let to automatic approach and 
withdrawal behaviour respectively. This does not imply that that positive emotion is more 
salient to the self. Generally, negative stimuli are more important than positive stimuli 
when considering a pure evolutionary perspective. Naturally, potential harmful stimuli are 
very salient especially when if they can be potentially threatening or/and are goal 
relevant. Furthermore, the strength or arousal of the emotion is more determining in 
directing our behaviour than valance alone (Mather & Sutherland, 2011). Emotional 
information is relatively quickly processed (roughly between 200 – 300ms with emotional 
words Kissler, Herbert, Peyk, & Junghofer (2007)) and evaluated on how self-relevant the 
emotional stimulus is (Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005). When information is more 
easily linked to the self, then positive emotion is likely to be favoured over negative 
information (Herbert, Junghofer, & Kissler, 2008; Herbert, Kissler, Junghöfer, Peyk, & 
                                              
Nonetheless, there is no complete consensus on the basicness of emotions (See reviews: Kreibig, 2010; Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011). 
However, this debate, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Rockstroh, 2006). This is possibly because positive information is more in line with one’s 
self-image or how an individual would describe themselves when compared to negative 
information (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Mezulis, Abramson, 
Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Taylor, 1991). However, negative information remains salient and 
can still be favoured over positive information when positive and negative information 
are equally related to the self (Herbert, Pauli, & Herbert, 2010). This link between emotions 
and self-related information will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.    
 In short, in this thesis the emotional valence of presented stimuli will be used to 
explore the effect on attention and subsequent memory of these stimuli. The stimuli used 
in this thesis are words (nouns or traits) that have a positive or negative valence with high 
arousal levels to maximise the influence of each emotion. This will allow a comparison of 
positive or negative valence words with neutral stimuli, which are stimuli that fall between 
positive and negative valence and have low arousal levels.  
 The next part of this chapter will review existing relevant research on emotion and 
the self. As will be discussed in the subsequent two sections, emotional and self-related 
information can attract attention and influence memory. However, depending on the 
situation, the influence of emotion and self-relatedness might not be beneficial per se 
(Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Mather & Sutherland, 2011). Because of the importance of the 
concept of attention to this thesis, the next section will explore this concept. This is 
followed by linking self-relevant information processing to attention and how emotion 
can impact this process. After the section on attention, the subsequent section explains 
how (emotional) self-relevant information impacts memory.  
Attention 
 Humans perceive their surroundings using their senses. However, in most cases 
there is too much information coming from the different sensory apparatus of the brain 
for the brain to process all at once. For example, in an experiment using guinea pigs and 
naturalistic images, researchers found that the amount of visual information sent by the 
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retina is estimated to be around 875,000 bits per second (Koch et al., 2006), which when 
translated to humans roughly equals 10 million bits per second. Consequently, the brain 
needs to be selective in processing only a subset of the information that the senses are 
receiving  (Neisser, 1976; Vuilleumier, 2005). In cognitive psychology, this process of 
selectivity is referred to as attention3 (Sperling, 1960; Von Wright, 1968). One 
phenomenon which attests to the selectivity of attention is inattentional blindness (Mack 
& Rock, 1998). The inattentional blindness paradigm presents observers with an 
unexpected stimulus under conditions in which they are performing a difficult visual 
tracking task. The primary finding is that when required to perform the tracking task, 
observers typically fail to consciously register the unexpected object that would otherwise 
to be easily perceived.  
One of the most ubiquitous  examples of inattentional blindness is the ‘invisible gorilla’ 
experiment (Simons & Chabris, 1999). In its typical setup participants look at a video of 
individuals from two distinct groups passing a ball around. The participants are told to 
count the number of times a player from a specific team (identified by wearing white or 
black shirts) passes the ball. However, at some point a man in a gorilla suit walks through 
the scene. Interestingly, 50% of the participants do not report seeing a gorilla, those 
tracking the players wearing white shirts are least likely to see it. As the gorilla is 
unexpected and not relevant to one’s current goal, people tend not to consciously 
perceive the gorilla. In other words, since the participants’ attention was fixed on counting 
the number of passes, events outside their focus of attention did not get detected, 
despite being very obvious. Those observers tracking the white shirts seem particularly 
to miss the gorilla because they are selectively prioritising things on screen which are a 
different colour to the gorilla. Therefore, attention is one way to select a subset from a 
wealth of information available to an individual, and information that is not attended to 
is less likely to be noticed. Directing our attention depends on the saliency of information. 
Briefly put, this selection of information by the brain is determined by the inherent 
                                              
3 An extensive review of attention is beyond the scope of this thesis. Please refer to the reviews of Driver 
(2001); Pashler and Sutherland (1998); and Yantis (2000) for a more in depth discussion on attention. 
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salience of an event (Gibson, 1966) or through existing knowledge (Bruner, 1957; Gregory, 
1970). This distinction between the stimulus or data-driven control of attention and goal-
directed control of attention is respectively referred to as bottom-up and top-down 
processing. Via attention an individual can focus on one event whilst ignoring others, 
filtering out unimportant information that is not relevant to one’s current goal.   
With bottom-up processing is meant that a stimuli can be prioritised attentionally 
regardless of the current goals or intent of the individual. This can be true for stimuli 
containing unexpected or abrupt movement. However, as soon as one is searching for a 
specific target then the process is no longer purely bottom-up, and is arguably driven by 
the goals of the individual. This top-down process suggests that selection of stimuli is 
dependent on the current goals of the individual and is called the contingent capture 
hypothesis (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994). In the 
now classic spatial cueing paradigm, Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) showed a cue 
which is directly followed by a target on four potential target locations (valid 25%). If the 
target was defined with a specifc caracteristic (e.g. look for a red dot), and a cue was 
defined by the same characteristics, particpants would respond faster on valid trials (i.e. 
the cue appeared in the same location as the target). There would be no difference 
between valid and invalid trials if the cue was not defined by the same characteristing as 
the target. These results showed that a top-down process influenced the allocation of 
attention . In this paradigm participants would prioritise the characteristics of the target 
and the attention is therefore directed to any stimuli that matched that characteristic (e.g. 
cue defined with red dots and a red dot as a target). Stimuli that do not share the specific 
characteristic of the target would then be ignored (e.g. cue defined with a shape, and a 
a red dot). In other words, the goal of the particpants (e.g. find the red dot) influenced 
the allocation of attention. Although this research shows that attention is not purely a 
bottom-up process, neither is it a purely top-down process as very salient stimuli will 
attract the attention regardless of one’s will (Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010; 
Theeuwes, Olivers, & Belopolsky, 2010). Previous research has provided two separate 
neural networks related to top-down and bottom-up attentional processing (Giesbrecht, 
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Woldorff, Song, & Mangun, 2003; Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 
1999). In their review, Corbetta and Shulman (2002) link a goal-directed system to a 
neural network involving the dorsal parietal cortex (dPC), intraparietal sulcus extending 
dorsomedially to the superior parietal lobule (SPL) and anteriorly to the postcentral 
sulcus) and frontal cortex (frontal eye field), and can be referred to as the dorsal attention 
network (DAN). It is suggested that a right lateralised neural network consisting of the 
temporoparietal and ventral frontal cortex (VFC) is involved in stimulus driven attention.   
Bottom-up and top-down driven processes often interact in directing our 
attention. (Yantis, 2000). For example, studies have found that suddenly appearing stimuli 
capture one’s attention automatically, i.e. bottom-up stimulus-driven direction of 
attention (Folk et al., 1992; Jonides & Yantis, 1988). However, if participants are asked to 
look for a target and that target is reliably cued then a sudden onset of a non-target 
stimulus in the visual field does not automatically attract one’s attention (Yantis & Jonides, 
1990). This suggests that top-down attentional control inhibits the bottom-up capture of 
attention that would otherwise occur. Rarely in cognitive psychology is the participant 
not given some form of ‘top-down’ task instructions. These instructions will always 
influence the way attention is allocated to the task. Similarly, the stimuli themselves will 
always have attention-grabbing properties which direct attention in a bottom-up 
manner. For instance the onset of a word or any other kind of object will tend to grab 
attention in an involuntary manner. Therefore no study is ever entirely free from bottom-
up or top-down attentional processes. The (bottom-up) salience of stimuli is often 
influenced by their behaviour relevance as defined in the given task (e.g. street signs for 
a lost person) and some forms of contingency can be a permanent aspect of attention 
processes due to genetics (e.g. spiders) and learning (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). This 
means that the salience of an object can be increased via a top-down process outside 
the awareness of the observer. It is for this reason that there is some overlap in the 
underlying neuro mechanisms between top-down and bottom-up processing. Research 
suggests that the lateral intraparietal cortex and the frontal eye field are involved in both 
top-down and bottom-up information processing (Bichot & Schall, 1999; Wolfe, 1994). 
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Naturally, some sensory information is very salient regardless of current behavioural 
relevance and will automatically attract attention (e.g. sudden movement). By directing 
one's attention to suddenly new behaviour-relevant information, one becomes aware of 
important information outside one’s current attentional focus.  Corbetta and Shulman 
(2002) link specifically the right lateralised temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the ventral 
frontal cortex (VFC) to the disengagement and subsequent reorienting of attentional 
focus from current to new highly relevant information. In this scenario, the TPJ and VFC 
are seen as a “circuit-breaker” that interrupts ongoing attentional focus. 
 Focussing one’s attention is the most efficient way of ensuring that what is 
focussed on remains in our consciousness so that we can mentally process the 
information. It also allows us to block competing signals and prevents us getting 
distracted by minor occurrences (e.g. distracting bottom-up noise). As with the invisible 
gorilla example, it is not guaranteed that other events will not automatically attract your 
attention (after all, 50% of the participants do notice the gorilla). It is important to remain 
aware of our surroundings and potential opportunities and threats therein.  
Self-relevance and attention 
Arguably, one way that the brain might use to prioritise visual information is in 
terms of self-relevance. It seems to make logical sense that information related to the self 
would be more important than information that is not self-associated. Therefore the brain 
may have an intrinsic tendency to preferentially select self-relevant information over 
other kinds of information when they are presented in competition. Indeed, there is some 
experimental data to support this. For example, when looking for a specific face, people 
are much faster in detecting the target face if that face is their face, or reject their face as 
not being the target (Tong & Nakayama, 1999).  Furthermore, research has shown that 
one’s name has a lower threshold for recognition and is, therefore, more salient (Moray, 
1959; Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997; Treisman, 1960). Naturally, self-relevant 
information extends beyond one’s name and face, as any item that is important to the 
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self is self-relevant. For example, the work of Treisman and Gelade (1980) has been highly 
influential in shaping the research interests of the author of this thesis, and whenever the 
name Treisman appears on a list his attention is automatically directed to it (i.e. it pops-
out), even when not actively searching for it. In other words, self-relevant information 
easily grabs our attention. As this anecdote illustrates, it seems a person can potentially 
learn and form associations between items and the self. This will be the main focus in the 
next few paragraphs as the influence of self-related information on attention will be 
discussed in more detail, using relevant literature.  
 The self-priority effect occurs when self-relevant information draws our attention 
over other potentially competing information. In this thesis, the term self-priority is used 
when describing the prioritisation of self-related information over other information for 
attentional processes. When studying the self-priority effect, self-relevant stimuli are 
needed. Most studies research the self-priority effect using highly familiar stimuli, such as 
names and faces (Alexopoulos, Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 2012; Cherry, 1953; Shapiro et 
al., 1997; Tong & Nakayama, 1999) since our names and faces are highly self-relevant 
stimuli.  
Your name is a highly familiar and self-relevant type of stimulus which can be hard to 
ignore (Moray, 1959; Wood & Cowan, 1995). In an article revisiting the well-known 
cocktail-party effect (Cherry, 1953), A. R. A. Conway, Cowan, and Bunting (2001) applied 
a dichotomous listening task where participants had to listen and repeat the information 
presented in one ear while ignoring the information presented to the other ear. The 
participant’s name was inserted into the message presented to the irrelevant ear. 
Interestingly, A. R. A. Conway et al. (2001) also measured the working memory capabilities 
of the participants. The results showed that participants with a lower working memory 
capacity were less able to ignore one’s own name when presented in the irrelevant ear, 
whereas participants with higher working memory capabilities were better able to inhibit 
the distracting information presented in the irrelevant ear.  
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 Besides names, one’s face is also highly familiar.  In a study on self-relevance and 
faces by Keyes and Brady (2010) participants were presented in their left or right (or both) 
visual field with faces of either themselves, a friend or a stranger. Furthermore, half of the 
faces were inverted. The participants were asked to judge as quickly and as accurately as 
possible, which of the three faces were present (self, friend, or stranger). Their results 
suggest that there is an advantage for one’s face compared to the face of a stranger or 
a friend, even if the faces are inverted. The familiarity of the faces lead to a more ‘robust’ 
representation of one’s face. This, in turn, enabled faster responses to one’s face 
compared to the faces of a friend or stranger, especially if the faces were inverted. 
 Another study using faces as stimuli found that one’s face is difficult to ignore 
(Brédart et al., 2006). In this experiment, participants had to decide as quickly as possible 
if the name shown on screen was their own or a classmate’s. At the same time, a face 
would flank the name and would either be congruent with the name or not. The faces 
could be the participant’s face, a classmate’s face, or a professor’s face from their course. 
The results showed that participants did respond slower for incongruent trials when the 
participant’s face flanked a name. The authors give two main possible explanations: first, 
your face is very emotionally important and previous research has linked strong 
emotional reactions when looking at one’s face (Brédart et al., 2006; McNeill, 2000); 
second, like the study by Keyes and Brady (2010), the authors believe that the familiarity 
of your face leads to a robust visual representation that quickly grasps the attention.  
 In a more recent series of experiments, Alexopoulos, Muller, Ric, and Marendaz 
(2012) investigated the effect of the self-relevance of names by looking at automatic 
attentional capture using a peripheral cueing task. In their first experiment, the authors 
briefly presented an orientating cue, which was followed by a target. This cue can be 
valid and correctly precede the target on the target’s location, or the cue is invalid and 
does not correctly predict the location of the target. The target, in this case, was an ‘O’ 
amongst ‘Qs’ in a four-point grid. The cue was the participant’s name; the name of a 
different participant; no cue; or some filler (e.g. a series of Xs) not related to their 
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conditions. The accuracy and reaction time data revealed that the difference between 
valid and invalid trials was greater when the cue was the participant’s name, compared 
to using a different name. In other words, there was a greater cueing effect when using 
one’s name. This could indicate that one’s name is more salient when compared to a 
different name.  
 In their second experiment, using subliminal orientating cues, the authors 
replicated the results from their first experiment. However, in this second experiment, a 
33ms reduction of the orientating cue was applied, which was followed by a mask for 
100ms. The aim was to make it unlikely that participants would be consciously aware of 
the cue. Despite presenting the cues outside of conscious awareness, the results 
replicated the findings of the first experiment (a greater cueing effect of one’s name 
compared to a different name), although for reaction time only. This indicates that self-
relevant information (the participant’s name) not only captures attention but can do so 
automatically, without conscious effort from the participant. It is possible that the high 
familiarity of one’s name is increasing the saliency of the stimulus allowing for faster 
(automatic) processing of the participant’s name, compared to a stranger’s name.  
 However, based on their third experiment, Alexopoulos et al. (2012) offer an 
alternative explanation for their findings. This experiment added a go/no-go element to 
their setup of the second experiment. The number of target locations was halved and 
would now only appear at either the left or right side of the screen. Also, the cue could 
now consist of four possible names: one’s own, a same-sex acquaintance (but not a close 
friend), and two same-sex names (unfamiliar to them) from a predetermined list. 
Participants had to respond as quickly as possible if the target was present (‘O’) and not 
respond if the target was absent.  The results replicate their previous experiments by 
finding a larger cueing effect for one’s name compared to other names, including the 
acquaintance name. However, no significant difference was found between the neutral 
names and the acquaintance names. Therefore the authors cautiously claimed that 
familiarity could not fully explain their findings as they found a larger cueing effect for 
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the participant’s name when compared to the acquaintance’s name. However, it is 
possible that one’s name is still more familiar than an acquaintance’s name. Nonetheless, 
if familiarity is the main factor underlying the observed results, the cueing effect should 
have been significantly different between the acquaintance and neutral names 
conditions.  
Finally, in their fourth experiment, the Alexopoulos et al. (2012) showed that 
attention to one’s name is not only automatic and unconscious but uncontrollable as 
well. For this experiment, they used an anti-saccade task. Participants were now instructed 
to actively inhibit inappropriate responses to the cue (i.e. do not look at the cue), while 
the target would always appear on the opposite side of the cue and consisted of an 
arrowhead pointing to one of four directions (left, right, up, down). Participants had to 
decide as quickly as possible the direction the target was pointing. The results show that 
the participants were less accurate when the cue was their name, showing that attentional 
control to your name is hard to control.   
 As mentioned earlier in this introduction, A. R. A. Conway et al. (2001), found that 
participants with sufficient cognitive resources seemed to be more able to inhibit the 
orienting toward one’s name. Nonetheless, the visual presentation of one’s name in the 
experiment of Alexopoulos et al. (2012) was sufficiently distracting to impact task 
accuracy, which was claimed to be an automatic, and hard to control process. If self-
related stimuli like names are indeed salient enough to grab the attention in a hard to 
control manner automatically, why would sufficient cognitive resources prevent an effect 
of self-relevance?  
The main difference between the two tasks is when attention needs to be applied to 
perform the task correctly. In the dichotomous listening task by A. R. A. Conway et al. 
(2001), attention was always fully on the information presented to the relevant ear 
meaning no switch in attention is required.  Since continuous listening to the correct ear 
is relevant to one’s current goal, the bottom-up interference of your name can be 
inhibited by top-down directed attention to ensure goal achievement. In experiments 
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one to three by Alexopoulos et al. (2012), it was not possible to continuously focus on 
one location. Since the cue is task-relevant, an initial orientation towards the cue is 
expected and followed by an anti-saccade movement to the target. However, it seems 
that switching away from self-relevant information is more delayed when compared to 
switching away from a name which is not relevant to the self. The study by Alexopoulos 
et al. (2012), is very interesting in the sense that it highlights the role of self-relevance 
without using familiarity to explain the effect (albeit with caution). The authors 
summarised the effect as being automatic, or in other words, unintentional, unconscious 
and uncontrollable (Moors & De Houwer, 2006).  
 Most of the literature mentioned thus far discusses the self-prioritising of 
information that potentially is highly familiar (names and faces). This allows for a possible 
confound of familiarity as it is a possibility that the familiarity of the stimuli influences the 
self-priority effect. Some recent work has addressed this potential confound by using a 
paradigm in which self-relevant and irrelevant information can be defined on-line in the 
task itself.  
 Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) used a perceptual matching paradigm which 
linked simple geometric shapes to an arbitrarily assigned label that could either be 
yourself, a familiar other, or an unfamiliar other. In a series of experiments, Sui et al. (2012) 
used reaction times (RTs) and accuracy to measure if there was any self-prioritisation 
when linking the self to a specific geometric shape. In their first experiment, participants 
learned to associate a label (best friend’s name, yourself or stranger) with each shape 
(square, triangle or circle). A small pre-test instructed the participants that: “[best friend’s 
name] is a circle; you are a square; and a stranger is represented by a triangle.” The 
geometric shape was presented above a fixation cross in the middle of the screen, and 
presented underneath the label was the fixation cross. The task was a perceptual 
matching task where participants had to judge as quickly and accurately as possible if the 
label and shape matched with the rule provided in the instructions. For example, in a 
matched trial the participant could be presented with a triangle and the label ‘stranger’ 
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underneath or a square paired with the label ‘yourself’. In this case the participant would 
have to respond with a ‘yes, it matches’ by clicking one of two buttons. In a non-matched 
trial, the label ‘yourself’ could be paired with a circle or triangle. Their results show that 
associating the self to geometric shapes did indeed result in a self-priority effect. 
Specifically, participants were more accurate at responding to trials where the geometric 
shape was paired to the self, compared to trials where the geometric shape was linked 
to a familiar-other and stranger. For RTs they found a difference between self and the 
other labels and between familiar-other and unfamiliar-other. The RTs were faster for 
familiar-other compared to unfamiliar-other, and the RTs for self was faster than both 
familiar- and unfamiliar-other.  
 What is interesting about this study by Sui et al. (2012) is that the familiarity of the 
stimulus is no longer a relevant factor as it was in the studies using names and faces as 
stimuli. The stimulus was a completely arbitrary assignment of self to a particular 
geometric shape. There is no a priori greater familiarity with any one geometric shape 
over any other. The faster responses to the familiar other over unfamiliar other can 
therefore not wholly be explained by familiarity but by self-relevance also. In a series of 
follow-up control experiments, Sui et al. (2012) replicated their findings of a prioritising 
effect of self-related information on attention. The unfamiliar ‘other’ label was replaced 
with the neutral word ‘none’ and the authors replaced for the familiar other label (the 
name of one’s best friend) with the word ‘mother’.  Since the concept of ‘mother’ is, 
presumably for most people, a highly familiar other, the authors were interested to see if 
the self-priority effect would be maintained. Their results revealed that the self and 
familiar other conditions were responded to faster and more accurately than the neutral 
label condition. Despite the highly familiar non-self control label of ‘mother’, the self label 
still led to more accurate and faster responses on the matching task, showing that even 




 Using an adaptation of the paradigm mentioned above, Wang, Humphreys, and 
Sui (2016) investigated the gains and costs in switching from or to self-associations.  For 
example, in one experiment the authors switched the label pairings of self-circle to self-
triangle, friend-square to friend-circle, etc. This means that participants were trained to 
associate specific shapes to self, friend, and stranger labels only to be forced to switch 
and form new associations between specific shapes and self, friend, and stranger labels 
in the second half of the experiment. In the first half of the experiment, the participants 
would learn to associate labels with geometric shapes. However, unlike the earlier 
experiments where participants had to judge if the label-shape pair was correct, the three 
labels appeared underneath the shape at the same time and the participant had to select 
the correct one.  For the second half of the experiment, the label-shape pairing would 
change (the participants were informed of this change), and the paradigm was more akin 
to the original experiment. However, the presentation of the label and shape would not 
be simultaneous. After a fixation cross, the shape would appear, followed by a blank 
screen, then the label, and finally a blank screen again during which participants had to 
judge if the shape-label pairing was correct.  
Like the previous experiments, their results showed an apparent self-priority effect 
for the first half of the experiment. The correct label for the geometric shapes linked to 
the self was selected more often than the geometric shapes linked to a friend or a 
stranger. For the second half of the experiment, the authors found that new self-shape 
associations were forming faster than the new friend- and stranger-shape associations. 
However, on the mismatch trials for the former self-shapes associations, participants 
made more mistakes and were slower in responding. Furthermore, in a correlation 
analysis, the authors discovered that the participants who showed a greater self-priority 
effect for new shape-labels pairs would show a cost in the mismatch trials for the previous 
self-shape association. The authors argued that self-associations could either be a benefit 
or a cost in a task, depending on whether the participants are learning new self-
associations or old ones need to change.   
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This conclusion is consistent with the results from Alexopoulos et al. (2012) 
mentioned earlier: the binding of self is automatic and beyond one’s control. In the study 
by Wang et al. (2016), undoing the binding of a previous self-shape pair was more difficult 
when the instructions changed. Moreover, the authors conclude that self-association 
leads to stronger binding in memory, referring to Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker (1977) who 
showed that self-association enhances the binding of different memory components, 
which can then be retrieved more accurately. This will be further explored later in this 
chapter. 
In several other experiments using variants of the matching paradigm, Sui et al. 
demonstrated both the robustness and ubiquity of the self-priority effect. The authors 
went on to show the self-advantage when the stimuli are degraded (experiment four; Sui 
et al., 2012),  when the size of the shape changes (Sui & Humphreys, 2015a), and when 
self-relevant information is expected or not (Sui et al., 2014). Crucial to the perceptual 
matching paradigm is the use of geometric shapes that are not overly familiar or at least 
the different shapes are equally familiar. However, as Woźniak and Knoblich (2019) 
pointed out, the linking of the self to an arbitrary geometric shape might not be the only 
factor driving the self-priority effect in this paradigm. The labels used (e.g. ‘yourself’, 
‘stranger’) might potentially create a self-priority effect on the matching trials. Like one’s 
name, labels related to the self are known to lead to a self-priority effect (Tacikowski & 
Nowicka, 2010; Zhou et al., 2010). In order to investigate the effect of the labels on the 
self-priority effect, Woźniak and Knoblich (2019) used an adaptation of the perceptual 
matching task by substituting the labels with unfamiliar symbols, and the geometric 
shapes were replaced with unfamiliar faces. This new ‘no-label’ perceptual matching task 
was then compared with the original version. Their results showed a clear self-priority 
effect in both the ‘label’, and for the ‘no-label’ perceptual matching task using unfamiliar 
faces. Furthermore, the strength of the self-priority effect found in the ‘no-label’ 
paradigm correlated with the strength of the self-priority effect of the original ‘label’ 
paradigm. Therefore, the authors concluded that the prioritisation of self-related stimuli 
during the matching trials could not be explained by a self-priority effect driven by the 
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labels. As such, the association of the self to an arbitrary and unfamiliar stimuli is the only 
remaining explanation of the self-priority effect found in the perceptual matching 
paradigm.   
The perceptual matching paradigm, originally developed by Sui et al., (2012), 
produces a robust perceptual self-priority effect. However, this paradigm uses stimuli at 
pre-attended locations. Therefore the role of attention on the self-priority effect (as 
measured by the perceptual matching paradigm) remains unclear.  
A variation of the perceptual matching paradigm was employed by Sui, Liu, 
Mevorach, and Humphreys, (2013). They interpreted their result as suggesting that self-
related information processing is modulated by an attention control network. In this 
experiment, participants were required to select a target amongst distractors. Similar to 
the original perceptual matching paradigm, participants learned to associate self, other, 
and friend to a respective geometric shape. However, in this experiment, participants had 
to respond to local-global shapes. Global-local shapes were first introduced by Navon 
(1977). In this classical paradigm, participants were presented with compound stimuli 
where a large ‘global’ letter was made out of smaller ‘local’ letters. The global and local 
were either the same (e.g. a large ‘E’ made out of smaller ‘Es’), or they would be dissimilar 
(e.g. a large ‘E’ made out of smaller ‘Hs’). Generally the conclusions of this paradigm are: 
there is a global precedence effect where participants identify the global shape faster 
than the local shape; when the global and local shapes are not the same participants 
respond slower, which is called the interference effect; and there is an inter-level 
interference effect as there is a larger interference effect when identifying local shapes 
when compared to global shapes (Gerlach & Poirel, 2018).  
In case of the experiment by Sui, Liu, Mevorach, and Humphreys, (2013),these 
local-global shapes were a combination of two shapes (e.g. small squares forming the 
outline of a circle). One local-global shape was displayed per trial and participants had 
to respond by pressing one of three buttons, indicating which label matched the local-
global shape (e.g. self, other, friend). Participants either had to make a global shape/label 
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judgement or a local shape/label judgement. Furthermore, the shapes could either be 
globally salient or locally salient. A shape was locally salient if the local shapes were 
contrasted with red and white. A shape was globally salient if the local shapes were 
blurred and were the same (red) colour. Their results showed that self-related, salient 
distractors distracted from low salient targets, regardless of whether the target was the 
global shape or the local shapes. For example, a participant could be presented with a 
global square, and the participant had to match the global shape to a label. The local 
shapes would interfere with this process if the local shapes were salient, associated with 
the self, and if the global low salient shape was associated with a distant other. They also 
found increased brain activation when self-related distractors were combined with a non-
self targets, related to top-down suppressive control via the left intraparietal sulcus. Based 
on these results, the authors conclude that self-related information can actively alter 
attention by modulating the saliency of stimuli.   
Humphreys and Sui (2016) proposed the self attention network (SAN) in an 
attempt to explain how the neural mechanisms involved in self-prioritising stimuli and 
attention interact. In this network the authors link the vmPFC to self-related processing 
together with the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (LpSTS), where the vmPFC 
provides top-down modulation to the LpSTS and can work independently from the 
attention network. In this view, irrelevant self-related information needs to be actively 
suppressed by the attention network (Sui et al., 2013). The ignoring of a high salient 
distractor over a lower salient target has been linked to the IPS (Mevorach, Hodsoll, Allen, 
Shalev, & Humphreys, 2010) which, as previously mentioned, is part of the attentional 
network. Using the vmPFC as the mechanism that prioritises self-relevant information, 
the SAN uses a separate self-mechanism distinct from the typical attention network. The 
vmPFC top-down modulation primes the attention network via the LpSTS to respond 
quicker to self-related stimuli.  
Humphreys and Sui (2016) showed that it is possible that self-related responses 
are made without involving the attentional network, but the attentional network would 
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be needed for more complex situations. Their research has shown that damage to the 
LpSTS results in a hyper-self-bias, which is possibly due to a lost capacity to sufficiently 
judge complex potential self-related information, whereas strong self-related responses 
remain unimpaired. Furthermore, the authors assume that due to the connection 
between the vmPFC and LpSTS, the vmPFC must receive input from the sensory areas 
earlier than the visual associative areas.  Although, there is some evidence suggesting 
that self-modulation takes place at later, e.g. response selection or memory encoding, 
stages (Stein, Siebold, & van Zoest, 2016). The SAN consists of three major parts: 1) the 
attention network, seen as a general top-down control, with a focus on IPS and the dorso 
lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC); 2) self-representations via the vmPFC; and 3) Bottom-up 
communication via the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS).  
In the model, the network is proposed to revolve around the interactions between 
a general-purpose top-down attentional control, a self-representation network, and a 
bottom-up orienting function which together guide our behaviour towards self-related 
information.  The self-representation modulates top-down attentional processes towards 
self-relevant information. Bottom-up information directly orientates attention towards 
self-relevant information but can be inhibited by top-down attentional control. For 
example, the self-representation network can prime the bottom-up orientating function 
to be sensitive to self-related information. Humphreys and Sui (2016) give the example 
of the perceptual matching task where participants link a specific colour to the self. In this 
case, the self-related colour is primed in the bottom-up orienting function by the self-
representation network, resulting in the faster detection and processing of the self-
relevant colour. Furthermore, the top-down attentional control can similarly modulate 
the self-representation network. This creates a loop which results in further attentional 





Other studies have found other brain areas involved in processing self-relevant 
information. Most notably the perigenual anterior cingulate (pACC) for the self and the 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the precuneus (PC) for distant other related 
information (Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Fox, Bzdok, Murray, Debban, & 
Eickhoff, 2014). These studies do however look at higher levels of self which are more in 
line with the conceptual self, which involves more complex processing such as 
                                                                    The solid arrows show excitatory connections and 
the dotted arrows show inhibitory connections. This network displays a top-down attentional 
network and a bottom-up network sensitive to self-related information. The self-
representational network is involved with self-related information, and the excitatory 
connection between the bottom-up orientating function helps prime self-related information, 
which generates the self-priority effect in attention (adapted from Humphreys & Sui 2016).  
Figure 1. The Self Attention network (SAN).
Figure 1 has been removed from this 
thesis due to copyright restrictions
 
26 
psychological representations of the self and is more linked to social cognitive processing 
(M. A. Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). 
The preceding paragraphs have illustrated how attentional processes have been 
claimed to be influenced by self-related information, resulting in a self-priority effect. 
From the above, it can be determined that most items are not inherently important to 
the self, but through experience will be. Even a randomly assigned colour shows that 
something that starts without any inherent importance to the self becomes part of the 
self via a simple instruction. As part of the self, the colour becomes salient enough to 
draw our attention automatically.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, self-related information is expected 
to involve emotion. Indeed, some research attempts to explain the prioritising effects of 
the self purely in terms of emotional processing (Brédart et al., 2006; McNeill, 2000). 
Certainly, emotion does influence attention; there is evidence going back at least as far 
as the 1940s demonstrating this (Bruner & Postman, 1947), and more recent work has 
described numerous conditions under which emotion and attention interact (Mather & 
Sutherland, 2011; Vuilleumier, 2005). However, emotion and self-relevant information 
processing are two separate processes. Therefore, in the subsequent paragraphs about 
attention, the influence of emotion and attention will be reviewed, and how this is linked 
to the self.  
Emotional information and attention 
Besides the self, one of the other ways to select information is the emotional value 
of an event or item. Manipulation of emotional valence is known to affect the saliency of 
information (Neisser, 1976; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Reinecke et al., 2006; Sperling, 
1960; Von Wright, 1968; Vuilleumier, 2005). The automatic capture of attention by 
increasing the salience of information through fear-eliciting stimuli is an example of how 
bottom-up information can direct and influence our attention. The next few paragraphs 
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will focus on the effects of emotional information on attention, and this section on 
attention will end with linking emotion and self together. 
Phelps, Ling, and Carrasco (2006) demonstrated the pervasiveness of emotional 
information on perception. They showed that, in addition to the attentional aspects, 
emotion could alter the perception of a stimulus. Participants were presented with either 
neutral or fearful faces using a discrimination paradigm. After a blank inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI), four Gabor stimuli were displayed, and the contrast of these Gabor patches 
was manipulated. One of these Gabor stimuli was a tilted target, and the other three were 
distractors. The participants had to report the orientation of the Gabor target. Their 
results showed that if the Gabor patches were preceded by a fearful face, the participant’s 
sensitivity to contrast -as measured by the Gabor discrimination task- increased when 
compared with neutral trials. This result indicates that emotion can alter the way the 
stimuli are perceived. In a follow-up experiment, Phelps et al. (2006)  used mostly the 
same experimental setup, but with a few crucial changes. Instead of presenting the 
neutral or fearful faces in the centre, the faces were additionally displayed in the 
periphery, preceding the target location (or on all four Gabor stimuli locations as a 
baseline condition), and drawing the attention to the location of the target Gabor stimuli. 
As expected, the mere presentation of any stimuli near the target location increased 
contrast sensitivity, but more so for the fearful faces than the neutral faces. Furthermore, 
fearful faces increased contrast sensitivity regardless of location, but if the fearful face 
preceded the target location the contrast sensitivity increased even further, i.e. location 
and emotion increased contrast sensitivity separately, but this effect was greater when 
both coincided. Therefore, emotion not only influences early visual perception, it affects 
attention also. This is because the elicited transient attention with a fearful face (cue) 
increased contrast sensitivity more than when fearful faces were displayed on all four 
locations.  
 This role of emotion on attention is demonstrated further by the emotional Stroop 
task (Ray, 1979; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; 
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Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). A classical and often used technique in attention 
research is the well-known Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). With this task participants are 
traditionally shown different words, of which the font-colour would vary. The task of 
participants is to say the colour of the ink aloud. Research found that participants are 
slower to report the ink colour aloud (as shown by an increase in reaction time) when the 
meaning of the actual word would describe a different colour. For example, saying the 
colour ‘red’ when you see the word ‘Car’ is less effortful than naming the green ink-colour 
of the word ‘Red’. The reason for this is an interference of the semantic meaning of the 
word which clashes with the naming of the ink-colour. This clash is most likely caused by 
parallel processing of the relevant ink-colour and irrelevant semantic meaning of the 
word (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935).  
In the emotional variation of the classical Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the 
participant still has to name the ink colour of the word. However, instead of using words 
incongruent to the ink-colour (e.g. ‘green’ in a red ink-colour), emotional words were 
used. Like the mismatch between word meaning and ink-colour, negative words often 
lead to delayed reaction times compared to positive or neutral words. This is often 
explained as an attentional bias towards negative (threatening) words, and this 
attentional bias enables better detection of potentially threatening stimuli. This focus on 
the emotional meaning of the words reduces available resources needed to identify the 
colour (Wells & Matthews, 1996; Williams, Mathews, et al., 1996).  
The comparison made in an emotional Stroop task is different from a traditional 
Stroop task since there is no conflict in the semantic meaning of a word and the naming 
of the colour font. The font colour of ‘purple’, does not conflict with the word ‘table’ and 
this is the same for neutral or negative words (e.g. ‘Table’ versus ‘Plague’). This difference 
means that the effects found with the emotional Stroop task are potentially not related 
to selective attention as measured by the original Stroop task. The effect found could 
reflect a more threat-driven automatic slow-down of active processes as a result of a 
defence mechanism that responds to threatening stimuli. This is in contrast to the 
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assumed post-attentive process underlying the traditional Stroop effect (Algom, Chajut, 
& Lev, 2004; Öhman et al., 2001). Although in both paradigms it is the automatic process 
of reading the words which cause the slowing down of the colour naming and there has 
been some evidence to suggest the emotional words are even more automatically 
processed and more easily interrupts other ongoing activities (McKenna & Sharma, 1995).  
Emotional Stroop effects are a clear indication that emotion has an impact on our 
cognitive processes. It shows that, at least for negative information, an automatic and 
uncontrollable influence of emotion draws our attention towards goal-irrelevant 
information and disrupts, or conflicts with, ongoing attentional processes. However, as 
the next paragraph will show, this influence over our attention processes is not a negative 
relation per se.  
The influence of emotion on attention was also demonstrated by Öhman, Flykt, 
and Esteves (2001). With a range of experiments, the effect of fear-relevant versus fear 
irrelevant search task with distracters was investigated. The authors found that indeed 
people direct their attention towards threatening stimuli and that if the target was a 
fearful stimulus, it was found quickly regardless of location. Furthermore, an increase of 
distractors did not influence threatening stimuli but did increase the detection time for 
non-threatening stimuli. Their results suggest that threatening stimuli were found faster 
regardless of one’s goal because threatening stimuli enjoy a default evolutionary goal-
relevance for fear-relevant stimuli, as such fearful stimuli like snakes and spiders would 
automatically become goal relevant (Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
Based on the above paragraphs on emotion and the self, it is clear that both 
potentially influence our attention. However, it is possible that emotion might interact 
with self-related information in different ways depending on the valence. For example, 
some evidence has suggested that positive emotions can widen visual attention, whereas 
negative emotion does not (Fredrickson, 1998; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006).  This 
broadening of attention appears to facilitate the detection of self-relevant information, as 
found by Grol, Koster, Bruyneel, and De Raedt (2014). In this experiment, the participant 
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had to detect a target presented in the periphery while observing a label in the centre of 
the screen. The label could either be ‘ME’ or ‘LR’. The word ‘Me’ referred to the participant 
and ‘LR’ referred to the initials of an unknown stranger. Interestingly, no effect of self was 
found in this experiment. However, in their second experiment a positive mood was 
induced by having the participant vividly recall a positive memory.  This induction of a 
positive mood resulted in attentional broadening as expected, but this broadening was 
greater for the self-related information when compared to information related to a 
stranger. 
 It appears that positive mood increased the likelihood of detecting a self-relevant 
label. It has been documented that people tend to attribute positive events to themselves 
and negative events to something or someone else (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & 
Crocker, 1993; Taylor, 1991). For example, Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, and Hankin (2004) 
conclude in an extensive meta-analysis that individuals link success to their characteristics 
but failure as unrelated to their characteristics. Emotions seem to have strong 
connections with the self, as individuals tend to describe themselves in positive traits 
(Alicke, 1985), even to the point of nullifying the self-priority effect in face recognition 
when asked if a negative trait describes the participant (Ma & Han, 2010). 
 However, several studies have shown that emotion alone does not explain the 
attentional advantage for self-related stimuli (Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon, & Schacter, 
2007; Leshikar, Dulas, & Duarte, 2015; Stolte, Humphreys, Yankouskaya, & Sui, 2016). For 
example, in the study by Stolte et al. (2016) the perceptual matching task of Sui et al. 
(2012) was used to see if there was a relationship between the self-bias and the positive 
emotion bias. First, the authors used the standard matching task version, as described 
earlier in this text. This is followed by a second matching task where the words “you”, 
“friend”, and “stranger” were replaced by images of happy, neutral and sad faces. The 
standard matching task showed a typical self-priority effect, and the second emotional 
matching task shows an advantage for positive faces. The authors found no correlations 
between the personal label matching and emotional matching tasks despite the 
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similarities between the two tasks. Although emotion and the self are both prioritised,  
the finding of Stolte et al. (2016) suggest that independent processes support the self and 
emotion.   
 So far, in this thesis, the focus has been on attention and how self-related 
information together with emotion influences our attentional processes. As discussed 
above, Self-related and emotional information often leads to improvements in the 
detection of relevant information (especially when relevant to our goals) and allows 
individuals to faster process information from our surroundings from which there are 
many competing signals. This increase in attention of emotion and self-relevant 
information carries beyond our initial detection and processing of that information. 
Information that is attended to more tends to be memorised better, compared to 
information that is attended to less (Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984; Craik, 
Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996).   
Memory 
 A further question concerns the role of any putative effects of self and emotion 
on episodic memory. In the previous sections, the importance of the self in directing our 
attention was discussed. As was alluded to by Wang et al. (2016), information related to 
the self does not only draw our attention; it influences our memories also (Rogers et al., 
1977). In the simplest term, memory is the consequence of learning which is stored in the 
brain for potential later retrieval. This term does, however, require some further 
elaboration, as not everything is learned at the same pace, and similar events are not 
remembered equally (Cowan, 1988).  
Evidence has shown that memory is not a unitary entity. Rather it is fractionated 
into several different processes. A typical distinction is usually between short-
term/working memory (STM)  and long-term memory (LTM) (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; 
Waugh & Norman, 1965). The differences between these two are mainly defined in terms 
of capacity limits and time course. Short-term memory and working memory are often 
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used interchangeably in the literature, but it is generally agreed that STM is the temporary 
storage of incoming information (up to a few minutes). The concept of working memory 
emphasises the active nature of STM processes in terms of the maintenance and 
manipulation of encoded information over short periods, and the role of STM processes 
in the retrieval of information from long-term memory (Baddeley, Hitch, & Bower, 1974). 
 Long-term memories are memories that are retained for longer than a few 
minutes, up to a lifetime. There are two distinct versions of long-term memory: declarative 
and non-declarative memory (Tulving, 1985). Non-declarative memory is often implicit, in 
the sense that people are not consciously aware of the memories. These memories 
contain skills, habits, and conditioned responses. Nevertheless, in specific cases, we can 
make ourselves aware of the memories. 
 Declarative memories contain knowledge of events and facts. These are referred 
to as episodic memory and semantic memory, respectively (Tulving, 1983). Declarative 
memories are more explicit than non-declarative memories. Semantic memory is general 
knowledge about the world and objects. For example, semantic memory is the memory 
of what a house is what parts of the house are called, and the purpose of a house. 
Episodic memory contains events related to ourselves, e.g. you know how you felt when 
you bought a house and when you first moved in4. When discussing memory in this 
thesis, it generally refers to declarative memory.  
 However, how are these memories created, and how are they connected in 
declarative memory? The example above shows that semantic knowledge can be 
connected with episodic memory to create meaningful events from a specific time.  In 
semantic memory, an item, like a chair, is represented by the concept of a chair. 
Furthermore, linked to the concept of a chair is knowledge of its different parts. Each of 
these parts exists independently, like the concept of a chair, but are also bound together 
in memory. Binding in memory helps recall by grouping individual features that belong 
                                              
4 For a more detailed review of the memory systems in the brain see Squire (2004). 
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together (Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; M. K. Johnson, 1996; Opitz, 2010).  This is not limited 
to the perceptual qualities of the concept ‘chair’, but concepts about its use would be 
bounded to it as well, and other objects closely associated with a chair. Whenever you 
try to memorise the word chair, each of the bindings connected to the concept of ‘chair’ 
will be strengthened. The more bindings and the stronger these bindings are, the 
stronger the memory of a concept becomes, and this, in turn, facilitates later retrieval.  In 
episodic memory, a chair is still a chair. Furthermore, the bits of information representing 
the concept of ‘chair’ now has bindings with yourself like ‘your favourite chair’. Linked to 
your favourite chair are memories of events such as buying the chair and of sitting on 
the chair reading an engaging book. Other more abstract examples are the memories of 
‘home’ which is a concept that is slightly different for everybody. A house is not a home, 
but the concept of ‘home’ is bound with a specific house, family members, and events 
occurring there. This idea of binding into memory is essential in this writing. This thesis 
revolves around the suggestion that situations involving the self and emotions can affect 
the strength of the bindings between different pieces of information. Naturally, this 
binding into memory is facilitated via underlying neurophysiological processes.  
To-be-remembered information needs to be first encoded. Generally, incoming 
information needs to be interpreted so that an internal representation can be 
constructed, using already existing knowledge. This is then followed by the binding of the 
internal representation into a lasting trace, which, when retrieved, leads to the 
recollection of the original event (Tulving, 1983). According to Paller and Wagner (2002), 
these two processes are linked to prefrontal plus posterior cortex (PFC), and medial 
temporal lobe (MTL), respectively. Exactly which regions of the prefrontal cortex are 
involved in encoding is dependent on the type of the to-be-remembered information 
and depth of processing (Otten & Rugg, 2001).  
Any memory will have different multiple internal representations making up the 
full event. It is thought that the MTL structures the hippocampus, perirhinal, entorhinal, 
and parahippocampal cortices are involved in linking these multiple internal 
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representations together in a single coherent event (Squire, 1992). The regions involved 
in encoding are also involved in retrieving information from memory (Moscovitch et al., 
2005; Petrides, 2005). Since the MTL is suggested to have a role in linking multiple internal 
representations into a whole and, the PFC as a stimulus and task-specific control, it makes 
sense that these regions are needed for the reverse process as well. Also involved in 
memory retrieval is the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & 
Buckner, 2005). Specifically, Ciaramelli, Grady, and Moscovitch, (2008) report that 
retrieval success is correlated to the left side the SPL along the IPS (mostly lateralised to 
the left side), and part of the IPL  adjacent to the TPJ. These results lead the authors to 
postulate that the IPL and SPL have a similar role in both attention and memory retrieval, 
which is the top-down and bottom-up attention to memory, respectively. That being 
said, there is evidence that within the PPC attention and episodic memory are 
anatomically separate and possibly interact competitively (Capotosto et al., 2016).  
Sestieri, Shulman, & Corbetta (2017) therefore introduce a functional anatomical 
model of the PPC wherein perceptual attention and episodic memory are mostly 
supported by different mechanisms in what the authors describe as a “push-pull” 
relationship. Naturally, attention and episodic memory can both simultaneously be active 
when information from memory is used in perception. This model contains brain areas 
used in: perceptual attention from the dorsal attention network (mainly posterior IPS and 
SPL as mentioned earlier) providing top-down modulations; Angular gyrus (AG, which 
holds the details of retrieved information from memory); the frontoparietal control 
network (FPCN) (including the lateral IPS and postcentral sulcus (PoCS)); and the MTL 
regions which is co-activated with the memory retrieval regions and is, as mentioned, 
involved in encoding consolidating multiple internal representations of an event and its 
early retrieval.  
Influencing all of this via top-down modulation is the cingulo-opercular network 
(CON, consisting of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), pre-supplementary 
motor area (preSMA), the anterior insula (aINS), and the frontal operculum (fO)). The 
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CON is mostly associated with task control, arousal, or sustained attention (Sestieri et al., 
2017). The AG (retrieval) and the regions in the DAN (perceptual attention) cause mutual 
suppression or are top-down modulated by the CON (i.e. push-pull, Sestieri, Shulman, & 
Corbetta, 2010). Recollection seems to be supported by the AG, whereas familiarity is 
supported by the lateral IPS (J. D. Johnson, Suzuki, & Rugg, 2013; Wheeler & Buckner, 
2004).  
In summary, three networks of the parietal lobe are involved in memory retrieval 
and attention: DAN, FPCN, and the AG. Together with the PFC and the MTL these regions 
are involved in the attending to, encoding, consolidating, and retrieving of information. 
Since emotional self-relevant information influences attention and memory, these neural 
networks could be differentially engaged when processing self-relevant information.  
Self-relevance and memory 
Just as one cannot attend to everything, not all attended information can be 
remembered, there are cognitive capacity limits which prevent this (Cowan, 1988). 
Therefore the more important or salient the event, the more likely one is to remember it. 
If self and emotion can modulate attention, then it is not unreasonable to assume that 
they could also modulate episodic memory. This is particularly the case given the 
established links between memory encoding and attention (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; 
Baddeley et al., 1984; Cowan, 1998; Craik et al., 1996). 
Turk et al. (2013) used a divided-attention paradigm to look at this issue. In a 
computer, task participants were instructed that an item belonged to either themselves 
or a fictional other. A colour would indicate which, and depending on the colour the 
participant had to put the item in their basket or the basket of the fictional other. 
Furthermore, a number was simultaneously displayed underneath each item, and after 
six items, the participant had a question which could be related to the preceding six 
numbers. In the divided-attention condition, participants had to remember all six 
numbers shown with the items, whereas for the full attention condition participants were 
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asked to copy an arbitrary number presented on the screen after the six items.  Their 
results showed a memory advantage for the self-owned items in the full attention task, 
and no such benefit was found in the divided attention task. Turk et al. (2013)  interpreted 
these results to indicate that attention is required for detecting any benefit of self on 
memory, viewing self-relevant information processing as attentionally demanding, 
allowing for richer encoding which in turn allows for better recall.  
There is indeed evidence suggesting that self-relevant information tends to be 
more salient and is remembered easier than information that has no self-relevance 
(Symons & Johnson, 1997).  As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the name Treisman always 
catches the attention of this thesis’ author. Along with capturing attention, a multitude of 
memories is also recalled. In this case, it is a memory of the first cognitive psychology 
experiment performed as an undergraduate, which was a feature integration experiment. 
Even though the exact details of this memory are vague, it is followed by a string of 
related memories all bound together by the attention drawing a self-relevant name. The 
next few sections will build on the example illustrated above and will focus on a scientific 
review on the influence of self-related information on declarative memory.  
Often the effect of the self on memory is studied by comparing the effect of self- 
versus other-reference encoding or self-reference versus semantic encoding. The 
frequently found superior memory for items related to the self is called the self-reference 
effect (Rogers et al., 1977)5. In this thesis, a beneficial effect of self-related information 
during encoding or recall is referred to a self-reference effect. For example, in a self-
reference versus other reference memory experiment, participants could be asked in the 
encoding phase if a trait word (e.g. ‘friendly’) describes themselves,  a highly familiar other 
(like a friend or mother), or a distant other (often a well-known stranger, e.g. Donald 
Trump). In a self-reference versus semantic memory experiment, there would still be a 
                                              
5  See Symons and Johnson (1997) for an extensive review on the self-reference effect. 
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self-reference effect, but it would be compared with semantic processing (e.g.  “Does 
‘friendly’ mean the same as ‘sincere’?”).  
One of the first studies to look at the self-reference effect is the study of Rogers 
et al. (1977). In this study, a depth of processing paradigm was adapted to include a self-
reference judgement. Typically in depth of processing paradigms, two conditions are 
compared that are thought to differ in depth of processing, which then leads to a 
measurable difference in during encoding (e.g. superior recall for semantically processed 
words compared to structurally processed words (Craik & Tulving, 1975)).  Rogers et al. 
(1977) used this approach to add self-referentially processed words by asking the 
participants if the adjectives described them (e.g. “Does the word describe you?”).  The 
researchers found that adjectives that were processed self-referentially were recalled 
more accurately than words that were semantically processed. Since then, the self-
reference effect using this approach has been demonstrated many times (M. A. Conway 
& Dewhurst, 1995; Kelley et al., 2002; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). 
An example of a study on the self-reference effect in memory comes from a study 
consisting of two experiments by Leshikar, Dulas, & Duarte (2015).  This study looked into 
the influence of self-referencing in recollection, using the paradigm based on the findings 
by Rogers et al. (1977). In their first experiment, Leshikar et al. (2015), looked at the effect 
of self-referential processing on both objective (source accuracy) and subjective (estimate 
of recollection) processing. This experiment presented the participants with negative and 
positive adjectives in a study phase which consisted of two conditions: the self condition; 
and the common condition. In the self condition, the participant had to judge if the 
adjective was describing them. In the common condition, the participants had to decide 
if the word was either commonly used or not commonly used. Each study phase was 
immediately followed up by a test phase in the form of a memory recognition task, 
consisting of the adjectives from the study phase plus 96 new adjectives. The test phase 
displayed an adjective. The participants had to decide if the adjective was either 
‘remembered’, ‘know’, or ‘new’ as a subjective measurement. Participants would select 
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‘remember’ is the participants would clearly remember the word, and ‘know’ was chosen 
if there only was a sense of familiarity or vague recognition of the word but no clear 
recollection. Participants would choose ‘new’ if they did not recognise the word at all. 
‘Remember’ generally reflect recollection, whereas ‘know’ reflects a feeling of familiarity 
with the word without recollection (Tulving, 1985). Next, the participants had to choose if 
the adjective was from the ‘self’ condition, the ‘common’ condition, or ‘unknown’ as a 
measurement of source accuracy.  
The results showed that a self-referential effect was present as shown by a higher 
estimate of recollection and source accuracy for the self-referenced adjectives. 
Interestingly the results showed higher source accuracy for negative adjectives for the 
common condition and a higher source accuracy for positive items in the self condition. 
However, no self-reference effect was found for the adjectives rated as ‘know’. The 
authors concluded that this lack of self-reference for ‘know’ items could be because the 
organisational and elaborative processes enriched by the self-reference effect are not 
present. The feeling of familiarity for the words without recognition might not be driven 
by these more elaborative processes that are part of recollection.  
In their second experiment, Leshikar et al. (2015), addressed the type of episodic 
details that are facilitated by self-referential processing by including a memory 
characteristics questionnaire (MCQ). The main setup of the second experiment was 
similar to the first experiment but the adjectives were no longer displayed on the screen 
and were presented in either a female or male voice instead. Like the first experiment, 
there was a self condition and a common condition in the study phase, which was 
followed by a memory recognition test phase. This test was still similar to the first 
experiment. However, after deciding ‘remembered’ or ‘familiar’ for the adjective, the 
MCQ followed. The MCQ consisted of five questions in which the participants had to 
decide if they recollected rich details, few details, or no details for visual details, auditory 
details, feelings, thoughts, and temporal order. For the temporal order question the 
choices were: beginning; middle; and end. After the MCQ, one final question was about 
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source information. Participants decided if the adjective was spoken by a male or female 
voice.  
The results not only replicate most of their findings in the first experiment (the 
self-reference effect most importantly) but, Leshikar et al. (2015) showed that the self-
referenced adjectives resulted in higher remembered details when compared to the 
semantically processed adjectives, indicating that the self-reference effect in memory is 
facilitated via enriched perceptual and internal details. In contrast with the first 
experiment, the second experiment did find a self-reference effect for the words rated as 
‘know’. The authors theorised that the self-reference effect for the ‘know’ words in the 
second experiment was the result of the addition of the MCQ test, which prompted 
participants to retrieve more details of each trial before making their decision. Leshikar 
et al. (2015) conclude that there is no general positivity or negativity effect in memory but 
that the effect of valence is determined by the cognitive task a person performs at a 
specific time.  The authors based this on their findings of an enhanced recollection for 
negative adjectives compared to positive adjectives. However, this was only when items 
were not processed self-referentially. Furthermore, only when items are processed self-
referentially would this results in a positivity effect. 
A different approach to measuring the self-reference effect is to compare self-
judgement to judgements made about a more distant other. Similar to the research by 
Leshikar et al. (2015), a study using a self- other-reference memory paradigm showed a 
self-reference effect as well (Gutchess et al., 2007). The encoding task consisted of a series 
of positive and negative adjectives and the participants were asked to either judge 
whether the word described themselves, a familiar distant other (Albert Einstein), or was 
in uppercase. Via these conditions, the authors could compare deep self- versus other-
reference encoding and shallow upper- lowercase encoding.  For each condition (self, 
other, case) the participant had to make a yes/no judgement (i.e. adjective describes me; 
adjective describes Einstein; adjective is displayed in uppercase). An old/new recognition 
task followed the encoding phase. For the old/new recognition test participants had to 
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judge whether the word shown on screen was presented during the encoding task (old), 
or if the word was not presented before (new). The results supported a self-reference 
effect, as overall more self-related words were recalled. However, there seemed to be an 
effect of emotion as well. In the self condition positive items were recognised more 
frequently than negative items. Interestingly, in the upper-, lowercase condition 
recognition from memory was higher for the negative items.  
In the second experiment of their paper, Gutchess et al. (2007) addressed the 
potential benefit of familiarity by replacing the unfamiliar other (Albert Einstein) with a 
familiar other (a close other of the participant). Participants completed a digit and pattern 
comparison task and were split into a high and low cognitive resource group accordingly. 
The results revealed that when comparing the high and low resources group, the high 
resources group did show a stronger self-reference effect, suggesting that cognitive 
resources are beneficial to self-referencing. Overall, negative items were remembered 
more than the positive items, but unlike the first experiment, emotion did not interact 
with self, other or, case.  
In their final experiment of the paper, Gutchess et al. (2007) manipulated the 
emotional information of their paradigm by replacing the other condition with desirability 
judgements based on the participant’s own experience.  This means that the participants 
still made a self-judgement if the trait described them with a yes/no response, but now 
they also made a judgement if the trait was desirable, and a case judgement as well. The 
main reason for asking for a desirability judgement was that these could contain 
spontaneous self-referencing (i.e. “Do I find this desirable?”), potentially extending to and 
further emphasising the self-reference. The authors found a self-reference effect and a 
better memory performance for the desirability condition compared to the case 
condition. Also, when comparing age differences, the younger group performed better 
in the self and desirable conditions when compared to the older adult group. Gutchess 
et al. (2007) suggest that these findings show that older adults benefit less from self-
referencing when attention is directed to emotional information. The authors conclude 
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that based on their three experiments, the self-reference effect is dependent on the 
availability of cognitive resources and is thus more limited in older adults. Moreover, if 
emotion was responsible for the self-reference effect, then the increased evaluative and 
emotional influence should lead to comparable memory performance between age 
groups.   
In the third experiment mentioned above (Gutchess et al., 2007), the effect of self 
was explored subjectively via desirability judgements, showing that these judgements 
extend to the self-reference effect. In an experiment by Turk, Cunningham, and Macrae 
(2008), self-referenced information did not have to be processed explicitly as self-relevant 
to result in a self-reference effect. This experiment compared an explicit self-referential 
memory task with an implicit self-reference memory task. In both cases a face was 
depicted of either the participant or of a famous individual, pairing each face with an 
adjective, shown either below or above the face. In the explicit condition, the participant 
had to make a typical self-reference response by saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ if the adjective 
described the depicted face. In the implicit condition, the participants had to respond 
with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ depending on if the adjective appeared below or above the face.  This 
task was followed-up by a standard old/new recognition task. In this fashion, no explicit 
self-reverence judgement is made in the implicit condition, whereas a direct comparison 
with the standard explicit self-reference judgement was possible.  
Their results showed a strong self-reference effect in the explicit condition, but 
although the overall score on the old/new task was lower for the implicit condition, a self-
reference effect was still present in this condition. An interaction between the two 
conditions was also found, revealing that the self-reference effect was stronger (i.e. 
greater difference between self and other) in the explicit condition compared to the 
implicit condition. According to Turk et al. (2008), these findings are the result of the 
cognitive system’s necessity to ensure the processing of relevant information as dictated 
by our goals and safety (Bruner & Postman, 1947). Via their research Turk et al. (2008) 
have shown that self-relevant information on its own, without any explicit self-referential 
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processing, is already enough to ensure preferential processing, leading to improved 
encoding into memory. The authors suggest that this preferential treatment of self-
related information could be the result of the positive affect (Alicke, 1985), where positive 
emotional information is associated with the self, and therefore the affective response to 
self-relevant items might impact memory. The authors further suggest that the automatic 
capture of self-related items (as discussed earlier in this thesis) leads to enhanced 
encoding adjectives related to the self. The authors conclude that it is likely the 
combination of the increased attentional capture due to the emotional nature of self-
relevant information. Also interesting here is that the more robust self-reference effect 
for the explicit condition could be explained by the integrative self (Sui & Humphreys, 
2015b, discussed earlier in this thesis). Not only does the more explicit processing of the 
adjectives lead to more enriched encoding (as reflected by overall better performance), 
this would also generate more binding to other self-related information which, in turn, 
facilitates later recall even more.  
A different approach to the often used self versus other or semantic processing 
as described above is via ownership (e.g. the feeling that something belongs to you)6. 
Through ownership, the self extends to what is perceived as ‘owned’ (Belk, 1988, 2013). 
The mere ownership effect reflects this when items arbitrarily associated with the self (i.e. 
owned) are seen as more positive (Belk, 1988) and more valuable (Morewedge & Giblin, 
2015) when compared to the same items not associated with the self. The experiment by 
Turk et al. (2013) on divided-attention mentioned earlier used ‘ownership’ by instructing 
participants that an item belonged to them. Also using this connection between the self 
and ownership, Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae (2008) designed a shopping 
experiment where the participant could “own” items. Also, a confederate (pretending to 
be a participant) was part of the experiment. The confederate could “own” some of the 
6 A detailed discussion of ownership is beyond the aims of this thesis, but ownership can lead to an 
‘immersion’ of self into the perceived owned object or concept creating close associations with the self and 
can even become an extension of the self, see the review of Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks (2003) for more 
detail. 
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items as well. In this way, a self (participant) versus other (confederate) manipulation was 
created. The confederate and participant were seated at a table with two baskets. Both 
were explicitly told that they owned the basket nearest to them. The participants were 
also instructed that they should imagine having won a basket full of items. These items 
were represented by picture cards. The baskets were red or blue which corresponded 
with the picture cards which could be red or blue too. The participant then had to place 
each of their picture cards (which represented an item they owned) in the same coloured 
basket. The participant or confederate was given a card one at the time. They would not 
know which of them would receive a card, but they were shown the card before it was 
handed over. After receiving a card the participant or confederate then put the card in 
the correct basket depending on the colour of the card.  After all the cards were handed 
out and divided over the two baskets, a computer based old/new memory task followed. 
With their experiment, Cunningham et al. (2008) showed that items, perceived as 
belonging to the participant, are more often correctly recognised in the old/new task 
when compared to items that were possessed by the confederate. Moreover, these items 
were also recognised faster. This effect is evident when the participant placed the card in 
their basket and when the confederate placed the card in the participants’ basket.  This 
led the authors to conclude that, despite the temporary and imaginary nature of 
ownership, encoding into memory is affected by enhancing memory for self-related 
owned items. According to the authors, this is likely due to the ecological benefit of 
remembering items that are yours versus those that you do not own.  
A study by by Kim and Johnson (2010) linked the mPFC to self-relevant objects, 
and subsequent memory of those objects.  Their experiment had three distinct phases: 
first participants were shown a picture of an object and had to indicate how much they 
liked the object, and how much people, in general, would like the object; second, after 
the preference rating task the participants were asked to assign pictures of objects to 
either themselves or another person. After each picture was shown, a coloured dot was 
depicted alongside the picture. The colour indicated if the participant had to assign the 
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picture to themselves or to another person; third, the object assignment task was 
followed by a memory task where the participants were again shown a picture, and this 
time they had to indicate if the picture had been assigned to them or another person; 
fourth and final phase was again a preference rating task similar to the first task, to see if 
“owning” an object would change their preference of said object.  
Overall, the findings of Kim and Johnson (2010) show typical mPFC deactivation 
for items not related to the self, i.e. self-related items show more activity in the mPFC 
when compared to distant other but generally did not significantly differ from baseline.  
Participants showed greater mPFC, paracingulate, and frontal pole activation for items 
assigned to themselves. The authors also found greater mPFC activity for items related 
to the self that were accurately recalled. Lastly, the results showed a mere ownership 
effect, meaning that the mere act of assigning items to yourself increases the preference 
for that object. In this study, the mere ownership effect was again linked to greater mPFC 
activity. The authors concluded that self-referential processing is linked to the mPFC.   
However, as mentioned by Turk et al. (2008) in the preceding section, this effect 
might be emotional in nature as the mere exposure effect is driven by a positive bias for 
owned items (Belk, 1988) Emotional processing of self-related information improves 
memory performance (D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2005; Kuiper & Derry, 
1982; Ochsner, 2000; Sedikides & Green, 2000, 2004). This, in turn, prioritised attention 
to self-owned items, which with the extra attention, help encode the items into memory. 
In short, the rich binding between self-relevant information could facilitate memory 
retrieval (Sui & Humphreys, 2015b).  
This rich binding between self-relevant information could refer to the 
interconnectedness of self and memory. This concept was the rationale behind the Self-
memory system (SMS) proposed by Conway & Pleydell-pearce (2000). The self, as 
discussed in the SMS, is arguably a higher order of self when compared to the self 
discussed so far. This self pertains more to the “I” (or Identity) mentioned earlier in this 
introduction, than the “me” (self as an object) which is the main focus of this thesis. 
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However, this research has been fundamental in self-reference research, and self-related 
information is naturally highly dependent on one’s identity in a natural setting. In order 
to explain the SMS, it is essential to introduce and define the concept of autobiographical 
memory.  
Autobiographical memories are specific memories of events, people, and 
semantic facts from a person’s life relevant to themselves and generally consists of three 
levels: lifetime periods (e.g. memories of your time at university, work, or childhood), 
general events (e.g. specific memories when you were playing sports, going out with 
friends), and event-specific knowledge usually recalled via remembering general events 
(e.g. winning first place, or a particular eventful outing with friends). These memories can 
be episodic in nature (e.g. how you felt when you started your first job) or semantic (e.g. 
the name of your first employer), but are always associated with the self (Anderson & 
Conway, 1993; Brown, Shevell, & Rips, 1986; Conway, 1992; Conway & Bekerian, 1987). 
 A second assumed component of the SMS is the ‘working self’ (M. A. Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The working self is a control process which helps to maintain 
coherence between the current and future goals by modulating the creation of relevant 
memories (Burgess, 1996). Furthermore, the working self is influenced by conceptual self-
knowledge, meaning all abstract knowledge structures which are independent of specific 
autobiographical events but nonetheless help define the self; and typical (culture-specific) 
behaviours in the environment (Conway, Meares, & Standart, 2004). Fundamental to the 
working self is to limit or resist goal changes, in order to maintain a coherent and stable 
self. In doing so, the working self can lower/increase accessibility or distort existing 
memories to fit more with the current goal and maintain coherence (Conway et al., 2004).  
The SMS comprises of the autobiographical systems and the working self, which 
together generate autobiographical recollections. This would not be possible if the 
working self and autobiographical self were acting independently. In this sense, the SMS7 
                                              
7 See Conway (2005) for a full review on the SMS. 
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promotes self-relevant information relevant to one’s goals, via the knowledge base of 
autobiographical information and the goal monitoring (coherence) of the working self. 
This promotion of self-relevant information is what could lead to the greater saliency in 
self- related information in memory, in other words: the self-reference effect. See Figure 
2 for an overview of autobiographical memory and SMS.  
Interestingly, emotion seems to either be used as a possible explanation to explain 
what drives the self-reference effect (S. J. Cunningham et al., 2008; Turk et al., 2008), or 
like the research by Gutchess et al. (2007) and Leshikar et al. (2015) have shown, 
emotional aspects interact with self-related information processing, but emotion alone 
cannot explain the self-reference effect. Similarly, the SMS (M. A. Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) is thought to be distinct from emotional processes. The SMS minimises 
potential disruptive effects of negative or intense emotional memories on one’s goals, 
yet still retains access to emotional memories relevant to one’s goals.  
In another fMRI experiment on memory, Kelley et al. (2002) found again mPFC 
activity related to self-referenced words. This experiment was a trait-word experiment 
where participants were shown trait-words in three conditions: 1) self-relatedness to trait-
word; 2) distant other-relatedness to trait-word (in this case a familiar distant other the 
then U.S. president George Bush); 3) control judgement (is the trait-word printed in 
uppercase?). After the encoding phase, a surprise recognition test followed.  The results 
showed that participants were faster for judgements related to the self when compared 
to judgements related to a distant other (e.g. George Bush). The uppercase judgement 
in the control condition was faster than the other two conditions. The memory 
recognition test revealed that trait judgements related to the self were recognised faster 
and more accurately than trait judgements related to a distant other. The performance 
for uppercase judgements was worst of all (since these judgments did not require 
semantic processing). In their fMRI results, the recognition for trait-words did not result 
in any differences between distant other referenced trait words and self-referenced trait 
words for any of the main brain areas involved in memory. It was discovered that the 
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mPFC was involved during self-judgements for later correctly recalled trait-words, again 
because distant other-judgement resulted in greater deactivation from baseline.  This led 
the authors to conclude that the mPFC contributes to the advantage of the self-reference 
effect on memory. Furthermore, it is suggested that if self-referencing is the result of 
normal memory processes and is but an extension of these processes that this should be 
reflected in additional activation, which they did not find and thus they conclude that the 
mPFC is driving the self-reference effect.  Lastly Kelley et al. (2002) hypothesize that since 
the greater activity of the mPFC for self-related information is not significantly different 
from baseline and is only different due to a greater deactivation when not processing 
self-relevant information, the self is not categorised as different from resting brain activity 
but by its similarity to resting brain activity.   
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                                                                                                   Replicated and 
adapted without permission from M. A. Conway, 2005). This figure illustrates how a cue activates 
existing long –term memories, either directly without being influenced by the working self, or 
generatively via an iterative cue elaboration involving the working self.  Via the retrieval models 
memories are distinguished from other mental imagery (e.g. daydreams) and the elaborated 
cue help assist is further memory retrieval/specification. 
Figure 2. Directed and generative retrieval in the Self Memory System (SMS). 
Figure 2 has been removed from this 
thesis due to copyright restrictions
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 Emotional information and memory 
It has been known for some time now that emotion (like the self) influences the 
likelihood of later recollection (Alicke, 1985; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Levine & Pizarro, 
2004; Mather, 2007). Many other studies involving trait-words and emotional valence find 
indications that the dmPFC is involved in encoding information related to the self (Fossati 
et al., 2004, 2014; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; Qin & Northoff, 
2011). Naturally, with emotion, it is well known that activity in the amygdala is linked to 
the processing of emotional stimuli (W. A. Cunningham, Raye, & Johnson, 2004; Herbert, 
Ethofer, et al., 2008; Zald, 2003). Like self-relevant information processing this is an 
automatic and fast process of which one does not have to be consciously aware of the 
emotional valence and as such activity in the amygdala does not reflect conscious 
emotional experience per se (A. K. Anderson & Phelps, 2002; Craig, 2008; Damasio, 1999). 
An excellent example of how recalling some information from memory can be 
easier, is the phenomenon of flashbulb memory (Brown & Kulik, 1977). Flashbulb 
memories are highly detailed bits of memory for an event often emotional in nature. For 
example, ask any American what they were doing on 9/11, and you will likely get a very 
detailed report of everyday things they were doing when the terror attack occurred.  
Naturally, this is an extreme emotional example illustrating how certain events are more 
(emotionally) important to remember compared to more neutral events. However, this 
does not mean that these emotional memories are always correct. Research has shown 
that even though the memories are more vivid, this does not mean that the remembered 
details are accurate (Dougal & Rotello, 2007; Kensinger, 2009; Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 
2004). 
In a series of experiments, Sakaki, Fryer, and Mather (2014) used an oddball 
paradigm to investigate the effects of emotion on memory.  For these experiments, the 
authors used photos with different semantic meanings on a white background, and one 
oddball picture on a black background. The black background ensured that the picture 
was an oddball. Furthermore, the pictures used as an oddball were either neutral or had 
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an emotional value (negative or positive). The instructions informed the participants to 
remember either the oddball picture, the picture immediately following the oddball 
picture, or the picture immediately preceding the oddball picture.  
The follow-up memory test showed that when the participant prioritises the 
picture before the oddball, they have better recognition for that picture. Moreover, if the 
oddball had an emotional value, the recognition for the picture before the oddball was 
better than if the oddball was neutral. This effect reversed when the participants had to 
prioritise the oddball picture, as the results showed a decrease in recognition for the word 
immediately before the emotional oddball when compared to the neutral oddball. 
Recognition decreased for the picture following the emotional oddball if these pictures 
were not prioritised. This decrease in recognition was reduced (but not to the point of 
memory enhancement) if the pictures following the emotional oddball were prioritised. 
This decrease in recognition inhibition was greater for negative emotions compared to 
positive emotions.  
Sakaki et al. (2014) conclude that emotion enhanced recognition when there was 
a top-down priority for the to-be-remembered items and impaired recognition when 
not. However, this is only true if the prioritised event precedes the emotional event. No 
enhancement was found when the prioritised stimuli followed the emotional event.  
Taken together, these studies can be understood in terms of arousal-biased 
competition (ABC) theory. This theory states that emotional arousal enhances processing 
and consolidation for high priority events over low priority events. The priority of an event 
is established through bottom-up perceptual salience and top-down relevance (Mather 
& Sutherland, 2011). In this sense, the top-down control of emotion is similar to the top-
down control of the self, and the goal promoting aspect of the SMS. In the case of Sakaki 
et al. (2014), the emotional oddball helps strengthen the prioritised event as the 
participants were instructed to remember the picture before the emotional oddball. In 
other words, the emotion is experienced while participants are trying to remember as 
many pictures as possible. The emotional oddball provides the participants with the 
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information they need (remember the picture before this oddball), and the emotion helps 
strengthen this top-down prioritised picture. The same could be true of anything related 
to the self: as soon as a specific piece of information is related to the self, top-down 
prioritisation increases the saliency of self-related information, which generates enriched 
encoding into memory. Via the self, the prioritised information binds to other self-
relevant information, which in turn increases the likelihood of later recall.   
How then have authors proposed that emotion and self-relevant information 
might interact with each other? As mentioned before people tend to see themselves 
positively (Alicke, 1985). Since memory is goal driven as discussed (M. A. Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), self-enhancing positive information which confirms the positive 
self-image is more memorable over information which is negative and would subtract 
from a positive self-image (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Mezulis et 
al., 2004; Taylor, 1991). This is precisely what previous research has found: an overall 
better memory for self-related positive information compared to self-related negative 
information (Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Ochsner, 2000; Sedikides & Green, 2004). Part of this 
enhancement of positive self-relevant information is thought to be the result of increased 
depth of encoding (Sedikides & Green, 2000). Here there is a potential overlap between 
the self-priority and self-reference effect. In other words, do the extra attentional 
resources, when processing positive self-relevant information, enable more in-depth 
encoding (i.e. self-reference effect)? D'Argembeau et al. (2005) researched another 
possible option. The influence of valence on self-relevant information was studied by 
comparing two memory retrieval methods.  
In their experiments, participants were asked to rate a list of traits. Half of these 
lists contained positive trait-words (e.g. happy) and the other half negative trait-words 
(e.g. sad). Furthermore, half of the participants were asked if the trait-words described 
them, and the other half of the participants were asked if the trait-words described a 
famous individual the participant did not know personally. The participants were not 
informed that a memory test would follow.  This encoding paradigm was precisely the 
52 
same for two experiments. In one experiment, an old/new recognition task followed the 
encoding phase. In the other experiment, a free-recall task followed the encoding task. 
By comparing two different memory tasks which were preceded by the same encoding 
task, the authors could compare the effect of a memory task with retrieval cues (old/new 
recognition task) versus a task with no retrieval cues (free-recall task). D'Argembeau et 
al. (2005) suggested that there is not as much need to look for emotion and self-relevant 
retrieval information in an old/new recognition task since the nature of the cue (valence 
or self) is superseded by the cue itself. In other words, the cue by itself provides enough 
information for fast retrieval. The free-recall task does not offer any external cues for the 
participant to use. Therefore, the emotional valence and self-related information of the 
trait-words become more critical in enabling successful recall. Based on this, the authors 
predicted a greater self-reference effect for positive information when compared to 
negative information for the free-recall task only. For the free-recall task, their result did 
indeed show a self-reference effect for positive self-related words, and no self-reference 
effect for the negative trait-words. For the old/new recognition task, a self-reference 
effect was also found, but with no difference between positive or negative valence. The 
authors interpret these results as reflecting the difference in retrieval processes. As 
such, the self-reference effect is partially taking place during retrieval. The rich external 
cue from the old/new recognition task overshadows any influence of valence on the self-
reference effect. The self-reference effect persists, but the distancing of negative trait 
from, or the attraction of positive trait to self-relevant information does not occur, or at 
least less clearly. The increased demand on internal cues on the free-recall task 
demonstrated the beneficial effect for positive self-related information.  
In an fMRI study by Herbert, Herbert, and Pauli (2011) this link between positive 
and self-relevant information on memory was investigated further. Participants were 
presented with pleasant, unpleasant and neutral nouns and these were either paired with 
the possessive pronoun ‘my’, ‘his’, or a definite article ‘the’. With this set up, the authors 
could compare the emotional effects on self- and distant other-relevant information 
processing compared to neutral information. The participants were presented with one 
53 
word at the time which they had to read silently, and they were told that some words 
would describe their emotions, some the emotions of a distant other, or just state an 
emotion not linked to anyone. After all words were presented, a surprise free-recall task 
followed. Their results showed that the amygdala and insula were active whenever 
emotional negative words were presented regardless of perspective, showing that 
negative emotions specifically activate the amygdala and insula.  The amygdala activity 
was also increased when the participant was presented with self-relevant positive 
information. According to the authors, this suggests that the amygdala is involved in the 
processing in multiple kinds of emotions and that the amygdala is also involved in 
detecting personal relevance, and also supports the self-positivity bias. Furthermore, self-
relevant positive nouns increased the ACC and the mPFC. As mentioned, the mPFC is 
linked to self-referential information processing and especially the vmPFC been linked to 
the evaluation of current feelings (Herbert, Herbert, & Pauli, 2011; Lee & Siegle, 2009; 
Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). The experiment also revealed the PCC and 
precuneus to be active during self-reference processing, especially if the self-related 
information is positive.   
The above shows that emotion has an effect on how self-relevant information is 
processed but now during retrieval. This suggests a separate (possibly multiplicative) 
benefit during retrieval compared to the influence of emotional self-related information 
on attention and encoding processes. Lastly, beyond the emotional valence of words, 
emotional feelings during encoding and retrieval influence how easily one will be able to 
recall certain words. 
The recollection of words learned while in a specific mood is easier when a person 
is in the same mood during recall (Bower, 1981).  In the free-recall experiment, Bower 
(1981) had participants learn wordlist in either a happy or a sad mood. After the learning 
phase, the participants were asked to recall as many words as possible freely. However, 
the participants were induced to have a similar or different mood during recall. The results 
showed that when one learns words during a happy mood, one is more likely to correctly 
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recall the words when in a happy mood as well. Similar effects were found when people 
learned and recalled during a sad mood. Bower (1981) explains this mood-congruent 
effect as each emotion binding to events with similar emotions, allowing for easier recall 
when the participant is in that emotional state. 
Interestingly, mood-congruent recall appears to be dependent on an individual’s 
self-knowledge base (Sakaki, 2007). People tend to recall fewer negative memories when 
in a positive self-related mood. However, when induced into a similar positive mood, but 
recalling memories not related to the self, people recall more negative words. When 
recalling positive words during a negative mood, similar effects are observed. Generally, 
people have mood-congruent recalls for self-related information and mood-incongruent 
recall for non-self-related information.  Furthermore, with recalling more positive 
memories, the participant would feel more positive afterwards (Sakaki, 2007).  It is not a 
huge leap to imagine that the words one attends to more (i.e. self-priority effect) 
influence the encoding of that information. This subsequently enables superior recall of 
that information, but the information itself (not just an encoding benefit) influences 
retrieval of that memory (i.e. self-reference effect).  
Summary 
Together, the sections on attention and memory show that emotion and self both 
seem to influence attention, memory encoding, and retrieval processes independently. 
Furthermore, it is clear that emotional valence influences self-related information 
differently depending on whether the information is positive or negative, although the 
exact nature of this interaction remains unclear. The above helps to illustrate that 
familiarity and emotion are not the driving force behind the self-priority effect and, to an 
extent, the self-reference effect. Each exerts an influence on cognitive processes on their 
own, but interact with each other also. In other words, it is possible that self and emotional 
processing do not function in isolation of each other despite being distinct systems.  
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Sui & Humphreys (2015b), offer a theory that self-relevant information enhances 
the binding of stimuli in perception (self-priority effect) and memory (self-reference 
effect).  This allows for a more rapid detecting and processing of self-relevant information 
into a core self-representation.  Furthermore, Sui & Humphreys (2015b) suggest that the 
enhanced binding of self-relevant information alters ongoing processes, which results in 
preferential treatment for the self-relevant information compared to information not 
related to the self.  This same enhancement of binding self-relevant information makes 
re-binding of information previously linked to the self more challenging (Wang et al., 
2016). In short: “Self-reference provides a form of associative ‘glue’ for perception, memory, 
and decision making and, through this, acts as a central mechanism in information 
processing” (Sui & Humphreys, 2015b, p. 719) 
If the self does act as a central mechanism, then one would expect this to be 
reflected by the underlying neurophysiological processes. Interestingly, the mPFC, pACC, 
PC, PCC, pSTS, TPJ, IPL, MTL and AG are all related to what is called the default mode 
network (DMN), which has been implicated in multiple self-related studies (Northoff & 
Bermpohl, 2004; Qin & Northoff, 2011; Spreng & Grady, 2009; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 
2009). The DMN includes cortical midline structures (CMS) as core structures and shows 
consistent task related de-activation, being more active at rest. The DMN is highly 
interconnected with other brain areas and networks. For example, there is a strong 
functional connection with the ACC, PCC, and a reciprocal connection with the parietal 
and lateral prefrontal cortex. Cognitively demanding tasks generally result in greater 
deactivation of the DMN (Singh & Fawcett, 2008). However, the opposite is true when 
the task involves self-referential processing (Mitchell, 2006). 
For example, experiments by Whitfield-Gabrieli et al. (2011) aimed to identify 
associations and disassociations in the CMS between the self-reference network and the 
DMN. Like many trait word experiments, the participants were asked to judge if trait-
words related to themselves and if trait-words were positive. Each trial was then followed 
by a resting state for ten seconds. When compared to the valence condition, the results 
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showed an increase in neural activity for the vmPFC, dmPFC, PCC, and pACC for the self-
traits condition. Interestingly during the resting phase, the CMS revealed greater activity 
when compared to the valence condition but not when compared to the self condition. 
The authors then looked to dissociate regions involved in rest and self and found that 
the dmPFC was more strongly activated during rest whereas the pACC, PCC, and vmPFC 
showed overlap between the two conditions.   
Based on a meta-analysis on more studies like the one described in the previous 
paragraph on self- and resting state, Qin and Northoff (2011) introduce the concept of 
“rest-self overlap” to describe the similarities between self-related processing and the 
resting state in term of neural overlap (Northoff, 2015). To explain this rest-self overlap, 
Northoff suggests two possible explanations: 1) regardless of overlap, the self and rest 
states are independent of each other. Similar regions might be recruited but in different 
ways so that the neural activity reflects two distinct processes. This is what the author 
refers to as “rest-self overlap”; 2) Northoff calls his second explanation the “rest-self 
containment”. Now the DMN not only shows overlap with self-related processes, but the 
neural activity also reflects the same process, i.e. the spontaneous activity during the 
resting state reflects self-related processing. This, in turn, means that resting state can 
predict if information will be processed as self-relevant or not and that stimuli that are 
highly related to the self do not show any differences in neural activity when compared 
to the resting state.  Northoff postulates that this is because spontaneous brain activity 
in the DMN already contains self-information and thus the processing of a highly self-
relevant item does not add to the already present self-related activity. Moreover, 
according to Humphreys and Sui (2016) the vmPFC is housing the self and via its top-
down modulations to the LpSTS self-relevant information is prioritised. Furthermore, the 
dlPFC is part of the SAN as well, and it this relation between the vmPFC and dlPFC that 
Northoff (2015) suggests is one way for different networks in the brain to encode 
spontaneous self-related brain activity to internal or external stimuli. His reasoning behind 
this is that where the vmPFC shows increased activity related to the self, the dlPFC activity 
is weaker. Since the vmPFC is linked to the DMN and the dlPFC is linked to the control 
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executive network (CEN), this negative correlation relationship encodes self-relatedness 
to stimuli, i.e. higher vmPFC activity and lower dlPFC activity equals higher self-
relatedness linked to stimuli.  
 Also, M. A. Conway, Pothos, and Turk (2016) suggest that the self attention 
network (Humphreys & Sui, 2016) might be part of an overall bigger self-relevance system 
(SRS). The authors emphasise the inhibitory network essential in discriminating between 
situations that are highly self-relevant and those that are not. Via the SAN, other 
processes, like memory, can be influenced as the result of attentional bias. The bigger 
SRS suggested by the authors shares cortical networks with the SAN linked to the DMN.  
In other words, the SAN model suggested by Humphreys and Sui (2016) and the 
rest-self containment model proposed by Northoff (2015) are very similar in their basic 
concept. Both suggest that the self is a separate function of the brain, and both suggest 
that the self-relatedness of a stimulus is determined at a low processing level of the brain. 
However, the SAN suggests that the self is housed in the vmPFC, linking self-relatedness 
to incoming stimuli earlier than the visual associative areas; whereas the rest-self 
containment model suggests that the self is part of the spontaneous brain activity. This 
means that both models agree that the self is not a higher cognitive function, but is a 
part of the brain’s basic functioning. With the link of the vmPFC to the DMN, both models 
together help explain how the self modulates stimuli at the earliest level of stimuli 
processing, e.g. sensory cortex (incoming information) to CMS (self/not-self attribution) 
to lateral cortex (higher cognitive aspects such as autobiographical memory) and reverse 
top-down modulation.  The above suggestion that the SAN is part of a bigger SRS fits 
well with the idea of an integrated self by Sui and Humphreys (2015). The self-reference 
and the self-priority effect are not two disconnected phenomena. The standpoint of this 
thesis is that self-relevant information influences both attention and memory systems. 
This is achieved via underlying cortical processes that help prioritise and bind self-relevant 
information together across multiple cognitive domains.  
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Lastly, this chapter has reviewed literature suggesting that emotion prioritises 
information as well (or at least as long as it is goal relevant). Furthermore, emotion and 
self-related information together seem to create an interaction between the two. Self-
relevant information is preferably linked with positive information, and the self seems to 
be distanced from negative information. Therefore how emotion and self-related 
information interact to influence attention and memory will be the main focus of this 
thesis. The final section of this chapter focusses on explaining the precise aims of this 
thesis (and of each chapter).   
Thesis aims and overview 
Emotion and self-related information processing are two factors that are being 
used to prioritise parts from the constant stream of information confronting people in 
their daily lives. Emotion and self-relevance are two indicators (albeit not the only two) 
to help us navigate the world and quickly perceive what is possibly harmful or beneficial 
to our continued existence. Furthermore, their effect on memory ensures that emotional 
and self-relevant events can be recalled with greater ease, ensuring that past benefits or 
harmful situations help guide future behaviour.  
However, there are several questions still unanswered: although research has 
indicated that emotion and self-referential processing are two separate and independent 
processes, it is still unclear what would happen in situations where an event is both self-
relevant and emotional. In short, how do these two priority systems interact, if they 
interact at all?  Especially if you are not judging if a positive trait describes you, which is 
the main modus operandi of previous research. Finally, most studies investigate the self-
priority or the self-reference effects separate from each other. Therefore, it is not clear if 
the same emotional self-related information that influences attention (i.e. self-priority 
effect), also influences memory (i.e. self-reference effect). 
This thesis is divided into two parts: the next four chapters describe seven 
experiments focussing on cognitive, computer-based, experiments. These four 
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experiments mainly gather reaction time (RT), d-prime, and accuracy data, except 
Experiment 2, where redundancy gain models are applied to the data. In Chapters 6 
through 8, behavioural data but also electroencephalogram (EEG) data is presented.  
Experiment 1 (a & b) reduced the influence of familiarity by using an adaptation 
of the Sui et al. (2012) matching task combined with an old/new recognition task. The 
adaptation of the matching task involved changing the geometric shapes used in Sui et 
al. (2012) to words and the linking of a specific colour to the self instead of a shape. 
Experiment 1a and 1b were very similar, and the main difference was the use of negative 
nouns in Experiment 1a and positive nouns in Experiment 1b. This approach would allow 
the testing of emotional self-relevant information without the elaborate encoding 
resulting from asking the participant to judge the words in relation to themselves.  
Experiment 1 (c & d) aimed to make the stimuli more self-relevant by replacing 
the emotional nouns with emotional trait-words. Experiment 1c used negative trait-words 
and Experiment 1d used positive trait-words. Like the previous two experiments, a 
matching task was followed by an old/new task.  
Experiment 2 attempted to highlight the different influences of self and emotion 
further and looked into a potential redundancy gain effect of self and emotion. This was 
achieved by making sure that the emotional meaning of the words was processed 
roughly at the same time as the colour of the word (i.e. self-relevance).  
Experiment 3 studied the effects of repetition on the self. The main reason for this 
was to examine the effect of automaticity on the self-reference effect. The standard 
matching paradigm was used from Experiments 1a-1b but was repeated three times, after 
which the old/new task followed.  
Experiment 4 used a free recall design to look beyond memory recognition to free 
recall. So far, all experiments have used an old/new memory task, which naturally 
provides a robust external cue for memory retrieval. Since there is a potential effect on 
retrieval by self-relevant information, a free-recall task was used as a memory task with 
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no external retrieval cues. Furthermore, like Experiment 3, there was an element of 
repetition, repeating the wordlist three more times. The number of words used in the 
free-recall task was too large and the wordlist was divided into multiple blocks. The use 
of multiple blocks allowed for an inspection on the effect of each repetition on the self-
reference effect.  
Experiment 5 is the major EEG experiment of this thesis. Like the two previous 
chapters, it examines the automaticity of self-relevant information processing. This was 
done by an intentional forgetting task where participants were instructed not to think of 
some words and instead try to suppress the recall of the word. For this task, participants 
had to learn a wordlist containing words linked to the self or a distant other.  
Experiment 6 was a free-recall experiment like Experiment 4. This final experiment 
was also an EEG experiment. This experiment used positive trait-words without any 
repetition. The primary purpose was to examine the effect of an increased recall difficulty 
on the self-reference effect and examine the underlying neurophysiological processed 
used in the matching task.  
Lastly, this thesis is concluded in Chapter 8. In this chapter, the results of all the 
experiments are summarised. Furthermore, the implications and limitations of 




Attention, Memory & Self  
Introduction 
The paradigm described in this chapter aimed to study the influence of self and 
emotion on attention and memory within the same participants. This was achieved by 
using the same stimuli for attention and memory, using a direct experimental control of 
self. A comparison was made between the effect of emotional self-relevant information 
and information related to a distant other on memory and attention.   
The experiments that follow involve manipulation of the encoding of stimuli, which 
subsequently have to be remembered in a memory recognition or recall task. These 
manipulations involve the self-relevance of the stimuli. Additionally, the presented 
memory items themselves were chosen with qualities which are expected to influence 
their encoding. Specifically, the stimuli varied in their emotional valance.  
The basic paradigm in this thesis involves an adaptation of the perceptual 
matching task of Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012). As discussed in Chapter 1, their 
paradigm linked the self and distant other to a geometric shape by instructing the 
participant that “you are a circle; a stranger is a triangle”. Their results showed clear 
prioritisation of the geometric shape linked to the self. Since one of the aims of this thesis 
is to explore the link between the self-priority and the self-reference effect, the matching 
paradigm of this thesis used different coloured words - rather than shape-associations 
as part of the manipulation of self-relevance. Participants were told that a particular 
colour belonged to them. 
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Similarly to using shapes, using colour should reduce any influence of familiarity 
or differences in processing the stimuli. As discussed in the main introduction, many self-
relevant stimuli have a potential confound of familiarity. Using the methods suggested 
by Sui et al. (2012), familiarity was separated from self-priority by using the matching task. 
Because of this, all stimuli could be expected to be equally familiar. Furthermore, the 
semantic meaning of the words varied in their emotional valance. Words were chosen to 
be either emotionally negative, emotionally positive, or emotionally neutral.  Using words, 
this version of the perceptual matching task not only allowed for manipulation of 
emotion, but the matching task could be used as an encoding paradigm as well. The 
perceptual matching task was therefore followed, after a delay, by an old/new 
recognition task. 
By arbitrarily associating a colour to the self or distant other, perspective could be 
linked to a word. With this adaptation of the perceptual matching paradigm by Sui et al. 
(2012), this study aimed to use the robust self-priority effect elicited by the perceptual 
matching test and link it to memory processes. This way, the possible relation between 
the prioritisation of self-related information via attention with a later self-reference effect 
in memory could be explored.  
With the matching task, the effect on attention of emotional and self-relevant 
information can be tested. Research suggests that positive information ‘broadens’ 
attentional processing, whereas negative information ‘narrows’ attentional processing 
(Fredrickson, 1998; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006).  
Another issue is the effect of negative emotions in the self. As was mentioned in 
Chapter 1, several studies have shown that it is easier to link positive information to the 
self compared to negative information. (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 
1993; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Mezulis et al., 2004; Ochsner, 2000; Sedikides & Green, 2004; 
Taylor, 1991). In other words, positive information is more approachable for the self, 
whereas negative information leads to a distancing of the self. Therefore the current 
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adaptation of the matching task should allow the testing of the effect of emotion and 
self-relevant information on attention. 
It is expected that item memory, as measured on the old/new recognition task, 
would be better for words related to the self compared to non-self related words. It was 
further expected that recognition of emotional words would be better compared to 
neutral words. As mentioned in Chapter 1, emotion and self could interact. Previous 
studies have explored the role of emotional self-related information (Gutchess et al., 
2007; Leshikar et al., 2015). However, these studies compared positive versus negative 
stimuli. Therefore, it was not clear if the self-reference for negative self-related items is 
reduced only in comparison with positive items or reduced in comparison with neutral 
items or vice versa. In the study by Leshikar et al. (2015), non-self conditions were used 
to compare with self-related information. Arguably, the task for the non-self conditions 
impact different processes (e.g. is ‘excited’ a commonly used word?), compared to self 
condition (e.g. Does ‘excited’ describe you?), which alone could partially account for any 
differences observed. Therefore, this thesis will investigate the self-reference effect using 
the matching paradigm as an encoding task as the task for both the self and other 
condition would the same. The only difference would be that the self is prioritised when 
processing the stimuli. In other words, any benefits in recognition would likely be the 
result of the more efficient processing of self-related information.  
The next four experiments described in this chapter varied from each other, but 
all were based on the matching paradigm paired with an old/new task. Mainly the next 
four experiments explore if there is a difference between positive and negative self-
related information when compared to neutral self-related information. The first two 
experiments (1a & 1b) will use negative and positive nouns, respectively. The last two 
experiments (1c & 1d) will use negative and positive trait words. In short, this chapter will 
explore the relationship between the self-priority effect and a self-reference effect using 
emotional stimuli, which are arbitrarily linked to the self or other using colour.  
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Experiment 1a: The self and negative emotions 
Leshikar et al. (2015) and Gutchess et al. (2007) both have shown that it is possible 
negative self-related words result in no, or a reduced self-reference effect. A reduced or 
missing self-reference effect is possibly due to the distancing of the self from negative 
information (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Taylor, 1991). However, 
as mentioned in the previous section,  the studies by Leshikar et al. (2015) and Gutchess 
et al. (2007) do not provide an equal encoding opportunity for the non-self condition, 
compared to the self condition. For example, asking individuals if something relates to 
themselves possibly results in a much richer encoding experience compared to asking if 
a particular word is commonly used. The former would potentially entail a wide range of 
memories of experiences, beyond the mostly semantic processing of the later.  
Experiment 1a of this thesis will further investigate the effect of negative self-
related words on the self-reference effect. This study aims to elicit a self-priority effect 
and a later self-reference effect, using the same stimuli. A self-priority effect will be 
achieved by using an adaptation of the perceptual matching task designed by Sui et al. 
(2012) as an encoding task. An old/new recognition task will then follow the matching 
task. Therefore, a reduced self-reference effect for negative information is expected with 
regards to memory. In other words, participants will show reduced accuracy levels in the 
old/new task for other-related information compared to self-related information. 
Furthermore, this effect will be stronger for words with a neutral valence compared to 
words with a negative valence.  For the matching task, it is expected that a self-priority 
effect precedes the self-reference effect. An interaction between perspective and 
emotion is expected. This interaction will be reflected by a slower RT and reduced 
accuracy in the matching task for other-related information compared to self-related 
information. This difference will be reversed for the negative words compared to the 





In total, 25 participants from Oxford Brookes University participated for course 
credit in the study.  Five participants were removed from the data analysis because the 
task was not understood or due to technical issues. Of the remaining 20 participants, 18 
were female, and two were male (mean age= 22.44 years, range: 18-50 years). The 
university ethics committee approved this study; all participants gave informed consent.  
Stimuli  
The stimuli used in this experiment were words with two main conditions. The first 
condition was the emotional value of the word; either negative or neutral. The second 
condition was a perspective linked to the words, which could either be ‘yourself’ or 
‘stranger’. 
Two hundred and thirty words were derived using the word database given by 
Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert (2013). This database consists of norm rating for arousal 
and valence, among other measures, for 13,915 English words. In the database, both 
valence and arousal were measured on a nine-point scale (for valence 1=unhappy, 
9=happy; for arousal 1=calm, 9=excited). The ratings for arousal and valence were used 
in combination with word frequency ratings derived from another word database 
reported by Heuven, Mandera, Keuleers, & Brysbaert (2014), of which 230 of the top 
frequent unique words were taken (homophones and different tenses were excluded). Of 
these 230 words, 115 were negative (valence <3, arousal >5), and 115 were neutral 
(valence between 5-6, arousal <3).  
These 230 words were divided into three lists: one practice list and two main lists 
of 100 words each. The main lists were subdivided into four sets: 25 were neutral and 
linked to the self (self/neutral); 25 were negative and linked to a distant other 
(other/negative); 25 were neutral and linked to the self (self/neutral); and 25 were 
negative and linked to stranger (other/negative), a similar division was made for the 
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practice list. Therefore, this created three lists with two main conditions each: perspective 
and emotion. The average word-length was 5.68 letters, was matched across conditions, 
and the Courier New font was used for all text (size 18).  
Procedure  
The experiment was designed and run using PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007). All 
stimuli were presented on a light grey background. Words from the matching task 
wordlist were presented in colour; all other texts were in white. The software was run on 
a pc in a darkened room on a 17” monitor running at 60 Hz with a resolution of 1280-
960.  All input provided by the participant was registered using a three button pc mouse. 
The experiment consisted of two components: an initial matching task and a later old/new 
recognition task in the same session. 
Matching task 
The matching task (see Figure 3A) was based on the perceptual matching task 
reported in Sui, He, & Humphreys (2012). For the experiment by Sui et al. (2012), 
participants had to compare one of three labels (‘self’, ‘mother’ or ‘stranger’), with a 
geometric shape based on an earlier given rule. In the current experiment, participants 
had to report if one of two labels (‘yourself’ or ‘stranger’) matched with a font colour of 
a simultaneously presented word. For example, the participants were instructed: “You are 
a salmon colour; a stranger is a slate blue colour”. The colours linked to stranger and self 
were counterbalanced across participants. In this study, the word-label pair could either 
match with the instruction or not match. The participant was instructed that they would 
be presented with a series of words, each of which would be in one of two font colours: 
salmon (RGB: 250, 128, 114) or slate blue (RGB: 106, 90, 205). Each of these coloured 
words would be presented with a label given in white ink which would state either 
‘yourself’ or ‘stranger’. The participants had to respond yes or no according to whether 
or not the colour of the word matched with the label presented for that trial by pressing 
the left or right mouse button respectively, which was counterbalanced across 
participants also. For instance, if a participant had been told to associate salmon with 
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‘yourself’ and slate blue with ‘stranger’ then they would have to respond yes if the label 
‘yourself’ appeared with the word given in the salmon font colour and ‘no’ if the label 
‘yourself’ appeared with the word in the slate-blue font colour. Half of the trials matched 
with the instructions and the other half did not match with the instructions.   
Each trial started with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen (subtended visual 
angle 0.57°), which was shown for 500ms. After the fixation cross, the emotion-word and 
the label (subtended visual angle for both 0.57°) were presented respectively above and 
below fixation cross (subtended visual angle as measured from centre of the fixation cross 
to the top of the emotion-word or label: 1.72°). Participants had to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
according to whether the given pairing of stimulus and label matched with their given 
rule (e.g. label ‘stranger’ displayed simultaneously with the emotion word ‘knife’ in a slate 
blue coloured font). They were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. All words remained on screen 2000ms irrespective of whether or not the 
participant responded in that time. Following the response, if the participants made an 
incorrect response, an auditory tone was played to inform the participant of the incorrect 
response. If the participant failed to respond within the 2000ms after stimulus onset, the 
word ‘slow’ would appear on the screen for 400ms after the offset of the emotion-word 
and label. After each trial, a blank screen ITI of random duration between 1000ms and 
1500ms was presented. The matching task consisted of 100 trials and was preceded by 
30 practice trials. There were two factors in this experiment, each with two levels: word- 
person category (‘yourself’, ‘stranger’) and emotion (neutral, negative). Equal numbers of 
these four factorial combinations of trial types were given. These were presented in the 
experiment in a pseudo-random order where each factor combination was never 
repeated consecutively more than three times. Participant were told to expect a memory 
task after the matching task. Even though this increased the workload for the matching 
task, this would put more emphasize on the words and not just the colour of the words. 
Increasing the focus on the words potentially increased later memory performance. 
Earlier pilots of this paradigm showed low performance on the old/new task.    
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Old/new recognition task 
The matching task was followed by the old/new recognition task in which 200 
words were presented, half of which were old words and the remaining half new words 
(see Figure 3B). The ‘old’ words were taken from the matching-task word-list (the 
emotion-words), and the ‘new’ words were taken from the second list of words described 
in the stimulus section. The ‘new’ words were matched in terms of word length, word 
frequency, valence and arousal with the ‘old’ word-list. For the old/new recognition task 
participants were asked to decide as quickly and as accurately as possible whether the 
word depicted on screen was either ‘old’ or ‘new’. Participants were asked to respond as 
quickly as possible to encourage responses as a result of clear recognition and not a 
feeling of familiarity with the words. A word was ‘old’ if it had been presented in the 
matching task and ‘new’ if it appeared for the first time. Each trial began with a fixation 
cross in the middle of the screen, lasting 500ms, which was replaced by a word. 
Participants had to decide as fast and as accurately as possible if the word was ‘old’ or 
‘new’ by pressing the left mouse button and the right mouse button respectively 
(counterbalanced across observations). The words remained on the screen up to five 
seconds or until the participant made a response. After each trial, a blank screen was 
shown for 500ms. The main task comprised of 200 trials and was preceded by five 
practice trials.  
The ‘new’ and ‘old’ condition in the old/new recognition task was 
counterbalanced, i.e. the words for the matching task and the new words from the 
old/new task were interchanged. Participants were able to take a self-paced break after 
the perceptual matching task and every seven minutes during the old/new recognition 
task.  The matching task took about 10 minutes to complete, and the old/new recognition 
task took about 35 minutes to complete. No data on source memory was collected. This 
was mainly due to practical limitations as the experiment already exceeded 35 minutes, 
and no a priori predictions were made on source memory and self-relatedness.  
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Figure 3. Procedure matching task (A) and old/new task (B), Experiment 1a-d.
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Design & analysis 
In this experiment, and unless stated otherwise, most analyses were performed 
using SPSS software (IBM Corp, 2013) by employing n-way repeated measures ANOVA 
of the relevant conditions. Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), a 
power analysis based on the effect-sizes found in previous literature showed that the 
sample size for attaining sufficient power should be 20. However, due to the novel nature 
of this paradigm there was no precedent for accurately determining the expected effect-
size. This is mainly because of the very robust findings of the matching task. For the 
old/new task the sample size ranges from 25 to 30 depending on the literature. A sample 
size of 20 was chosen as both over-powered and under-powered test are undesirable.  
In this experiment, a 2 (perspective[self, distant other]) x 2 (emotion[negative, neutral]) 
repeated ANOVA was used to analyse the data, and a Bonferroni correction was applied 
for multiple comparisons. The independent variable of ‘perspective’ consisted of two 
levels (‘self’ versus ‘distant other’), and the second independent variable was emotion 
also with two levels (‘negative’ versus ‘neutral’). The dependent variables were 
participants’ responses and reaction time in milliseconds for the matching task. For the 
old/new task, only the proportion of correct responses were analysed. The reaction time 
data of the old/new task was not analysed as it is less accurate due possible fast guesses.  
With the signal detection theory, it is possible to isolate a signal from noise, 
allowing for the measurement of a response bias by the participants. In other words, with 
signal detection theory, the sensitivity of detecting a true signal amidst noise or 
competing signals can be calculated. Using hit rates (finding something that is actually 
there) and false alarm rates (claiming to have found something that is not there) one can 
calculate a person’s sensitivity to detect a signal using the d-prime (d’) statistic.  
With d’ it is possible to separate the means of a signal from noise, and it is a sensitivity 
index used in signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). This sensitivity index 
is measured by calculating the difference between the Z-transforms of the proportion of 
hits and the Z-transforms of the proportion of false alarms: d’ = Z (Hit rate) – Z(False 
  
71 
alarm rate). A d’ of 0 indicates that an individual cannot distinguish a signal from noise 
and with every increase in d’ reflect an increased capability to distinguish signal from 
noise. Hit rates of 100% or false alarms of 0% were assigned values of 99% or 1% 
respectively (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004).  
Although the d’ measure is an accurate measure of one’s ability to differentiate 
signal from noise, in the current (and subsequent) experiments, there were several issues 
in calculating d’. In the non-matched trials, the process of recognising an incorrectly 
paired label and colour is more laborious, and therefore a quick self-judgement is not 
possible. Furthermore, when the label and colour are not matched, it is difficult to 
ascertain in retrospect which aspect (label or colour) was more important in making a self 
or other judgement. This approach is the same for all experiments using the matching 
task. Throughout this thesis, the colour of the word linked to self is seen as ‘self-related’ 
for analysis purposes, but this potentially creates interpretation issues for the non-
matched trials with the label of self and the colour linked to a distant other.  The label 
‘yourself’ or ‘myself’ might be enough to elicit self-relatedness. 
For this reason, the experiments were analysed with an overall d’ rating, which, by 
necessity, includes the non-matched trials. However, the proportion of correct trials is 
reported as well, separately for the matched and non-matched trials, avoiding the 
potential problematic interpretation of the non-matched trials. Therefore, when 
discussing the proportion of correct responses, the emphasis is placed on the matched 
trials. Similarly, the reaction time data was split up in matched and non-matched trials 
and only the reaction times for the correct responses were analysed.   
Results 
Matching task  
For Experiment 1a there was a significant effect of d’ for perspective (see Figure 
4), F(1,19)= 14.619, p = .001, η2p = .435. Participants were more accurate in detecting 
signal from noise for the self-condition than the distant other-condition. There was no 
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significant effect of emotion, F(1,19) = .039, p = .845, nor was there a significant interaction 
between emotion and perspective, F(1,19) = 2.466, p = .133. See Table 1 for an overview 
of all means and standard errors for the matching task.  
                                                           D’ of perspective for the matching task (Error bar = 
standard error. * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 
Table 1. Experiment 1a, Matching task. Proportion correct responses, median RT, and d’. 
Standard error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
d’ 
Correct RT Correct RT 
Self .97 (.01) 1007.30 (31.82) .92 (.02) 1206.65 (35.56) 3.80 (0.20) 
Other .88 (.02) 1228.61 (44.54) .86 (.02) 1232.67 (37.29) 2.75 (0.22) 
Negative .93 (.01) 1124.50 (39.73) .88 (.02) 1246.46 (35.86) 3.30 (0.21) 
Neutral .92 (.01) 1111.41 (33.62) .90 (.02) 1192.86 (35.88) 3.26 (0.17) 
Self/Negative .97 (.01) 1009.57 (33.35) .91 (.02) 1240.30 (42.63) 3.70 (0.26) 
Self/Neutral .97 (.01) 1005.03 (36.68) .93 (.02) 1173.00 (32.88) 3.91 (0.22) 
Other/Negative .90 (.03) 1239.43 (54.44) .86 (.03) 1252.62 (34.73) 2.90 (0.25) 


















Figure 4. D’ matching task, Experiment 1a.
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When looking at the proportion of correct responses for the matching trials, there 
is a main effect for perspective, F(1,19) = 13.327, p = .002, η2p = .412 where proportion 
correct responses for the self-condition was higher than the distant other-condition. 
Again, no significant effect for emotion, F(1,19) = 1.411, p = .250, and no significant 
interaction between perspective and emotion F(1,19) = .788, p .386 were observed.  For 
the non-matching trials there is an effect of self for the proportion correct responses, 
F(1,19) = 4.754, p = .042, η2p = .200, where self outperformed distant other. There was 
no effect of emotion, F(1,19) = .462, p = .505, and no interaction effect between emotion 
and perspective was found F(1,19) = .418, p = .526.  
There was a main effect on median correct RT data for perspective, F(1,19) = 
50.883, p < .001, η2p = .728. There was a significantly faster RT for the self condition when 
compared to the distant other-condition, see Figure 5A. There was no significant effect 
of emotion, F(1,19) = .444, p = .513, and no interaction between the two conditions, F(1,19) 
= .106, p = .748. The RT data showed no main effect of perspective for the non-matched 
trials, F(1,19) = 1.465, p = .241. However, there was a significant main effect of emotion 
(F1,19) = 9.686, p = .006, η2p = .338). Neutral words were responded to faster than the 
negative words, see Figure 5B. No interaction was found between the conditions 
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  Looking at the sensitivity data (d’), an effect emerges of perspective (F(1,19) = 
10.207, p = .005, η2p = .349), where the d’ for the self condition was higher (.925) than 
the distant other-condition (.775), see Figure 6A. Furthermore a main effect of emotion 
is revealed, F(1,19) = 5.212, p = .034, η2p = .215. Participants were more sensitive in 
detecting a signal (i.e. correctly identifying an ‘old’ word) for the negative trials than for 
the neutral trials, see Figure 6B. No interaction between the conditions of perspective 
and emotion was found, F(1,19) = 1.686, p = .210.  Table 2 shows the means and standard 
error of the old/new task.   
 
Analysing the proportion correct responses for the matched trials resulted in an 
effect of both perspective (F(1,19) = 6.674, p = .018, η2p = .260) and emotion(F(1,19) = 
24.721, p < .001, η2p = .565).  The mean scores revealed that the self trials resulted in 
higher number of correct responses compared with the distant other-trials. For the 
emotion condition participants correctly recognised more words from the negative trials 
than from the neutral trials. Again, no interaction was observed between the perspective 
and emotion condition, F(1,19) = 1.699, p = .208.  
                                                                      d’ measures for perspective (A) and emotion (B) on the 
old/new task, Experiment 1a. (Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001) 
A B 
Figure 6. d’ old/new task, Experiment 1a.  
** *
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For the non-matched trials only a main effect was observed for the emotion 
condition for the proportion of correct responses: F(1,19) = 17.384, p = .001, η2p = .478. 
A closer look indicated that the negative words were recognised more often than the 
neutral words. No significant effect was found for perspective: F(1,19) = 3.177, p = .091, 
and there was no interaction between the two conditions, F(1,19) = .048, p = .828.  
Discussion 
Self-related information does not only impact memory (Symons & Johnson, 1997) 
but influences the early stages of attention also (Phelps et al., 2006). By creating a new 
paradigm (the matching task) based on the work of  Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012), it 
was possible to examine the early self-priority effect of attention. The matching task was 
followed-up by an old/new task in order to examine a potential self-reference effect in 
memory. Furthermore, since emotion too influences early attentional processes (Bruner 
& Postman, 1947) and later memory (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006) processes, the connection 
between self and emotion was investigated.  
Table 2. Experiment 1a, old/new task.  Proportion correct responses, Median RT, and d’. Standard 
error in parenthesis. 
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
D’ 
Correct Correct 
Self .64 (.03) .64 (.03) 0.93 (0.08) 
Other .58 (.03) .58 (.03) 0.78 (0.08) 
Negative .71 (.03) .67 (.03) 0.93 (0.08) 
Neutral .51 (.04) .55 (.03) 0.77 (0.09) 
Self/Negative .71 (.03) .70 (.03) 0.97 (0.08) 
Self/Neutral .56 (.05) .58 (.04) 0.89 (0.10) 
Other/Negative .71 (.04) .65 (.04) 0.90 (0.10) 
Other/Neutral .45 (.05) .52 (.04) 0.65 (0.09) 
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The results from the matching task show that via the higher proportion correct 
responses, faster responses and better signal detection (d’) for words linked to the self, 
information was prioritized when self-relevant, and these findings are in line with previous 
research (Sui et al., 2012, 2014; Wang et al., 2016). Therefore, it can be concluded that a 
self-priority effect was found in Experiment 1a. This shows that self-relevance influences 
attention. The self-priority effect was achieved by using a perceptual matching paradigm 
that avoided any influence of familiarity. These findings add to the robust findings of a 
self-priority effect using this paradigm (Sui et al., 2012, 2014; Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). 
The results demonstrate that our attention is drawn to self-related items in our 
environment over items that are not related to the self. In other words, this helps us to 
select relevant information from our surroundings in an automatic, efficient and fast 
manner.  
However, the emotional valence of the words did not have a significant effect on 
the matched trials. Emotion was expected to influence perception and attention also.  As 
is discussed shortly, emotion does seem to have a very clear and robust effect on the 
subsequent old/new recognition task. Furthermore, past research has shown the effect 
of processing emotion-laden information on perception and attention (decreased 
reaction times, Bruner & Postman, 1947; Increased contrast threshold, Phelps et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, emotional words are even more automatically processed than regular 
words (McKenna & Sharma, 1995). Therefore, it can be assumed that the emotional value 
of the word was processed for the matched trials, but the experimental setup of the 
matching task fails to highlight this effect, especially since a threat-driven slowing down 
of ongoing activity is expected for negative words as demonstrated by the emotional 
Stroop task (Algom et al., 2004; Öhman et al., 2001). A possible reason is that participants 
did not have to actively read the words in order to perform the matching task, i.e. 
participants were likely to respond as soon as they perceived the label and the colour of 
the emotion-word combination. This response was likely well before the word was fully 
processed.  In the task, the words remained onscreen for two seconds irrespective of the 
latency of participants’ responses. Since it was explicitly mentioned in the instruction that 
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the words must be read and that people cannot help reading a word that is displayed in 
front of them (Logan, 1988), it can be assumed that the words were read. This insured 
that the fast colour processing of the word was followed by the processing of the 
emotional value of the word. This is further exemplified by the significant effect of 
emotion for the non-matching trials. Although the non-matched trials are unclear 
regarding self-relevance, the slower processing of the more difficult matching-judgement 
during the non-matched trials allowed for a measurable influence of emotion. 
Furthermore, Previous literature did find that emotion influences early perception and 
attention processes (Phelps et al., 2006). Therefore, the absence of an emotion effect in 
Experiment 1a on the matching task may be due to the nature of the task itself (a rapid 
matching judgement via colour recognition before word meaning processing).  
In support of this, it was found that during the non-matching trials of Experiment 
1a the overall RTs were higher than the overall RTs for the matching trials. The matching 
judgement during the non-matching trials was more difficult as there was a mismatch 
between the colour of the word and the label. This greater task difficulty possibly had the 
effect of increasing processing time for the non-match trials and in turn provided enough 
time for emotion to have a measurable effect. Because of this, negative emotion did 
significantly increase the RTs for the non-matching trials. Nonetheless, the exact 
interpretation of the non-matched trials remains problematic as the self-relatedness of 
the trials is unclear (i.e. the label “yourself” might already make the words self-relevant, 
even if matched with the colour linked to a distant other).  
Despite the lack of a main effect of emotion on the matching task, there still was 
a measurable effect of emotion on the later memory recall task. It was found that negative 
words were recognised more often compared to neutral words. Therefore, emotion did 
influence memory processes as measured with the old/new recognition task. This 




In order to test whether the lacking effect of emotion on the matching task was a 
consequence of processing time, as was argued above, a further experiment was 
conducted. In this experiment, an attempt was made to delay the participant’s response 
until after the word has been read. If the lack of an effect was a consequence of limited 
processing time of the word, then we should expect an effect of emotion to emerge 
under the different task conditions of this experiment.  
Where the matching task showed a clear self-priority effect, the old/new 
recognition task revealed a self-reference effect and an effect of emotion. Participants 
recognised more self-relevant words and more negative words correctly, faster, and with 
better signal to noise detection (d’). These results show that information related to 
emotionally negative events or the self are recalled more easily than neutral information 
or information not related to the self.  
However, no interaction was found between emotion (negative) and perspective 
(self-related words). This appears to be at odds with earlier experiments suggesting a 
reduced effect for negative self-related items compared to positive self-related items 
(Gutchess et al., 2007; Leshikar et al., 2015). Even so, this might not be a strange finding 
in the sense that the enhancing effects of emotion and the enhancing effect of the self 
on memory are possibly two distinct processes (Stolte et al., 2016). Taken separately, 
these findings support the idea that emotional (negative) events are remembered more 
easily (Alicke, 1985; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Mather, 2007). This 
possibly supports the concept that emotion enhances later recollection of an item if that 
item is of higher priority (i.e. ABC-theory (Mather & Sutherland, 2011)). In this case, the 
participants were instructed that a memory task will follow the matching task. This means 
that the nouns were goal relevant and of high priority, which lead to greater recall for all 
emotional words. The emotional information is processed separately from the self-
relevant information as they were not directly linked together in the matching task. Lastly, 
because people tend to readily associate positive events with themselves and avoid 
linking negative events to the self (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; 
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Taylor, 1991), it remains possible that a reduction of self-relevance by negative 
information would be minimal. Previous research did find an enhancing effect of positive 
emotion on self-relevant information, compared to an increased effect of negative 
information in a non-self or semantic condition (Gutchess et al., 2007; Leshikar et al., 
2015). This experiment compared self versus distant other and not self versus a semantic 
condition. Therefore, it is possible that negative self-related information does not lead to 
a reduced self-reference effect per se when compared to distant other-relevant negative 
information. However, a clear interaction between positive emotion and self-relevant 
information has been shown by previous research (Gutchess et al., 2007; Leshikar et al., 
2015). Therefore, the next experiment will use positive nouns linked to the self in a similar 
paradigm as used in Experiment 1a. 
Experiment 1b: The self and positive emotions 
The previous experiment (1a) has shown a self-priority effect on attention, as 
measured by the matching task. However, negative emotions did not seem to impact 
attention. An old/new recognition task followed the matching task and revealed an effect 
of self on memory and separately an effect of emotion on memory. The main purpose 
of Experiment 1b is to see if positive emotions will generate similar results. Furthermore, 
Experiment 1a was adapted to delay the participant’s response slightly during the 
matching task. This should allow for a measurable effect of emotion on the matching 
task. No interaction between perspective and emotion was found in Experiment 1a. 
However, opposite to negative emotions, which might cause some distancing of the self 
from negative events, positive events may result in a stronger self-reference effect.  
Furthermore, in Experiment 1a, the matching task revealed no effect of emotion 
(an effect of emotion was only found for the non-matched trials). As discussed, this could 
be due to the faster matching judgement for the matched trials. Therefore an attempt is 
made to delay the participants’ response in the matching task, which should then show 
an effect of emotion.  
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The main purpose of Experiment 1b is to study the effects of positive emotions 
and the self on attention and memory. Where negative emotion could potentially weaken 
the self-reference effect, positive emotions might have the opposite result. In other 
words, participants will be more accurate on the old/new matching task for self-related 
items compared to items not related to the self. However, this effect will be larger for 
positive words than for neutral words. With the “delay” (explained below in the methods 
section) to the matching task, it is likely that beyond a self-priority effect, an effect of 
emotion will be observed as well. This means that participants will be faster and more 
accurate for self-related items compared to items related to a distant other and this effect 
possibly interacts with emotion, i.e. the predicted beneficial effect for self-related items 
will be stronger for positive items when compared to neutral items. 
Methods  
Participants 
Twenty participants took part in this study. However, screening of the data showed 
that three participants performed at chance level and were not included in the 
subsequent analysis (N = 17,  mean age 22 years, range 18-59 years ).  All participants 
were female.  
Stimuli 
The materials were the same as Experiment 1a except for three changes: first, the 
negative valence words were replaced with positive valence words from the same word 
database of Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert (2013) creating a list of 280 words. Half 
of which were neutral and the other was positive (valence > 6.0, arousal > 5); second, 40 
of the 280 words were catchwords and were added to ensure that participants were 
reading the words during the matching trials and  always described something living (e.g. 
‘puppy’, ‘dragon’, ‘tomato’). Third, the colours used in this experiment for the matching 
task were changed from ‘salmon’ and ‘slate-blue’ to ‘dark-cyan’ (RGB: 0, 136, 136; referred 
to as ‘jade’) and ‘dark-yellow’ (RGB: 183, 137, 0; referred to as ‘yellow’). In Experiment 1a, 
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participants referred to the salmon colour as ‘pink’. Since pink can have very strong 
gender-specific meaning/ preference (Koller, 2008), the colour was changed.  
The words were again derived from the database of Warriner et al. (2013). 
However this time instead of negative words, positive words (valence > 6, arousal > 5) 
were chosen, the neutral words chosen in the same way as Experiment 1a (valence 
between 5-6, arousal < 3). 280 words were dived into two lists of 140 words for each.  
These lists were then subdivided into four sets: 35 words were neutral and linked to the 
self (self/neutral); 35 words were positive and linked to the self (self/positive); 35 words 
were neutral and linked to a distant other (other/neutral); and 35 were positive and linked 
to a distant other (other/positive). Of each category, five of the 35 words were the catch-
words.  This thus created two main lists with two main conditions each: perspective, 
emotion, and each condition contained catch-trials (words describing something living, 
e.g. ‘dragon’, ‘goat’, ‘girl’).  
Procedure 
The setup is the same as Experiment 1a. However, there were some changes 
specifically for the matching task. Added to the normal procedure outlined in the 
methods section of Experiment 1a, the participants were now instructed to withhold any 
response if the word describes something living (i.e. the catchwords). For this experiment, 
the participants were instructed: “You are a yellow colour; A stranger is a jade colour.” 
The colour linked to stranger and self was counterbalanced across participants.  
Results 
Matching task 
The d’ data for signal detection showed a significant effect for perspective: F(1,16)= 
20.886, p < .001, η2p = .566. This difference was caused by a higher sensitivity in detecting 
a signal for the self-related words when compared to words linked to a stranger. No 
significant effect was observed for emotion: F(1,16) = .259, p = .618; nor was there an 
interaction between perspective and emotion: F (1,16) = 1.208, p = .288, see Figure 7. For 
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an overview of all means and standard errors for the matching task Experiment 1b, see 
Table 3. 
For the matched trials, the proportion of correct responses showed a similar 
pattern was found for perspective, F(1,16)= 16.273 , p = .001 , η2p = .504. Words linked to 
the self were responded to more accurately than words linked to distant other. Emotion 
did not show a significant difference, F(1,16)= 2.519, p = .132. There was no interaction 
between the conditions of emotion and perspective, F(1,16) = 1.076, p = .315. 
Very similar findings were found when looking at the RT data, where the 
differences in median correct RT was compared for the matched trials (See Figure 8A). A 
main effect of perspective was found, F(1,16)= 133.250, p < .001, η2p = .893; The self-
related words are responded faster to for the matched trials when compared to words 
related to a distant other. No significant result were found for emotion, F(1,16) = .007, p 
= .936, and no interaction between perspective and emotion, F(1,16) = .155, p = .699 (see 
Figure 8B). 
For the non-matched trials, a significant difference for perspective was calculated 
for the proportion of correct responses: F(1,16) = 5.201, p = .037, η2p = .245. Like the 
matched trials, the words related to the self are responded to more accurately than the 
                                                                                                
(Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001) 







































































words related to distant other. Again, no effect of emotion (F(1,16) = 1.000, p = .332) was 
found and there also was no interaction between emotion and perspective (F(1,16) = .653, 
p = .432).  
The RT data for the non-matched trials revealed a significant main effect for 
perspective, F(1,16) = 5.956, p = .027, η2p = .271. Words related to the self were responded 
to faster than words related to distant other. There was no main effect of emotion, F(1,16) 
= .005, p = .943. However, a significant interaction was observed between emotion and 
perspective, F(1,16) = 12.263, p = .003, η2p = .434. A further analysis of this interaction 
revealed that perspective had a significant effect on the neutral trials (p = .002), 
other/neutral trials were responded to faster than other-positive trials. Perspective had 
no significant effect on the positive trials (p = .780). When looking at distant other-related 
trials, a significant difference was found for emotion (p = .032). The other-neutral trials 
were responded to significantly faster than the positive words linked to distant other. 
There was no effect of emotion for the self-related trials (p = .102).  
                                                                                 A) RT for perspective, matched trials. B) RT 
for interaction emotion and perspective, matched trials. (Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** 
= p<.01, *** = p<.001) 
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The d’ findings of the old/new task revealed two main effects: perspective F(1,16) 
= 10.696 , p = .005, η2p = .401; emotion F(1,16) = 19.773, p <.001, η2p = .553. The d’ for 
words related to the self (.81) were higher than words related to a distant other (.66), See 
Figure 9A. Furthermore, participants were more sensitive in detecting a signal for the 
positive words when compared to the neutral words (.81 Vs .61), See Figure 9B. No 
significant interaction effect between perspective and emotion was found: F(1,16) = 1.535, 
p = .233. See Table 4 for the means and standard errors.  
The results for the proportion of correct responses on matched trials, showed 
significant main effects for: perspective, F(1,16) = 6.836, p = .019, η2p = .299; and emotion, 
F(1,16) = 5.673, p = .030, η2p = .262. Participants correctly recognized more words related 
to the self than to distant other-related words. The participants also recognized more 
positive words than neutral words, but no interaction was found between perspective 
and emotion, F(1,16) = .027, p = .872. 
Table 3. Experiment 1b, Matching task. Proportion correct responses, median RT, and d’. 
Standard error in parenthesis.   
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
D’ 
Correct RT Correct RT 
Self .89 (.03) 1121.43 (30.86) .87 (.02) 1221.77 (29.07) 2.90 (0.27) 
Other .71 (.04) 1319.40 (37.94) .81 (.03) 1282.29 (36.98) 1.74 (0.26) 
Positive .82 (.03) 1219.62 (37.87) .83 (.02) 1252.82 (29.41) 2.37 (0.24) 
Neutral .79 (.03) 1221.21 (31.66) .85 (.03) 1251.24 (35.77) 2.28 (0.27 
Self/Positive .92 (.02) 1117.24 (25.67) .86 (.03) 1247.47 (34.40) 3.02 (0.30) 
Self/Neutral .87 (.04) 1125.62 (38.99) .87 (.03) 1196.06 (30.75) 2.78 (0.31) 
Other/Positive .72 (.04) 1325.18 (43.03) .79 (.03) 1255.00 (41.53) 1.71 (0.28) 
Other/Neutral .71 (.05) 1313.62 (42.17) .83 (.03) 1309.59 (35.77) 1.78 (0.29) 
85 
The non-matched trials only revealed a significant main effect of emotion, F(1,16) 
= 14.465, p = .002, η2p = 475. Looking closer at this significant finding, a greater 
proportion of correct responses were revealed for the positive words when compared to 
the neutral words. No significant results were found for perspective, F(1,16) = 2.431, p = 
.139, and there was no interaction between perspective and emotion, F(1,16) = .2.658, p 
= .123. 
 
                                          
                                                                            A) d’ main effect of emotion. B) d’ main effect of
perspective (Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001) 
Table 4.  Experiment 1b, old/new task. Proportion correct responses, Median RT, and d’. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
D’ 
Correct Correct 
Self .68 (.03) .56 (.02) 0.81 (0.08) 
Other .60 (.02) .52 (.04) 0.66 (0.07) 
Positive .67 (.02) .60 (.03) 0.86 (0.08) 
Neutral .61 (.02) .48 (.03) 0.61 (0.08) 
Self/Positive .70 (.03) .64 (.03) 0.97 (0.08) 
Self/Neutral .65 (.03) .48 (.02) 0.65 (0.09) 
Other/Positive .64 (.03) .55 (.04) 0.75 (0.09) 
Other/Neutral .57 (.03) .49 (.04) 0.57 (0.08) 



























































The main difference between Experiment 1b and Experiment 1a was the use of 
positive emotions instead of negative emotions. The main reason for this change was to 
explore if positive emotions would influence the matching task and old/new task in a 
similar way compared Experiment 1a, which used negative emotions. Experiment 1a 
showed a main effect of perspective for the matching task.  
As predicted, a main effect was found of perspective for the matching task. No 
effect of emotion was found, despite adding catch trials. However, most participants 
reported that even though they understood the rule of withholding a response when the 
word describes something living, they would often be too late in realising that the word 
did indeed describe something living and would have made a response already. This can 
be seen in the results as in over 50% of the living condition participants responded 
regardless. This coincides with earlier findings that suggested that participants respond 
to the label and colour combination before properly processing the meaning of the word. 
The matching task did once again show a robust self-priority effect, showing that 
information related to the self is prioritised over information not related to the self. The 
full advantage of the self-priority effect is displayed in the greater accuracy and reaction 
times for the words linked to the self in the matched trials, displaying a clear self-priority 
effect, providing further support for the prioritising effect of self-related information. 
Potentially interesting, where the RTs in Experiment 1a were increased for the non-
matching negative nouns, the non-matching trials in Experiment 1b demonstrated a self-
priority effect for only the positive trials, with faster RTs for the positive-self trials than for 
the positive-distant other trials. These differences in RTs for positive emotions (faster RT 
for positive-self trials) and negative emotions (slower RT for negative trials) show typical 
preference to relate positive emotions to the self and a typical withdrawal from negative 
emotions (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Taylor, 1991). It remains possible 
that the slowing down of the negative trials of Experiment 1 was in response to an 
automatic threat-driven process as typically measured by the emotional Stroop task. 
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However, positive emotion would not be affected by this defensive mechanism for 
threatening stimuli. Furthermore, the effect was different depending on the perspective.   
The old/new task showed a main effect of emotion and perspective, as was 
predicted. However, there was again no interaction between perspective and emotion. 
This suggests that the self-reference effect was present for both neutral and positive 
words, with no significant difference between the two conditions. These findings are 
similar to what was observed in Experiment 1a with negative nouns, again lending support 
to the separate processing of emotional and self-related information (Stolte et al., 2016).  
However, a crucial difference between the experiments of Gutchess et al. (2007), 
and Leshikar et al. (2015) is in how the self-reference effect is being measured or 
manipulated. In the experiments of this thesis, the self-reference effect is achieved via the 
matching task, which links the to-be-remembered information (i.e. the nouns) indirectly 
to the self (i.e. the colour). This way, the amount of elaboration of the to-be-remembered 
information is relatively the same regardless of condition. In a typical self-reference 
experiment, a word is linked to the self by asking the participants a yes/no question with 
regards to the word and themselves, for example: does the trait patience describe you? 
This potentially allows for more in-depth processing and encoding compared to the 
matching experiment where the word is not relevant to the task. Participants are warned 
that a memory task follows. Nevertheless, the task’s pace does not allow for any in-depth 
encoding. The consequence of which will be further explored later. First however is the 
possibility that the nouns used in Experiment 1a and 1b are more difficult to link to the 
self compared to the adjectives used in the experiments by Gutchess et al. (2007), and 
Leshikar et al. (2015). Therefore the next experiment will aim to replicate the current 




Experiment 1c: The self & negative trait-words 
The last two experiments revealed that words linked to the self are more 
accurately recalled than words not linked to the self. However, this effect seems to be 
influenced equally by both positive and negative emotions. It remains possible that the 
emotional words in the previous experiment were not personal and therefore, less self-
relevant. The current experiment aims to further influence the self-reference effect by 
using negative words that are more personal or closer to the self by nature. For this 
reason, trait-words are used in this experiment (e.g. arrogant). Since trait-words are more 
easily applied to the self, it is expected that negative trait words result in a greater 
distancing from the self (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Ma & Han, 2010). This means that negative 
trait words linked to the self will result in a reduced or abolished self-reference effect 
(Gutchess et al., 2007; Leshikar et al., 2015), compared to neutral self-related trait words. 
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-five participants from Oxford Brookes University participated for course 
credit. However, four participants were excluded from further data-analysis because two 
participants failed to learn the matching task and one participant performed below 
chance level for the old/new recognition task, and one participant was excluded due to 
technical failure. Of the remaining 21 participants, 20 were female, and one was male 
(mean age: 19.71 years, range: 18-33 years). 
Stimuli and procedure 
A different set of words were used as stimuli for this experiment as the words were 
replaced by trait words using the wordlist compiled by Dumas, Johnson, & Lynch, (2002). 
In this database, the ratings of likableness (1 = “would not like the person at all” – 6 = 
“would like the person very much”) and familiarity (1 = “not familiar with the word at all” 
– 6 = “very familiar with the word”) of the trait words are provided.  Only the very familiar 


























This created a wordlist of 200 trait words and similar to the previous experiments these 
words were divided into two main word-lists using the exact process described for 
Experiment 1a, creating two unique lists with neutral and negative trait words. The 
average word length was similar across conditions (8.62). The procedure for the matching 
and old/new trials is precisely the same as Experiment 1b without the catch trials since the 
catch trials did not have the desired impact.  
Results 
Matching task 
Participants were more accurate in correctly detecting a signal (d’) for the self 
condition when compared to the distant other-condition, F(1,20) = 4.928, p = .038, η2p 
= .198, see Figure 10. Like the previous experiments no effect of emotion was found 
during the matching task (F(1,20) = .074, p = .789), nor was there an interaction between 
emotion and perspective (F(1,20) = .022, p = .885). Table 5 provides an overview of the 
means and standard errors for the matching task.  
                                                                         Mean d’ for perspective on the matching task (Error bar 
= standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 



























The same pattern is observed for the proportion of correct responses during the 
matched trials. Again a main effect of perspective (F(1,20) = 9.780, p = .005, η2p = .328) 
was found as participants provided more correct responses for the self condition when 
compared to the distant other-condition. There was no main effect of emotion (F(1,20) 
<.001, p = 1.00) and no interaction between emotion and perspective (F(1,20) = .074, p 
= .789). For the non-matched trial no significant effects were observed: perspective 
(F(1,20) = .192, p = .666); emotion (F(1,20) = .380, p = .545); emotion X perspective (F(1,20) 
= .192, p = .666).  
The most obvious benefit of the self condition was observed for the median 
reaction times on the matched trials correct responses (F(1,20) = 32.818, p < .001, η2p = 
.621). Participants responded faster to the words from the self condition compared to 
words from the distant other-condition, see Figure 11. Again, for the non-matched trials 
there were no main effects of emotion, perspective nor an interaction between emotion 
and perspective (F(1,20) = respectively: 1.245, p = .278; .106 , p = .748; 1.037, p = .321).  
                                                                                          RT for perspective on the matching task, 
matched trials (Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 
Figure 11. Median RT matching task, Experiment 1c.
***
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Old new task 
Two main effects were found for the old/new task with the d’ measurement (see 
Figure 12A):  perspective (F(1,20) = 5.828, p = .025, η2p = .226), where the d’ of self was
higher when compared to distant other; and emotion (F(1,20) = 15.722, p = .001, η2p = 
.440), where the d’ was higher for the negative emotions than the neutral emotions, see 
Figure 12B. There was no significant interaction effect, F(1,20) = 1.336, p = .261. See Table 
6 for an overview of the means and standard error for the old/new task.  
For the proportion of correct responses, a distinction could be made again for the 
matching and non-matching trials. For the matching trials, two significant effects were 
found. A main effect was found for emotion (F(1,20) = 9.508, p = .006, η2p = .322) where
participants correctly recalled more negative words compared to neutral words. No main 
effect was observed for perspective (F(1,20) = 1.907, p = .183). However, perspective and 
emotion were found to significantly interact (F(1,20) = 4.915, p = .038, η2p = .197). A
further inspection revealed that there was no significant effect of emotion when only 
Table 5.  Experiment 1c, Matching task. Proportion correct responses, median RT, and d’. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
d’ 
Correct RT Correct RT 
Self .92 (.05) 858.01 (23.68) .85 (.05) 1040.06 (34.56) 3.31 (0.29) 
Other .86 (.05) 1037.78 (38.45) .86 (.05) 1045.08 (35.48) 2.90 (0.32) 
Negative .89 (.05) 938.28 (27.90) .86 (.05) 1027.84 (29.42) 3.12 (0.27) 
Neutral .89 (.05) 957.51 (29.89) .85 (.05) 1057.30 (42.63) 3.09 (0.33) 
Self/Negative .92 (.05) 860.30 (26.49) .86 (.05) 1014.04 (33.45) 3.34 (0.28) 
Self/Neutral .92 (.05) 855.71 (24.25) .84 (.06) 1066.08 (47.45) 3.28 (0.32) 
Other/Negative .86 (.05) 1016.27 (37.20) .86 (.05) 1041.64 (34.17) 2.90 (0.31) 















































looking at the words from the self condition (p = .057), but there was a clear significant 
effect of emotion for the words from the distant other-condition (p = .002). Participants 
responded more accurately for the negative words related to a distant other compared 
to distant other-related neutral words. Furthermore, an effect of perspective was only 
found for the neutral words (p = .032). Participants correctly judged more neutral words 
as old for self-related words, than distant other-related words. No difference was found 





For the non-matching trials there was no interaction between perspective and 
emotion (F(1,20) = .286, p = .599), nor was there a main effect of perspective (F(1,20) = 
1.827, p = .192). Only a main effect of emotion (F(1,20) = 6.761, p = .017, η2p = .253) was
observed, where negative words were  recalled more often than neutral words.  
                                                                          d’ of perspective on the old/new task (A) and d’ of 
emotion on the old/new task (B) (Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 
A B 




                                                                                                                          The interaction between 
emotion and perspective for the proportion of correct responses (Error bar = standard error,* = p<.05, 
** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 
Table 6.  Experiment 1c, old/new task. Proportion correct responses, Median RT, and d’. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
D’ 
Correct Correct 
Self .61 (.03) .57 (.03) 0.53 (0.08) 
Other .57 (.02) .53 (.03) 0.43 (0.07) 
Negative .63 (.02) .59 (.03) 0.59 (0.07) 
Neutral .55 (.02) .52 (.03) 0.38 (0.08) 
Self/Negative .62 (.04) .61 (.04) 0.61 (0.07) 
Self/Neutral .59 (.03) .53 (.04) 0.46 (0.10) 
Other/Negative .64 (.04) .56 (.04) 0.57 (0.90) 
Other/Neutral .50 (.03) .50 (.04) 0.30 (0.07) 



































The matching task of Experiment 1c showed similar results as the previous two 
experiments. This means that no effect of emotion was found for the matching task for 
the matched trials. This is despite the fact that effort had been made to make the words 
more personally relevant by using negative trait-words. Therefore, the original 
explanation of this missing effect of emotion still stands: the colours of the words were 
processed faster than the meaning of the words and its subsequent emotional effect. 
Therefore, later memory processes were influenced by emotion, but emotion did not 
influence early perceptual processes. A main effect of perspective is found, and this 
replicates the findings of the previous experiments (Experiment 1a-b). Experiment 1c 
showed that participants were not only faster in detecting self-relevant information but 
also made more accurate judgements, and were more capable of distinguishing self-
related signals from noise. 
For the old/new task emotion had an effect on memory as d’ revealed main effects 
of perspective and emotion. The d’ measure therefore again indicated an overall effect 
of emotion and self but no interaction. However, when looking at the proportion of 
correct responses for only the matched trials, an interesting pattern unfolds. Unlike 
Experiment 1a and 1b, there was no main effect of perspective, indicating that emotional 
trait-words did influence the self differently than just emotional nouns, but there was an 
interesting interaction between emotion and perspective. The interaction was caused by 
an effect of self for the neutral words, but not for the negative words. An effect of emotion 
was only found for the words related to a distant other and not for words related to the 
self.  
This shows that by using trait-words, the effect of negative emotions seem to 
influence the self-reference effect and similarly self-reference influences emotion, 
although the exact nature of this interaction between emotion and self remains unclear 
as negative self-related words do not outperform neutral self-related words or negative 
distant other-related words. If negative emotions were the main mnemonic influence, 
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then negative trait-words should still result in more recognised words in the self condition 
for negative words. However, no differences between negative and neutral words were 
found for the self condition. The same holds in reverse: if the self-reference effect was 
the main reason behind the increase in memory recall, a self-reference effect should be 
observed for both negative and neutral conditions. These data, therefore, seem to 
suggest that emotion and self separately influence memory processes, but when both 
conditions coincide (i.e. emotional self-related information) no additive effect is found. It 
is difficult with the current data to interpret how self and emotional trait words influence 
each other. Therefore in the next two experiments, this process is examined further by 
replicating Experiment 1c with positive trait words in Experiment 1d and looking for any 
additive effect of self and emotion together in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 1d: The self & positive trait words 
In order to test whether the memory results of Experiment 1c were due to the 
influence of emotion per se or specifically to the influence of negative emotions, 
Experiment 1d used positive trait word stimuli. Research suggests that negative emotions 
might results in a distancing of the self (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 
1993; Taylor, 1991), but Experiment 1a with negative nouns and Experiment 1b with positive 
nouns showed similar main effects of emotion and perspective on memory and no 
interaction. 
Therefore, based on the results on Experiment 1a and 1b, it was predicted that 
positive valence would impact memory processes similarly to Experiment 1c. This is 
because the results of Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b did not show a different effect of 
positive or negative emotions on the self-reference effect. Like Experiment 1c, the use of 
emotional trait-words created a more personal emotional self-relevance. It is possible 
that the use of positive words will allow for an easier link to the self when compared to 
self-related negative words. Since both trait-words experiments are identical in the 




A total of 22 participants took part in this experiment. Two participants were 
removed from further analysis due to a below change level performance on the matching 
task. Of the remaining 20 participants, 19 were female, and one was male (mean age: 
19.35 years; range 18–33 years).   
Stimuli and procedure 
For Experiment 1d the same stimuli and procedure were used as in Experiment 1c, 
except for the valence of the trait words. Whereas Experiment 1c used negative trait 
words, Experiment 1d used positive trait words.  The positive trait words were derived 
from the same word database by Dumas, Johnson, and Lynch, (2002). The same word 
selection procedure was used as with Experiment 1c, but the selection of the positive 
words were all based on the likableness scale score > 5 and words familiarity score > 3.  
Results 
Matching task 
For the matching task a signal detection analysis (d’) revealed that participants 
were more capable in separating signal from noise in the self condition when compared 
to the distant other-condition, F(1,19) = 15.183, p = .002, η2p = .397, see Figure 14. Also 
see Table 7 for an overview of the means and standard errors. No such difference was 
found for emotion, F(1,19) = .045, p = .834. However, a significant interaction was found 
between perspective and emotion, F(1,19) = 4.562, p = .046, η2p = .194.  
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The proportion of correct responses for the matched trials showed that 
participants responded more accurately to words related to the self than words related 
to a distant other, F(1,19) = 13.535, p = .002, η2p = .416. All other effect were non-
significant: F(1,19) emotion <.001. p = 1.00; emotion × perspective = .014, p = .166; non-
matched perspective = 2.430, p = .136; non-matched emotion = 1.120, p = .303; non-
matched perspective × emotion = 1.046, p = .319.  
The median reaction times  for the matched trials were faster for the self-related 
words when compared to the words linked to a distant other, F(1,19) = 33.173, p < .001, 
η2p = .636, see Figure 15. No other significant effects were found: F(1,19) emotion = .921, 
p = .349; perspective × emotion = .018, p = .895; non-matched perspective = .714, p = 
.409); non-matched emotion = .061, p = .807; non-matched perspective × emotion = 
.180, p = .676.  
                                                                          Mean d’ of perspective for the matching task (Error bar 
= standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 




























                                                                                        Median RT of perspective for the matching 
task, matched trials (Error bar = standard error,* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 
Table 7. Experiment 1d, Matching task. Proportion correct responses, median RT, and d’. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
D’ 
Correct RT Correct RT 
Self .91 (.03) 1012.36 (31.45) .88 (.03) 1216.34 (34.16) 3.15 (0.32) 
Other .81 (.03) 1201.33 (33.63) .84 (.03) 1191.83 (36.34) 2.28 (0.25) 
Positive .86 (.03) 1091.90 (26.58) .84 (.03) 1206.49 (34.10) 2.68 (0.26) 
Neutral .86 (.03) 1118.79 (34.43) .87 (.03) 1201.68 (34.06) 2.74 (0.26) 
Self/Positive .93 (.03) 998.58 (35.32) .87 (.04) 1222.00 (35.54) 3.20 (0.32) 
Self/Neutral .90 (.03) 1026.15 (39.72) .88 (.03) 1210.68 (35.90) 3.09 (0.32) 
Other/Positive .80 (.04) 1191.23 (32.36) .81 (.04) 1190.98 (10.811) 2.15 (0.25) 




























Figure 15. Median RT matching task, Experiment 1d.    
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Old/new task 
The d’ results from the old/new task revealed that that the participants were more 
sensitive in detecting signal from noise for the words related to the self than words related 
to a distant other, F(1,19) = 6.034, p = .024, η2p = .241, see Figure 16A. Similarly, 
participants were more sensitive in detecting a signal in the old/new task if the words 
were neutral (.573) compared to positive (.456), F(1,19) = 4.674, p = .044, η2p = .197, see 
Figure 16B. However, no interaction between the two main conditions of perspective and 
emotion was found, F(1,19) = 1.800, p = .195.   
When looking at the matched trials old words only, the participants were more 
accurate for the words related to self than from the distant other-condition, F(1,19) = 
4.361, p = .050, η2p = .187, and positive words were remembered correctly more often 
than neutral words, F(1,19) = 23.514, p < .001, η2p = .553. Furthermore, there was a 
significant interaction between perspective and emotion, F(1,19) = 14.413, p = .001, η2p = 
.431.   Further analysis revealed that this interaction was driven by a significantly greater 
accuracy for positive words compared to neutral words linked to a distant other (p <.001). 
No significant effect of emotion was found for the self-relevant trials (p = .285). 
Furthermore, a significant self-reference effect was found for neutral words (p = .002). 
                                                                          Mean d’ for perspective (A) and mean d’ for emotion 
(B) for the old/new task (Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001)
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There was no significant difference between self-related positive words and distant other-
related positive words (p = .126). See Figure 17 for a graph of the interaction and Table 8 
for the means and standard errors for the proportion of correct responses and d’.  
For the non-matched old words, a significant effect was found for perspective, 
F(1,19) = 5.159, p = .035, η2p = .214, where words related to the self were more often 
correctly remembered than words related to a distant other. There was no main effect of 
emotion for the non-matched words (F(1,19) = 1.739, p = .203), and there was no 
interaction between emotion and perspective (F(1,19) = .589, p = .452).  
                                                                                                             The interaction between 
emotion and perspective for the proportion of correct responses, matched trials (Error bar = standard 
error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 




































The results of Experiment 1d were very similar to the results of Experiment 1c. Again 
the matching task showed a strong effect of self as shown by better performance on the 
signal detection measure. This was also shown for the matched trials in terms of faster 
and more accurate responses. As previously explained, there was no effect of emotion 
for the matching task.  
For the old/new task, the observed effects are again very similar to Experiment 1c. 
Interestingly the d’ data revealed a weaker effect on memory for the positive trait-words 
compared to neutral. However, this was not further supported by the proportion correct 
responses which can be further subdivided into matched and non-matched conditions, 
possibly indicating that the non-matched trials influenced the d' data. When looking at 
the proportion correct responses data, positive trait-words and trait-words related to the 
self led to better memory separately, but positive emotion and the self together did not 
lead to greater recognition from memory than each condition by itself. 
Table 8.  Experiment 1d, old/new task. Proportion correct responses, Median RT, and d’. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
D’ 
Correct Correct 
Self .67 (.03) .65 (.02) 0.57 (0.05) 
Other .63 (.03) .60 (.03) 0.46 (0.06) 
Positive .72 (.03) .65 (.03) 0.46 (0.06) 
Neutral .59 (.03) .60 (.03) 0.57 (0.06) 
Self/Positive .69 (.04) .66 (.04) 0.48 (0.06) 
Self/Neutral .65 (.03) .63 (.02) 0.66 (0.07) 
Other/Positive .74 (.03) .63 (.04) 0.43 (0.07) 
Other/Neutral .52 (.03) .56 (.03) 0.49 (0.07) 
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Taken together, Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d all suggest that emotion and self 
are processed independently from each other, at least in terms of memory processing. 
Unlike the experiments of Gutchess et al. (2007) and  Leshikar et al. (2015), positive or 
negative self-related information does not seem to lead to an increase or decrease of 
the self-relevance effect. No interaction was found in Experiment 1a or Experiment 1b, 
and the interaction between emotion and perspective in Experiment 1c or Experiment 1d 
did not support a direct influence of emotion on self-referential processing.  If positive 
emotions did have an additive effect on the self, then a greater self-reference effect for 
the positive trials would have been expected when compared to neutral trials. Oppositely, 
if negative emotions disrupt self-related processes, a decreased self-reference effect 
should have been found for the negative trials when compared to the neutral trials.  
As mentioned, there are important differences between the experiments of this 
thesis and the study of Leshikar et al. (2015) and Gutchess et al. (2007) that could account 
for these observed differences. First, the Experiments 1a-d studied negative and positive 
emotion separately and compared the emotion trials with neutral trials. Possibly the offset 
between positive and negative emotions helped highlight the differences between the 
two emotions. However, emotion still improved recall for the self and distant other 
condition equally when using nouns (Experiment 1a and 1b), and when using emotional 
trait words (Experiment 1c and 1d) emotion did not affect self-related words. If the self 
withdraws from negative emotions, no such improvement (or at least less improvement) 
should have been observed for the negative nouns in the self-condition. Lastly, in the 
encoding phase of the experiments by Leshikar et al. (2015) and Gutchess et al. (2007), 
participants have to actively judge if the adjective describes them or not. As it is much 
easier to think of yourself in a positive way than in a negative way (Mezulis et al., 2004; 
Taylor, 1991), positive emotions were possibly less distracting from the encoding task than 
negative emotions. In the current experiments, the influence of emotion was more subtle 
in the matching (encoding) task as no decision had to be made involving the meaning 
and/or valence of the word. Furthermore, the main strength of the current encoding or 
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matching task was that participants did not judge if something described themselves, 
forgoing any influence of familiarity and social desirability.  
Therefore, the tentative conclusion made for now is that the effect of emotion 
that has been reported in the literature on self-relevance (Gutchess et al., 2007; Leshikar 
et al., 2015) are possibly the result of richer or more in-depth encoding compared to 
items not related to the self. Furthermore, during these experiments, positive words are 
actively linked to the participant, whereas the opposite occurs with negative information. 
This, in turn, results in better recall for positive self-related words, and reduced recall for 
negative self-related words. This is due to the distancing of the self from negative 
information and preferring positive information about the self (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; 
Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Mezulis et al., 2004; Ochsner, 2000; 
Sedikides & Green, 2004; Taylor, 1991). This did not happen in Experiments 1a-1d, because 
emotion was not directly linked to the self in a self-reflecting manner, but indirectly via 
the matching task for which the depth of encoding was equal across all conditions, but 
since self-related and emotional information is attended to faster and possibly more 
intensive, both aided encoding into memory. Thus, it seems that there is no interactive 
effect of self and emotion because the self-relevance judgement has already been made. 
Furthermore, emotion itself helps increase the salience of the word and as such, is goal 
relevant for the memory task (Mather & Sutherland, 2011).   
The lack of influence of emotion on self-related items in memory can represent 
the possibility that information involving the self and emotion may be processed via 
independent channels. This is in line with the findings of previous research that found no 
correlation between emotion processing and self-relevance processing (Stolte et al., 
2016). The argument here is not that emotion does not influence self-relevant processing. 
There is clear evidence that it does (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; 
Taylor, 1991). Therefore, the above seems to illustrate that emotion and self-related 
information influence attention and memory similarly, but the underlying processes are 
different. Potentially the influence of emotion can make an item more or less self-relevant, 
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but the methodology used in Experiments 1a-d does not link emotion and self together 
in a direct fashion. As a consequence, the stimuli used are self-relevant and emotional 
but not emotionally self-relevant.    
Looking at the results of Experiment 1c and 1d, emotion, in general, seems to improve 
memory processes irrespective of valence. However, there is a limit to the improvement 
of memory processes in both experiments. Self-relevance, combined with emotion, does 
not increase the proportion of correctly recognised words or vice versa. It is currently 
unknown to what extent the self and emotion influence each other. The current paradigm 
might not be able to highlight the relation between self and emotion clearly enough. 
Therefore, Experiment 2, reported in the next chapter, was designed to see if there is any 
interactive benefit of emotional valence on self-referenced words or not. This was done 
by adapting the matching paradigm used so far and ensuring that the valence judgement 




Redundancy gain emotional self 
Introduction Experiment 2 
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate the observed effects of self-
relevant emotional information further. The old/new tasks of Experiments 1 (especially 1c 
and 1d) showed that emotion and the self both influence memory. When memory items 
were paired with a self-associated stimulus, then those items tended to be better 
remembered than when items were paired with stimulus associated with someone other 
than the self. This shows the importance of self-relevance in driving memorability. When 
items were emotional in nature, then they also tended to be better remembered, against 
neutral-emotion control stimuli. However, Experiment 1c and Experiment 1d showed an 
interaction between emotion and self as well on the old/new task. The self-reference 
effect was only present for neutral stimuli, whereas improved recognition for emotional 
stimuli was only present for stimuli not related to the self. In other words, there appeared 
to be a ceiling where the combined effect of emotion and self is not greater than the 
effect of self and emotion separately.  It is difficult to determine from this memory 
recognition data alone if self and emotion operate completely independently as the data 
seems to suggest, or if both emotion and self combined can impact information 
processing, as previous research seems to suggest (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & 
Crocker, 1993; Gutchess et al., 2007; Leshikar et al., 2015; Taylor, 1991).   
In Chapter 2, the Experiments 1a-d all show a clear effect of self on attention. 
However, an effect of emotion was expected as well (Neisser, 1976; Öhman et al., 2001; 
Phelps et al., 2006; Ray, 1979; Reinecke et al., 2006; Vuilleumier, 2005; Williams, Ellis, et 
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al., 1996). Self and emotion are two systems that are critical for our being in the world 
and guide our interpersonal relationships in our daily life. A close link between self and 
emotion shape our daily experiences. For example, it has been suggested that self is 
critical for emotional experience (Tracy & Robins, 2004),  and emotion is critical for 
awareness of self (Northoff et al., 2006). Recent neuroscientific understanding of the role 
of self and emotion in guiding our behaviour has shown that self and emotion affects 
several cognitive processes. For example, self has been sown to increase perceptual and 
attention processes (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Brédart et al., 2006; Cherry, 1953; Keyes & 
Brady, 2010; Shapiro et al., 1997; Tong & Nakayama, 1999), and memory process (M. A. 
Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; M. A. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; M. A. Conway et al., 
2016; Kelley et al., 2002; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Rogers et al., 1977; Symons & Johnson, 
1997; Turk et al., 2013). In a study investigating self, other, general, and superficial syllable 
level encoding of positive and negative trait words Craik et al. (1999) found non 
significantly increased memory performance for self-related words compared to all the 
three conditions. The PET activation data from their study showed increased activation 
of the medial and right frontal cortex related to self-condition. Similarly, Kelley et al. 
(2002) also found better memory performance for self-condition compared with other. 
In a study examining attribution of emotion to self and others, Ochsner et al. (2004) found 
selective activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the left temporal cortex 
which was attributed to attention to and elaboration of internally generated information. 
In contrast to the self-related selective activation, the other related processing selectively 
activated the left lateral PFC including the Broca’s area and the medial occipital cortex. In 
addition to this their findings also showed common brain structures such as the mPFC, 
superior temporal gyrus (STG) and posterior cingulate/precuneus involved in processing 
self and other related information. In another study Fossati et al. (2003) showed that 
bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was active in self-related processing 
whereas the lateral prefrontal cortex was active in other related areas when participants 
were asked to judge if a trait word describe them or someone else. The right dorsomedial 
prefrontal was found to be mediating evaluation of emotional stimuli relevant to the self. 
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The findings suggest that the critical brain areas associated with self and emotional self 
might be different.  
Similarly, emotion is the other system that has been consistently found to 
influence perceptual and attentional processing (Neisser, 1976; Öhman et al., 2001; Phelps 
et al., 2006; Ray, 1979; Reinecke et al., 2006; Vuilleumier, 2005; Williams, Ellis, et al., 1996) 
as well as memory (Alicke, 1985; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Mather, 
2007; Sakaki et al., 2014). This remarkable similarity on their effects on modulating 
different cognitive processes may suggest that self and emotional systems are same or 
have very close relationship. Indeed emotional self is represented in the mDFC (Fossati 
et al., 2003) or in the ventral anterior cingulate, an area close to the mDFC region (Moran, 
Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006) which is suggested to integrate information 
from self and emotion. That makes emotional stimuli, negative or positive, self-related. 
However, neutral stimuli are not relevant to self and may not elicit the same responses 
as any emotional stimuli would do (Northoff et al., 2006). The emotional valance 
determines the strength of mineness and therefore, the response strength of the 
individual. For example, Greenwald and Farnham (2000) using the implicit association test 
to measure self-esteem found that participants were much faster to respond to self-
positive affective (e.g., diamond, health, sunrise) and evaluative trait words (e.g., bright, 
noble, honest) than the self-negative affective (e.g., agony, filth, poison) and evaluative 
trait words (e.g., ugly, vile, guilty). However, it is important to understand that emotional 
valance alone is not sufficient to increase the response strength. Moran et al. (2006) 
demonstrated this by showing that participants were faster in responding to positively 
valanced highly self-relevant word.  
However, some researchers argue that self and emotions are dissociable 
(Gutchess et al., 2007; Leshikar et al., 2015; Stolte et al., 2016). The contrasting nature of 
relationship between the self and emotion may suggest that in certain circumstances self 
is not needed to experience emotion (e.g., experience of fear when involved in an 
accident, joy of winning a lottery). However, in most of the situations self is critical in 
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experiencing emotion what is called as self-conscious emotion (e.g., sense of pride, 
shame, guilt:  Tracy and Robins, 2004).  
Part of the difficulty in interpreting the effect of emotion so far is the apparent 
lack of emotional influence on attention as measured by the matching tasks of the 
previous chapter. In the previous experiments (experiment 1a – 1d), the lack of an effect 
of emotion on attention was suggested to be the result of an early matching response 
based on the colour of the word. It is suspected that a response is made (or at least 
initiated) before the meaning of the word is extracted, and therefore before its emotional 
valence is processed. Because of this, the matching task may have been a poor choice 
for measuring any emotional influence in relation to the self. However, since an effect of 
emotion is observed in the subsequent old/new recognition task, the matching task used 
in the previous experiments (1a -1d) might have been unable to measure the effect of 
emotion on attention.  
Therefore, the experiment described in this chapter (Experiment 2) adapted the 
matching task of the previous chapter (Experiments 1b-1d) to explore the possible effect 
of emotion on attention. Furthermore, this adaptation of the matching task will allow for 
the measurement of any potential gains when processing the combined effects of 
emotional self-related information. In other words, the current study sought to provide 
evidence for an interaction between self and emotion. The aim was to show that self-
related and emotional information, when processed together, will lead to a more efficient 
processing of that information compared to emotional or self-related information by 
itself. This new paradigm used a redundancy gain approach to explore the effect of self, 
emotion and combination of self and emotion on perceptual processes. 
One phenomenon which can be utilised in exploring the effect of emotional self-
relevant information in more detail is that of redundancy gain. Redundancy gain is a 
phenomenon associated with response latencies towards stimuli which have multiple 
identifying target attributes. Generally, redundant stimuli are processed faster than single 
stimuli when the same response is required. In typical redundancy gain experiments 
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participants either have to respond to audio stimuli, visual stimuli, or audio-visual stimuli. 
It is generally found that participants respond faster to a stimulus which contains 
redundant information across two dimensions, than to either audio or visual stimuli alone 
(Hershenson, 1962). Naturally, the phenomenon of redundancy is not limited to cross-
modal experiments such as audio-visual experiments; instead, it seems to be a general 
principle of cognitive processing. For instance, the effect of redundancy has been 
observed with redundant signals within a single sensory system such as vision (Miller & 
Adam, 2006; Miller, Beutinger, & Ulrich, 2009). For example, in one of their experiments 
Miller, beutinger, and Ulrich (2009) used a simple reaction time task with target squares 
appearing to the left or right of fixation. The location of these squares would be cued 
with an arrow before being displayed, and this would be a valid cue in 80% of the trials. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible if a square appeared. In the 
redundant condition, a square block would appear in both the top and bottom of the 
screen, either left or right of the fixation in the middle of the screen. In the non-redundant 
condition a single square would only appear one of the four corners of the screen. Their 
results showed a redundancy gain for when the squares were displayed in both the top 
and bottom of the screen, compared only one square in either the top or bottom side of 
the screen. In other words, participants were faster in responding when two visual stimuli 
conveyed the same information, compared to one stimulus.  
There are two classes of model which differ in their interpretations of how having 
a redundant target reduces response latencies: the race model and the coactivation 
model. The difference between these model classes is an important one because they 
make fundamentally different assumptions about stimulus information processing. Race 
models assume that redundant stimuli are processed independently from one another 
(Miller, 1982).  When there is a single stimulus the processing of that stimulus varies 
according to a statistical distribution. With two stimuli the distributions of each separate 
stimulus overlap, causing the slower stimulus to be compensated by the faster stimulus, 
which results in a faster response for redundant stimuli (Gondan & Minakata, 2016).  For 
example, according to the race model when a participant is presented with two 
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redundant stimuli (e.g. two different visual targets, both requiring the same response), 
then the average processing of one stimulus will be faster than the other. The fastest 
stimulus wins the race and initiates the response, the slower stimulus processing time 
overlaps with the faster processing time, resulting in a faster RT for redundant stimuli 
compared to single stimuli. In other words, a parallel race model proposes that each 
process is separate and each can lead to a response by themselves. However, with 
redundant targets, the faster process compensates for, the slower process.  
Coactivation models propose that the two redundant stimuli are integrated into 
their processing rather than processed separately. Processes are still viewed to occur in 
parallel, but the processes of the redundant signals coalesce at some point and the 
summed processes, in having a higher strength signal, lead to a faster response being 
executed. Note that neither class of model makes any specific predictions about the state 
that this coalescence occurs. One way to determine if redundant stimuli are processed in 
an independent (race model) or dependent (coactive model) manner is to calculate 
capacity coefficients (Townsend & Nozawa, 1995). These coefficients are based on a 
capacity index where C(t) = 1 is the value indicating unlimited capacity which means that 
processing in a channel in unaffected by workload or the presence of a target in a 
different channel. If C(t) < 1, then this indicates limited capacity. This means that additional 
targets will decrease performance, possibly due to interference between stimuli 
processing. A value of C(t) > 1 indicates that there is super-capacity. Supercapacity 
indicates the presence of integration. It means that the two signals have been convolved 
together and improve decision-making processes.     
Previous research on the self-priority effect has explored the notion of 
redundancy. It has been found that there is super-capacity for redundant self-related 
stimuli (Sui, Yankouskaya, & Humphreys, 2015). Their experiment was a variation of the 
matching task used by Sui et al. (2012), and four geometric shapes were equally assigned 
to either the participant or a friend, meaning that two different geometric shapes were 
linked to the self and two other distinct geometric shapes were assigned to a friend.   
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Participants were then shown a shape in the left or right visual field, two matching shapes, 
or two non-matching shapes. This created a total of six conditions: self, same shape 
displayed left and right; self, different shape presented left and right; self, one shape 
presented left or right; and then the same three conditions for ‘friend’. By pressing a 
button the participant had to decide if the shape belonged to them or a friend. In this 
case, the redundancy was in two geometric shapes that result in the same response. Their 
results support a coactivation model for the self-trials. This showed that self-relevant 
shapes were processed with super capacity. Where self-trials benefited from redundancy, 
friend-trials did not.  
The experiment described in this chapter (Experiment 2) will not look for 
redundancy gain between self-related stimuli. Instead, this chapter will explore if there is 
a redundancy gain effect for information that is both self-relevant and emotional. In order 
to make a direct comparison with the previous experiments of this thesis, a redundancy 
manipulation was added to the matching paradigm described in Chapter 2.  
This means that participants had to give the same response for emotional words, 
label/colour matched words, and emotional label/colour matched words. The exact 
details are explained below in the methods section. It was expected that emotion and 
self-matching trials would lead to faster and more accurate responses. Furthermore, a 
redundancy gain analysis explored if redundant targets were processed completely 
independent or showed coactivation. An old/new task will again follow the matching task. 
The old/new task is exactly the same as Experiment 1d and can be used for easy 
comparison of the results. The same results are expected (i.e. an interaction between 
emotion and perspective).  
Methods 
Participants 
In total, 27 participants took part in Experiment 3. Six participants were removed 
from further analysis, as two participants were removed due to a technical error during 
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testing, and four participants were removed because they performed below chance level 
during the matching task. Of the remaining 21 participants, five were male and 16 were 
female. The mean age was 19 years (range 18-22 years).  
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli used in Experiment 2 are selected from the same list using the same 
procedure as discussed in Experiment 1d. However, the nature of the task and the 
instructions were altered to reflect a redundancy gain task. The stimuli onset times were 
still exactly the same as in the previous four experiments. However, initially the words 
were displayed in white. After 150ms the trait-words turned into one of the two colours, 
linked to either the self or some distant other. Participants were instructed not to respond 
before the word changed into a colour. Added to the normal instructions of matching 
the trait-word colour with the label ‘myself’ and ‘stranger’ was a new rule in which had 
people respond to the emotion of the word as well.  
For example, the matching task still required the participant to match the label 
‘myself’ or ‘stranger’ with one of two colours which were linked to the self or a stranger 
in the instructions. Added to this was the instruction to press a button (same as the 
matched response) if the trait-word was positive. In other words, the participant had to 
press the left mouse-button if the label and colour matched, and the participant also had 
to press the left mouse-button if the trait-word was positive, disregarding any 
colour/label matches and the right mouse-button if the trait-word was neutral. This 
resulted in three instances where the same button response was required: Positive 
emotion but not-matched, neutral emotion but matched and positive emotion and 
matched. The only remaining condition was the neural not-matched trials and these 
required a different, right-mouse-button response. The button-presses required were 




The data were analysed in a similar fashion as the previous experiments. Added 
to the analysis is the race model of inequality. Omitted responses were assigned an RT 
value exceeding the allowed RT-time window. The race model of inequality was 
generated using R script from equation 8 by Gondan and Minakata (2016): F*PM(t) + F*C(t) 
≤ F*P(t) + F*M(t), for all t. Assuming that fast guesses equally contaminate the RT for all 
distributions, the cumulative RT distribution (F*(t)) for the redundant trials (PM) plus catch 
trials (C) is always equal or smaller than the cumulative RT distribution for positive 
emotions trials (P) plus matched trials (M). This applies the ‘kill-the-twin’ method to correct 
for fast guesses (Eriksen, 1988).  
If the race model fails, the capacity coefficient was used to examine the possibility 
of a coactivation model further. For OR Capacity coefficients (COR(t)) the survivor function 
of the response time (the probability of a to-be-made response) is the probability of a 
to-be-detected target on a channel, compared to the baseline assumption of unlimited 
parallel processing via multiple independent channels. COR(t) is defined via integrated 
hazard functions, which is a measuring method of efficiency or capacity (Townsend & 
Ashby, 1978), and can be calculated by taking a –log of the survivor function for each t. 
COR(t) is obtained by the ratio of the integrated hazard function of both sources (PM) to 
the integrated hazard function from each single source (P + M): COR= H𝑃𝑀
(𝑡)
H𝑃(𝑡) + H𝑀(𝑡)
 .  When 
the performance of P + M is equal to PM (COR(t) = 1) then this indicates unlimited workload 
capacity. If P + M is smaller than PM (COR(t)  < 1) then this indicates a limited workload 
capacity. Finally, if P + M is greater than PM (COR(t) > 1), this means that performance 
reflects possible coactive processing i.e. super capacity. The coefficients were calculated 
using the methods described by Houpt, Blaha, McIntire, Havig, and Townsend (2014) 





The data for the matching task has been analysed according to the three 
conditions requiring the same response. These are: just a matching response without 
emotion; just emotion without a matching response; and a matching and emotion 
response. These were split up in self and distant other condition and created a 
3(redundancy [redundant, emotion, colour/label matched]) × 2(perspective [self, distant 
other]) repeated ANOVA design and a Bonferroni correction was applied with multiple 
comparisons. Again the sample size was based on the effect-sizes found in previous 
literature and the previous experiments. A power analysis showed that a sample size of 
20 was needed for sufficient power. However, like the previous experiment this is again 
a novel task and therefore it remains difficult to accurately estimate an effect-size  
For the proportion of correct responses, a main effect was found of redundancy, 
F(3,60) = 23.652, p < .001, η2p = .542. Participants were more accurate for the redundant 
trials where the stimuli were both matched and positive (.870), compared to neutral 
matched trials (.732, p = .004), positive non-matched trials (.541, p <.001), and neutral 
non-matched trials (.557, p < .001). Furthermore, neutral matched trials were also more 
accurately responded to than positive non-matched trials (p = .024), and neutral non-
matched trials (p = .043).  Lastly, there was no significant difference between the non-
matched positive trials and the non-matched neutral trials (p = 1.000). There was no main 
effect of perspective, F(1,20) = 1.464, p = .240.  
However, there was a significant two-way interaction between redundancy and 
perspective, Greenhouse-Geisser F(1.37, 27.72) = 9.024, p = .003, η2p = .311.  This 
interaction showed that the redundant trials have a higher proportion of correct 
responses for the self-related trials compared to the distant other related trials (p < .001). 
This same pattern was found for the matched trials where again the self-relevant trials 
were responded to quicker than the distant other-related trials (p = .025). However, for 
the positive trials, the effect reverses as the non-matched positive trials were more 
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accurately responded to for the trials related to a distant other, compared to self-relevant 
trials (p = .011). For the non-matched neutral trials, there was no significant difference 
between self and distant other (p = .100). Furthermore, for the self-relevant trials, the 
participants were more accurate for the redundant trials compared to either matched 
neutral trials, non-matched positive trials, or non-matched neutral trials (Respectively: p 
= .012, p < .001, p <.001). The neutral matched trials resulted in a higher proportion 
correct than the non-matched positive trials (p = .008) and the non-matched neutral 
trails (p = .031). No significant difference was found between the non-matched positive 
and non-matched neutral trials (p = .586). For the trials related to a distant other, only 
the difference between the redundant trials and the matched neutral trials was significant 
(p = .029) as the redundant trials have a higher proportion of correct responses 
compared to the matched neutral trials. All other differences were not significant: 
redundant/non-matched positive (p = 1.00); redundant/non-matched neutral (p = .099); 
matched neutral/non-matched positive (p = 1.00); matched neutral/non-matched neutral 
(p = 1.00); or non-matched neutral/non-matched positive (p = 1.00). See Table 9 and 
Figure 18 for an overview of the proportion of correct responses.  
Table 9. Experiment 2, Matching task. Proportion correct responses, and median RT. Standard 
error in parenthesis. 
Self Other 
Correct RT Correct RT 
Matched/Positive .941 (.020) 756.74 (45.05) .799 (.036) 958.79 (38.40) 
Matched/Neutral .800 (.047) 912.31 (42.97) .664 (.053) 1013.19 48.54) 
Non-matched/Positive .362 (.084) 1039.17 (55.01) .719 (.060) 846.24 (52.55) 
Non-matched/Neutral .454 (.084) 1099.79 (44.70) .660 (.049) 1123.29 (43.05) 
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The RT for the correct responses data revealed a similar pattern. A main effect of 
redundancy was found, F(3,60) = 16.217, p < .001, η2p = .448. Participants generally were 
significantly faster in when responding to the redundant trials (857.76ms) compared to 
the neutral matched trials (962.75ms, p = .005), and when compared to the non-matched 
neutral trials (1111.53ms, p < .001). There was only a marginally significant difference 
between the redundant trials and the non-matched positive trials (942.70ms, p = 0.53). 
Furthermore, participants we faster for the matched neutral trials compared to the non-
matched neutral trials (p = 1.00), but there was no significant difference between the 
matched neutral and the non-matched positive trials (p = .004). Lastly, there also was a 
significant difference between the non-matched positive trials and the non-matched 
neutral trials (p = .017), as participants responded faster to the non-matched positive 
trials.  
                                                                                                   Mean proportion correct responses 



















*** * * 
Figure 18. Proportion correct matching task, Experiment 2.
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No main effect of perspective was observed, F(1,20) = 2.038, p = .169. However, 
there was a significant interaction between redundancy and perspective, F(3,60) = 8.843, 
p < .001, η2p = .307, See Table 9 and Figure 19 for the means and standard errors.  Similar 
to the proportion correct responses, there was a significant difference between self and 
distant other for the redundant, neutral matched, and non-matched positive trials 
(respectively: p = .002; p = .046, p = 0.12). The same pattern unfolded as participates 
were faster to respond on the redundant trials related to the self compared to a distant 
other, and likewise, the self-relevant matched neutral trials were responded to faster 
compared to matched neutral distant other related trials. Again this pattern reversed for 
the non-matched positive trials as participants were significantly slower for the self-
related items compared to the distant other-related trials. No differences were found 
between the self and distant other for the neutral non-matched trials (p = .551).  
Looking at the different levels of redundancy, for the self-related trials, there was 
a significant difference between the redundant trials and the other levels as participants 
responded fastest to the redundant trials: matched neutral (p = .019); non-matched 
positive (p = .003); and non-matched neutral (p < .001).  No significant difference was 
found between matched neutral and non-matched positive (p = .572), but a significant 
difference was found between the faster responses on the matched neutral trials 
compared to the slower responses of the non-matched neutral trials (p = .017). There 
was no significant difference between the non-matched positive trials and the non-
matched neutral trials (p = 1.00). 
For the distant other related trials, a significant difference was found between the 
redundant and non-matched neutral trials (p < .001), as participants were faster for the 
redundant trials.  There were no significant differences between the redundant trials and 
the matched neutral trials (1.00), or the non-matched positive trials (p = .060). A 
significant difference was observed for the matched neutral, and the non-matched 
positive trials (p = 0.17) as the participants were slower in responding to the matched 
neutral trials. No such difference existed between the matched neutral trials and the non-
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matched neutral trials (p = .177). Finally, participants were faster on the non-matched 
positive trials compared to the non-matched neutral trials (p = .001).  
Redundancy was tested using the race model of inequality, as described earlier. 
Using the race model inequality script of Ulrich, Miller, and Schröter (2007), the latencies 
distribution were calculated, as shown in Figure 20. The model compares the reaction 
times if the trials matched (X), were positive (Y), or matched and were positive at the 
same time, i.e. redundant (Z).  If Z is to the left of the X + Y, then the race model of 
inequality is violated. As can be seen in Figure 20, the trials linked to the self seem to 
violate the model around 550ms to 650ms. For the trials linked to the distant other-
condition, the model holds.  Due to the nature of multiple testing, a permutation test was 
performed for the group data as described by Gondan and Minakata (2016).  A rejection 
of the race model occurs if the maximum of the T values is greater than 95% (one-sided) 
of the simulated T*max values. Applying the inequality 8 method of Gondan and Minakata 
(2016) revealed the violation of the race model for the trials related to the self: t max = 
4.379, critical t max* = 2.460, P = .001. For the trials with the distant other-condition, no 
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Figure 19. RT matching task, Experiment 2.
** * * 
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violation of the race model of inequality was found: t max = 0.401, critical t max* = 2.530, P 
= .783, indicating support for a parallel, first-terminating model.  
                                                                                                                 The top figure 
shows the violation of the independent race model for the self-related trials. The bottom figure shows 
the model for the distant other-related trials. 
Figure 20. Race model of inequality for self and other trials, Experiment 2.
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Figure 21. Capacity coefficients Experiment 2.  
However, the violation of the race model for the self-related trials does not by 
default imply a coactivation-model. For this reason, a follow-up coactivation model was 
applied to the data. Although the race models suggest that this was only needed for the 
self-related trials, a comparison is made again between self and distant other. In Figure 
21, the capacity coefficient of each participant for the self-trials and the distant other-
trials is depicted. These graphs illustrate coactivation for the self-trials but not for the 
distant other-trials, between 250ms and 400ms. The number of participants showing 
super-capacity was calculated. For the self-trials, 19 out of 21 participants showed super-
capacity, which was significantly more than the distant other-trials where 10 out of 21 
participants showed super-capacity: χ2 = 7.11, p = .008.  
                                                               A C(t) of 1 (the horizontal line) indicated the 
minimal values for unlimited capacity and any value above one reflects super capacity. 
The graph shows that the capacity coefficients for the self-trials and indicated a super-
capacity (C(t)>1) for most participants, whereas the distant other-trials which showed 
limited capacity for redundant trials (C(t)>1) for most participants. The coloured band 


















Table 10. Old New Task Redundancy gain experiment. Means for d’, 
and proportion correct responses. Standard error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
d' 
Correct Correct 
Self .768 (.023) .712 (.028) 1.24 (0.10) 
Other .700 (.029) .710 (.028) 0.98 (0.06) 
Positive .735 (.025) .723 (.025) 1.08 (0.07) 
Neutral .733 (.026) .699 (.034) 1.13 (0.10) 
Self/Positive .741 (.029) .742 (.025) 1.10 (0.10) 
Self/Neutral .794 (.031) .683 (.038) 1.38 (0.14) 
Other/Positive .729 (.030) .705 (.034) 1.06 (0.08) 
Other/Neutral .671 (.034) .716 (.037) 0.89 (0.09) 
See Table 10 for an overview of the means and standard errors for the old new 
task. The d’ results revealed a significant effect of perspective, F(1,20) = 8.379, p = .009, 
η2p = .295. Participants were better at separating signal from noise for trait words that 
are related to the self when compared to trait words related to a distant other. No 
significant effect of emotion was found, F(1,20) = .334, p = .570, but there was an 
interaction between emotion and perspective, F(1,20) = 7.176, p = .014, η2p = .264, see 
Figure 22. This interaction is mainly driven by a significant difference between self-related 
neutral trait-words and distant other-related neutral trait-words (p = .003). Furthermore, 
there is a marginally significant difference between positive and neutral trait words from 
the distant other-conditions (p = .053).  There were no differences between positive and 
neutral trait words linked to the self, neither were there any significant differences 
between self and distant other-related positive trait words (respectively:  p = .088; p = 




For the proportion of correct responses for the matching trials a main effect of 
perspective is revealed F(1,20) = 6.420, p = .020, η2p = .243. Participants were more 
accurate in recognising old words linked to the self, compared to words linked to a distant 
other. No main effect of emotion was found, F(1,20) = .010, p = .921, but there was an 
interaction effect between perspective and emotion, F(1,20) = 5.772, p = .026, η2p = .224. 
The interaction was formed by a significant difference between positive and neutral trait 
words related to a distant other (p = .048), where positive/distant other trait words were 
recognised more accurately than neutral/distant other traits words. Furthermore, 
neutral/self trials were more often correctly recognised than neutral /distant other trials 
(p = .005). There was no effect of emotion for the self related words (p = .199), and no 
effect of perspective for the positive words (p = .719).  For the non-matching trials no 
                                     
                                                                                                                                             
An interaction between perspective and emotion. (Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** 
= p<.001). 











































significant differences were found for: perspective, F(1,20) = .017, p = .898; emotion, 
F(1,20) = .802, p = .381; perspective×emotion, F(1,20) = 1.613, p = .219.  
Lastly, a correlation analysis was run between the proportion of correct responses for 
both the matching task and the old/new recognition task. If self-related and positive 
emotion both facilitate performance in an integrated manner, the increased accuracy in 
the matching task, should be associated with increased accuracy in the old/new task.  The 
results only revealed a significant strong positive correlation between the positive self 
condition of the matching and old/new tasks, rs = .664, p = .001. No other significant 
correlations were found.  
Discussion 
To examine the precise influence of emotion on self-relevant processing, this was 
designed to force the participant to make a judgement about emotion and self-related 
information. For this redundancy task, participants had to provide the same response 
when an item had emotional value, was linked to the self, or both. This required several 
adaptations of the matching task of (Sui et al., 2012) to ensure that the emotional value 
was processed at the same time as the self-related information. Furthermore, instead of 
geometric shapes, colours were used to link to the self or a distant other.  
The matching task revealed that matched positive trials (i.e. redundant trials) were 
responded to faster and more accurately for the trials related to the self, compared to 
trials related to a distant other. For the matched trials alone, a similar difference was 
found as self-relevant trials were more accurately and faster responded to, compared 
distant other-related trials. Interestingly, this pattern reversed for the non-matched 
positive trials as positive stimuli were responded to slower and less accurately for the self-
related trials when compared to the distant other-related trials.  No differences were 
observed between the self-related and distant other-related stimuli for the non-matched 
neutral trials. As predicted, participants responded faster and more accurately on the 
redundant trials, especially for the trials related to the self compared to a distant other.  
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Interesting here is that although the expected superior performance was shown 
for the self-related and emotional stimuli, the interaction revealed the opposite pattern 
with self-relevant positive words for the non-matched trials. In other words, as soon as 
the participants were shown the colour related to themselves for positive words, but 
linked to the label ‘stranger’, the participants were slower and less accurate when 
compared to the trials related to a distant other. Although it is possible that the non-
matching nature of the trials itself (as mention before) influenced the data, this should 
then still be the same for both the self-related and distant other-related stimuli. 
Furthermore, no significant difference was found for the neutral non-matched trials. This 
could potentially be explained by an initial attempt to link the positive self-related item 
to the self as indicated by the colour of the word and the conflicting non-matching 
information lead to a conflict in processing. Remember that for this redundancy 
experiment the same response is still required for the non-matched positive trials, 
meaning there is no increase in difficulty. Furthermore, the words chosen were either 
neutral or highly frequent very positive nouns. Especially since previous research has 
shown that it is easier to link positive information to the self (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; 
Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Taylor, 1991). Furthermore, when an initial self-relevance 
connection is made, it is more discard this association (Wang et al., 2016). According to 
Wang, Humphreys, and Sui (2016), self-association could disrupt ongoing processes if 
the association has to be reassessed. In this experiment, the easier and faster link of 
positive self-relevant information to the self would need to be reassessed based on the 
conflicting information provided by the label. This does not happen for the neutral non-
matched trials as the neutral trials do not benefit from the increased speed of creating a 
self-association generated with positive information. Naturally, for the trials related to a 
distant other, this conflict is easier to resolve as no association with the self is made.      
With two potentially competing signals (self versus emotion), a RACE model 
(Miller, 1982) was applied when analysing the matching task data. This was done to see if 
there were any redundancy gains between emotion and perspective. Simply put, the 
experiment studied if one relevant signal (i.e. emotion OR self-relatedness) would result 
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in an equally fast or slower response compared to the presentation of two relevant signals 
(emotion AND self-relatedness) for the same response.  The redundancy data shows that 
the RACE model is violated which indicated that emotion and self-related information are 
not processed separately. A follow-up coactivation-model testing (Townsend & Nozawa, 
1995) revealed that the majority of participants showed super-capacity for emotional self-
relevant items. In other words, self-related information and (positive) emotional 
information together lead to more efficient processing. If both emotion and self-
relevance are task-relevant, then the summation of the two leads to faster processing 
than self and emotion alone, especially between 250ms and 400ms. A result which on 
first glance lends support to the idea that positive self-related information can enhance 
attention because it is easier to link positive traits to yourself when compared to neutral 
or negative traits (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Taylor, 1991). These 
results show a similar advantage of the self in redundancy tasks as the experiment by Sui, 
Yankouskaya, and Humphreys (2015), where the authors found a clear effect of super-
capacity for the self when displaying two self-related redundant visual stimuli.  
In the old/new task, words were recognised from memory more accurately if they 
had a positive valence or if the words were related to the self. An interaction was found 
between emotion and perspective where a self-reference effect was found for neutral 
words only, and an effect of emotion was found only for the distant other-condition. 
Therefore it appears the super-capacity finding and the findings of the accuracy and 
reaction times of the matching task are at odds. Naturally, super-capacity and recognition 
memory are two different processes as the former revolves around decision time during 
the matching task and the latter on an old/new recognition judgement. However, super-
capacity does enhance processing of emotional self-relevant words during the matching 
task, which could aid with encoding.  
This possibility is further supported by the strong positive correlation found 
between the proportions of correct matching judgements of the positive self-related 
condition and the proportion of correctly recognised old words from the positive self-
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related condition. This indicated that there was a relationship between the matching task 
and the old/new recognition task as an increase of correct responses for positive and 
self-related words in the matching task was matched by an increase of correctly 
recognised self-related positive words. If self-relevant and emotional information are 
processed with super-capacity, as shown by the matching task, this should be reflected 
in superior encoding processes for positive words linked to the self over neutral words 
linked to the self. 
Potential explanations include that the process measured by the redundancy data is not 
the same as the processes described old/new data. Another potential explanation 
suggests that although emotion and self-relevance improve memory, both do so to a 
maximum. This means that even when a word is both emotional and self-relevant, it 
cannot benefit more than each condition on its own.  
To conclude, self-relevance and positive emotion together did integrate. The evidence 
suggested super-capacity of the two attributes. This shows more efficient attentional 
processing of positive self-relevant information compared to information which is only 
emotionally positive or only self-relevant. This supports the possibility that self-relevant 
and positive emotion, both independently and interdependently prioritise information. It 
also supports the idea that positive information can easily be linked to the self. However, 
despite these effects, the super-capacity for positive self-relevant words measured with 
the matching task did not translate to an effect on recognition. There was no greater 
recognition for positive self-relevant words when compared to positive words alone and 
self-relevant words alone as would be expected if this was affected. This may be because 
memory processes were unaffected or it could be because there was a possible ceiling 
effect in recognition of positive self-relevant words.  
Therefore, Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 will have a more focussed investigation into 
the memory processes. As the previous chapters have shown, the self and emotion 
influence later memory processes. The matching task however is not a controlled 
encoding paradigm and thus any encoding into memory is, to some degree, incidental. 
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Participants were aware of a follow-up memory task, but the matching task itself would 
have been a distractor for any mnemonic the participant could have applied, as actively 
reading the words was not needed for the matching task, as it was assumed to be an 
automatic process (Logan, 1988; McKenna & Sharma, 1995). Therefore to ensure deeper 
encoding, the words used in the matching task will be repeated a few times, allowing for 
more opportunities to encode the words into memory. At the same time the assumed 
automaticity of emotional and self-referential processing is investigated. Both processes 
are described as fast and automatic (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; McKenna & Sharma, 1995; 
Moors & De Houwer, 2006). By repeating the stimuli, the beneficial effect of a fast and 








Automaticity & Self 
Introduction Experiment 3 
The experiments so far have focused on investigating the facilitating effect of self-
related information and emotion on attention and memory. The current chapter will focus 
on a specific aspect of self-relevant processing: that of the automaticity with which self-
relevance facilitates attentional and memory processing.  
The experiments of the previous two chapters (Experiment 1a-1d, & Experiment 2) 
have consistently shown a self-priority effect as measured via the matching task, which 
was followed by a self-reference effect as measured by the old/new task. Experiment 3, 
discussed in this chapter, will focus on a particular aspect of self-relevant information 
processing, specifically the apparent automaticity of the self. In the introduction of this 
thesis, self-relevant information processing was described as an automatic and effortless 
process (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Therefore, an interesting 
question to ask is, what happens when this automaticity is less important in promoting 
recognition in memory?  
So far, the results of the old/new task show a consistent advantage of self-related 
information. Participants recognise self-related words correctly more often than words 
related to a distant other. A similar effect was found for emotional words as more 
emotional words were correctly recognised compared to neutral words. These have been 
interpreted as reflecting an increase of binding into memory. With binding into memory 
is meant that events, features, or object are linked together in memory to form a coherent 
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whole (Zimmer, Mecklinger, & Lindenberger, 2006). This binding into memory is arguably 
especially important for self-related information as it is suggested that self-related 
information enhances the binding of information in attention and memory (Sui, 2016; Sui 
& Humphreys, 2015b). The increased binding results in mnemonic advantages, creating 
richer memories when compared to information not related to the self (Symons & 
Johnson, 1997).  
Of course, there are several ways by which memory strength can be improved. 
Repetition is a useful manipulation in memory research for improving a memory trace, 
as it has been known for some time that repetition does improve memory (Ebbinghaus, 
2013; Hintzman & Block, 1971), albeit not very efficient and requires some intent to learn 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972).  
Although not efficient, repetition will be used in this Experiment 3. Repetition in 
this thesis means that a wordlist is presented again with the same colour/perspective 
associations. No attempt is made for deeper binding to already existing memories. As 
explained earlier, self-related information already enhances binding into memory, and a 
more elaborative rehearsal would likely benefit self-related information processing, which 
is not the goal of this chapter. Furthermore, the matching paradigm used in this thesis 
does not lend itself to more in-depth encoding as the matching task itself would distract 
from memorising the words. If a wordlist is repeated several times, the initial benefit of 
self-referenced processing is no longer the main influence of enhancing binding of 
information, which should result in increased memorability mostly for other-related 
words. The initial fast and automatic benefit of self-related information is still present but 
other-related words might be recognised more easily now as well. .   
Using repetition, it is possible that repeating stimuli only helps enhance the overall 
memory strength regardless of condition. It is unlikely that self-related information can 
become more ‘self’ (i.e. repetition does not lead to more ‘binding to self’) and therefore 
the initial benefits of self-related information is not additive to learning through 
repetition. In other words, self-related information could result in faster and more stable 
  
131 
binding, which is unaffected by repetitions, whereas other-related words are affected by 
repetition. This would result in an increase of recognition for other-related words.  
Experiment 3 used similar stimuli to Experiment 1a (neutral and negative nouns). 
For the matching task is was predicted that the participants would become more 
proficient per repetition regardless of condition. The previous experiments (Experiment 
1a-1d) have not shown an effect of emotion, and therefore no effect of emotion is 
expected for the same reasons as discussed in the previous chapters (the matching 
judgement is already initiated before the semantic meaning of the words is processed). 
A main effect of perspective is predicted as self-related trials should be processed more 
accurately and faster compared to trials not related to the self. Lastly, no interaction 
between repetition and perspective is predicted. Self-relatedness is determined by the 
colour of the word, which will not become more self-relevant over time. In other words, 
perspective will have a main influence as self-related words will be prioritised, and 
participants be better at the matching task in later blocks, compared to earlier blocks as 
overall proficiency increases.   
 For the old/new task it was predicted that the other-related information benefits 
more from repetition compared to self-related information. Since a self-reference effect 
would this be present, this result in other-related information to be recognised as 
accurately as self-related information In other words, repeating the same stimuli with the 
matching task most likely will not affect the old/new task beyond an overall increase of 
recognition memory of the participant. This is because the word meaning is irrelevant to 
the self-priority effect as measured with the matching task used in this thesis. However, 
although the meanings of the words had no intrinsic relation with self-priority, the word 
meanings were certainly attended to and processed to a semantic level. We can see this 
in the findings that the emotional valence of the word meanings had a clear effect on the 
old/new task in Experiment 1a-1d and Experiment 2.  
Therefore, we have established that semantic meaning is processed in our task. 
We have also established that emotional valance is important in memorability. Given this, 
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it is possible that word repetition and the resultant strengthening of these words in 
memory might vary in association with the valence of the words.  
Methods 
Participants 
For this experiment, 22 participants recruited from Oxford Brookes University 
participated for course credit, but two participants were removed from the dataset 
because their performance on the matching task was below chance level. In total 20 
participants were included in the data set (mean age 19.75, range: 18-33) of which one 
was male and 19 were female.  
Stimuli & procedure 
Both the matching task and the old/new recognition task are based on Experiment 
1a. The word-lists were generated similarly as described in the methods section of 
Experiment 1a, but the procedure is based on the changes made in Experiment 1b. No 
changes were made to the old/new recognition task, but the matching task was changed 
on one point: the matching trials were now repeated three times, i.e. the matching task 
consisted of four blocks of 100 trials each. For each block the same trials were used but 
were presented in a pseudo-random order where each factor combination was never 
repeated consecutively more than three times. There were no other differences to the 
procedure of Experiment 1b. 
Results 
Matching task 
In order to see if each repetition influences the self-priority effect a 
2(perspective[self, distant other])×2(emotion[negative, neutral])×4(Time[time-window 
1,2,3,4]) Repeated ANOVA was run to analyse the d’, proportion correct, and RT data, 
and a Bonferroni correction was applied.  
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For the d’ data the three-way interaction was not significant, F(3,57) = .393, p = 
.759. Of the two way interactions, only the interaction between perspective and emotion 
was significant, F(1,19) = 6.089, p = .023, η2p = .243, see Figure 23. A self-priority effect 
was found for both negative and neutral trials (p = .003, and p < .001 respectively). 
However, no significant difference was found between negative and neutral trials for 
perspective (self p = .114, and distant other p = .108). The interaction was caused by a 
higher d’ for neutral-self words compared to negative-self words. Although this 
difference is not significant, the opposite pattern appeared for the words related to a 
distant other where negative words have a higher d’ than neutral words. This is reinforced 
by a main effect of perspective, F(1,19) = 22.617, p <.001, η2p = .543, where the self-related 
trials result in higher d’ than distant other-related trials. Furthermore, there was no main 
effect of emotion, F(1,19) = .140, p = .712. There was no significant main effect of time, 
Greenhouse- Geiser F(3,57) = 2.883, p = .069.  The remaining two-way interactions were 
not significant: time×perspective, F(3, 57) = .809, p = .494; and time×emotion, F(3, 57) = 
.186, p = .905.  See Table 11 for an overview of the means and standard errors.  
Table 11. Experiment 3 d’, matching task.  d’ for each per time-window. Standard error in 
parenthesis.  
d’ 
 Time 1 2 3 4 
Self 3.37 (0.25) 3.44 (0.21) 3.58 (0.12) 3.64 (0.13) 
Other 2.76 (0.27) 3.07 (0.27) 3.05 (0.20) 3.20 (0.16) 
Negative 3.06 (0.26) 3.30 (0.24) 3.31 (0.17) 3.43 (0.13) 
Neutral 3.06 (0.26) 3.21 (0.25) 3.32 (0.15) 3.41 (0.16) 
Self/Negative 3.29 (0.29) 3.47 (0.22) 3.55 (0.13) 3.56 (0.17) 
Self/Neutral 3.45 (0.24) 3.42 (0.22) 3.60 (0.16) 3.72 (0.12) 
Other/Negative 2.84 (0.26) 3.14 (0.27) 3.06 (0.24) 3.30 (0.16) 
Other/Neutral 2.68 (0.30) 3.00 (0.29) 3.04 (0.19) 3.11 (0.22) 
Average 3.06 3.26 3.31 3.42 
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The proportion of correct responses for the matching trials followed a similar 
pattern, see Table 12. Emotion and perspective did not interact with time: three-way, 
F(3,57) = .998, p = .401; two-way perspective, F(1,19) = .361, p = .781; two-way emotion, 
F(1,19) = .060, p = .980.  There was a two-way interaction between emotion and 
perspective, F(1,19) = 4.431, p = .049, η2p = .189. The follow-up paired comparisons 
revealed a self-priority effect of perspective for the neutral trials (p = .001 ), and for the 
negative trials (p =.005 ). However, no differences between neutral and negative trials 
were found for proportion correct for self (p = .325), or distant other (p = .215). This 
showed a slightly more robust effect of self for the neutral trials compared to the negative 
trials. See Figure 24. Also a main effect was found for perspective, F(1,19) = 14.543, p = 
.001, η2p = .434, indicating that participants scored a higher proportion correct for the 
trials related to the self when compared to the trials related to a distant other. Lastly, 
there was a main effect of time for the proportion of correct responses, Greenhouse-
                                                                        Mean d’ for all conditions (Error bar = standard error, 
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001)
































Geiser F(3,57) = 4.072, p = .033, η2p = .176. Nonetheless, a follow up comparisons did 
not reveal any significant differences between the time blocks.  
For the non-matched trials only a main effect of time was found, F(3,57) = 6.660, 
p = .001, η2p = .260. However, a pairwise comparison revealed that only the difference 
between block one and block three (p = .061), and the difference between block one and 
block four (p = .066) approached significance. No differences were found between the 
remaining blocks. Furthermore, none of the interactions were significant: 
perpective×emotion×time, F(3,57) = 1.176, p = .327; perspective×time, F(3,57) = .131, p 
= .941; emotion×time, F(3,57) = .838, p = .479; perspective×emotion, F(1,19) = .579, p = 
.456.  The remaining two main effects were also non-significant:  emotion, F(1,19) = .361, 
p = .555; perspective, F(1,19) = 3.020, p = .098.  
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Figure 24. Proportion correct Matching task, Experiment 3. 
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The median RT data revealed a clear effect of perspective for the matching trials, 
F(1,19) = 14.821, p = .001, η2p = .438. Participants responded faster on trials related to the 
self than to trials related to a distant other. The only other significant effect is the main 
effect of time, F(1.74, 33.08) = 5.700, p = .010, η2p = .231. Although participants did not 
respond significantly faster in block two compared to block one, (p = 1.000), participants 
did respond faster for block three and four when compared to block one (p = .038), but 
no difference was found between block one and block four (p = 0.147). Furthermore, 
participants were faster in block three when compared to block two (p = .041), but again 
no difference was found between block two and block four (p = .090). Lastly, no 
difference in median RT was found between block three and block four, p = 1.000.  For 
the main effect of emotion, there was no significant difference between the negative and 
neutral trials, F(1,19) =  2.060, p = .167. None of the interactions were significant: 
perspective×emotion×time, F(3,57) = .379, p = .769; time×emotion, F(3,57) = .866, p = 
.464; time×perspective, F(2.20, 41.74) = .162, p =.869; and perspective×emotion, F(1,19) 
= 1.608, p = .220.  
Table 12. Experiment 3 proportion correct, Matching task. Mean proportion correct responses per 
time-window for the matched and non-matched trials. Standard error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
 Time 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Self .94 (.03) .96 (.01) .98 (.01) .98 (0.1) .83 (.05) .92 (.04) .97 (.01) .97 (.01) 
Other .85 (.04) .89 (.03) .91 (.02) .93 (.01) .81 (.06) .91 (.03) .94 (.02) .96 (.01) 
Negative .90 (.03) .93 (.02) .94 (.01) .96 (.01) .82 (.06) .92 (.03) .95 (.02) .97 (.01) 
Neutral .89 (.03) .92 (.03) .95 (.01) .95 (.01) .82 (.05) .90 (.04) .96 (.01) .96 (.01) 
Self/Negative .92 (.03) .96 (.02) .98 (.01) .98 (.01) .83 (.06) .93 (.04) .97 (.01) .97 (.01) 
Self/Neutral .93 (.03) .96 (.02) .98 (.01) .99 (.01) .82 (.05) .91 (.04) .96 (.01) .98 (.01) 
Other/Negative .87 (.03) .90 (.03) .91 (.02) .94 (.02) .80 (.06) .92 (.03) .92 (.02) .98 (.01) 
Other/Neutral .84 (.04) .87 (.04) .92 (.02) .92 (.02) .82 (.06) .89 (.04) .96 (.01) .95 (.02) 
Average 0.8925 0.92375 0.94625 0.95625 0.81875 0.9125 0.95375 0.9675 
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The median RT data for the non-matched trials again revealed a main effect of 
perspective, F(1,19) = 4.963, p = .038, η2p = .207. Trials related to the self condition were 
responded to faster than the trials related to the distant other-condition. The only other 
significant result was the main effect of time, F(1.80, 34.12) = 10.042, p = .001, η2p = .346. 
Participant responded slower to block one of the non-matched trial when compared to 
block two (p = .005), block three (p = .005), and block four (p = .011). There was no 
significant difference in median RT between the remaining block combinations. The last 
remaining main effect of emotion revealed no significant effect, F(1,19) = .633, p = .436. 
Lastly, the interactions for the non-matched trials were all non-significant: 
perspective×emotion×time, F(3,57) = .803, p = .498; time×emotion, F(3,57) = 1.160, p = 
.333; time×perspective, F(3,57) = .110, p = .954; and perspective×emotion, F(1,19) = 1.065, 
p = .315.  View Table 13 for the median RTs and standard errors per time block.  
Table 13. Experiment 3 RT, Matching task. Median RTs per time-window for the matched and non-
matched trials. Standard error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 

































































































































Average 978.26 949.95 905.153 901.726 1102.51 1034.80 986.601 984.159 
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Figure 25. d’ of the old/new task for all conditions, Experiment 3. 
Old/new task 
The d’ data revealed only a main effect of emotion, F(1,19) = 54.626, p < .001, η2p 
= .742, see Figure 25. Participants were more capable in discerning signal from noise for 
the negative trials (1.354) than the neutral trials (.794). No significant d’ effect was found 
for perspective, F(1,19) = 1.124, p = .302, nor was the interaction between perspective and 
emotion significant, F(1,19) = .028, p = .869.  
Just looking at the matched trials, the proportion of correct responses resulted in a 
significant effect between the negative trials and the neutral trials where participants 
scored a higher proportion correct for the negative trials, F(19) = 39.623, p <.001, η2p = 
.676. There was no significant interaction between emotion and perspective, F(1,19) = 
.006, p = .940, and there was no main effect of perspective, F(1,19) = .143, p = .709. 
Similarly, the non-matching trials only show a main effect of emotion, F(1,19) = 38.951, p 
< .001, η2p = .672.  Again negative words were more often correctly recognised than 
neutral words. There was no main effect of perspective, F(1,19) = 1.064, p = .315. The 
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interaction between perspective and emotion was also not significant, F(1,19) <.001, p = 
1.00. See Table 14 for the averages and standard errors of the old/new task.  
Discussion 
Self-relevant information processing is generally viewed to be an automatic 
process (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). This Experiment 3 explored 
the automatic nature of self-relevant information processing. This was achieved by 
repeating the stimuli three times. Using repetition as a manipulation, the influence of 
repetition on memory was measured and compared with the influence of emotional self-
related information on memory. In other words, a comparison could be made between 
an automatic (self-relatedness) influence on memory and non-automatic influence of 
repetition on memory. If self-related information leads to an automatic enhancement of 
binding into memory, there should be no effect of repetition on self-related information. 
As repetition of self-related information does not become more ‘self’. Naturally repetition 
itself was predicted to lead to an overall improvement on memory.     
  The results showed a robust effect of repetition for all time-windows with the 
matching task. An interaction was observed for emotion and perspective, but neither 
emotion nor perspective was influenced by time.  It is possible that with each repetition 
Table 14. Experiment 3 proportion correct, old/new task. Mean proportion correct 
responses and d' old/new task. Standard error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials d’ 
Correct Correct 
Self  .71 (.03)  .66 (.03) 1.10 (0.13) 
Other  .70 (.04)  .64 (.03) 1.05 (0.12) 
Negative  .79 (.03)  .75 (.03) 1.35 (0.11) 
Neutral  .63 (.04)  .55 (.04) 0.97 (0.14) 
Self/Negative  .80 (.03)  .76 (.03) 1.39 (0.13) 
Self/Neutral  .63 (.04)  .56 (.05) 0.82 (0.16) 
Other/Negative  .79 (.03)  .74 (.30) 1.32 (0.11) 
Other/Neutral  .62 (.04)  .53 (.04) 0.77 (0.14) 
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the task became easier, freeing more mental resources, and since the words were 
repeated, these too could be processed faster. If repetition influenced the self-priority 
effect, an interaction should have been observed as the influence of time would have 
been greater for self-related stimuli compared to the influence of time on stimuli not 
related to the self. This interaction was not found, and it can be concluded that repetition 
itself did not influence the self-priority effect. Repetition on an item already deemed to 
be related to the self would not make it more self-relevant. In the matching task, self-
relatedness is manipulated by linking the self to a specific colour, which is then either 
matched or not matched with a label. As suggested in the previous chapters, the meaning 
of the word is not relevant in the matching task, and only the colour/label combination 
is task-relevant for the matching judgement.  
However, the interaction found between emotion and perspective suggested that 
emotion influenced the self-priority effect in the current task. This was not the case in 
previous experiments (Experiment 1a-1d), which used a similar matching paradigm, albeit 
without repetition. There is a likely explanation for this as the current experiment was 
likely to be much more sensitive. This was due to a quadrupling of the number of given 
trials in the current experiment compared to these earlier experiments. This larger 
number of trials was necessary in order to do the repetition manipulation. The increase 
in sensitivity which comes from the larger trial numbers may be the reason why the 
interaction, which was not previously exhibited, was found here. It suggests the 
interaction is a fairly weak one and not one which is consistently shown across 
participants.   
Nonetheless, for the proportion of correct responses and d’, the effect of self was 
greater for the neutral words than for the negative words in the matching task. This can 
only mean that the emotional value of the words was processed. Taken together, the 
increase in power and the faster processing of the words (learning the task via repetition) 
means a significant effect is found for emotion on self-relevant information. Like 
Experiment 2, emotion seems to impact the self, but unlike Experiment 2, emotion is not 
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task-relevant, which could explain the smaller self-priority effect for negative words when 
compared to neutral words. As mentioned in the main introduction, it is possible that the 
negative emotion led to a distancing of the self for negative words (Baumeister & Cairns, 
1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Mezulis et al., 2004; Ochsner, 2000; 
Sedikides & Green, 2004; Taylor, 1991). However, the RT measure remained unaffected 
and only revealed a main effect of self and time, meaning that the decision time was not 
disrupted by emotion. This suggests that emotion distracted but not delayed the 
processing of self-related information. This finding is not in line with the concept that 
negative information results in distancing from the self (Williams, Mathews, et al., 1996). 
Furthermore, the old/new task revealed no adverse effect of emotion and negative words 
were more accurately remembered when compared to neutral words, regardless of 
perspective.  
For the old/new recognition task, the four repetitions greatly affected the self-
reference effect and resulted in no significant difference of perspective in any of the 
measurements. However, the effects of emotion were very similar to the previous 
experiment (Experiment 1a-1d & Experiment 2) and showed faster responses, greater 
signal detection, and overall more correct responses for negative emotional words. 
Although it has been suggested in previous research that people identify much more 
with positive emotions and much less with negative emotions (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; 
Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Taylor, 1991), our current and previous results do not support this. 
If the negative valence of words is obscuring the self-reference effect, then this should 
not happen for neutral valence words. Since there is no interaction between emotion and 
perspective, emotion does not influence self-related information in this experiment. It is 
likely that the absent self-reference effect was caused by the added manipulation in this 
experiment, which is repetition.  Furthermore, the participants were aware of a follow-up 
memory task, which made the words task-relevant and a priority. The emotional valence 
of the words helped to increase its saliency (Mather & Sutherland, 2011) for later recall 
despite being disruptive in the matching task and no general slow-down of ongoing 
activity was found (Algom et al., 2004).  
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If the added benefit of the self leads to a more efficient processing of words, then 
the repetition of words does not equally facilitate to self-related words and words that 
are linked to a distant other. The repeated processing of words would inevitably lead to 
greater recall of these words. Up to a certain point (learning curve) this effect is additive, 
each repetition further strengthening memory binding of the words. The binding of 
information to the self does not strengthen with repetition, as the main benefit is in the 
initial automatic and fast processing (Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). This gives self-
related information an initial aid in binding into memory. However, this “boost” does not 
benefit from repetition as the binding of information to the self does not become more 
self-related after each repetition. The value of self remains the same.  In short, with an 
increased number of repetitions, the initial benefit of the self-priority effect on memory 
is superseded by the additive benefit of repetition, the value of which is equal for all 
words.  
Emotion is different compared to self-related information, as the former is linked 
to the meaning of the word directly, and the latter is linked to the colour of the word. 
The increased attentional resources for self-relevant information and the binding of 
information to self helps retrieve information from memory, but the emotional meaning 
of the words help the words stand out during the memory task. Each repetition might 
not strengthen the binding to the self, but it does strengthen the meaning, and thus the 
emotional valence of the word. 
The old/new experiment was only presented at the end of all repetitions, and 
therefore, only the total effect of repetition could be measured. These results show that 
after three repetitions, the old/new experiment did not show any effect of self-reference. 
As the self-priority effect was still present in the matching task, when did the mnemonic 
boost of repetition catch up with the mnemonic effect of self-related information? The 
follow-up Experiment 4 helped explore this question. However, the next experiment will 
focus purely on self-related information processing. Experiment 3 did find an effect of 
emotion, which shows that repetition using the current paradigm does not influence the 
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encoding of emotional words. However, the absence of a self-reference effect should be 
investigated further. Therefore, the next chapter will try and show exactly when a self-




Free-Recall & Self 
Introduction Experiment 4 
In Experiment 3, the automatic mnemonic influence of self-relevance on 
information processing was explored using a repetition version of the matching paradigm 
used in this thesis. Experiment 3 however, had a limitation due to its design. It only allowed 
us to measure the cumulative effect of the wordlist repetitions on memory. In other 
words, the time-course of the mnemonic effects of repetition is unknown. The main 
limiting issue is the choice of the old/new paradigm. This paradigm does not lend itself 
to any circumstance where repeated testing is required of the same item, not only 
because participants would be able to reach ceiling level fairly easily, but it would be 
difficult for the participant to keep the ‘new’ words from being seen as ‘old’ after the first 
trials.  
Experiments 1-3 have all focussed on the memory processes on self-related 
information using the old/new paradigm.  Testing memory via the old/new task is not an 
intensive recognition task. This is because the task only requires recognition rather than 
recall the task, it does not tax the processes associated with accessing memory 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Norman & Schacter, 2014). It only requires participants to 
make a decision based on familiarity (Tulving, 1985). This means that some words are not 
clearly recalled per se, but recognised as being familiar. If a word reaches a certain 
threshold of familiarity, then this would be enough for the participant to judge the word 
as ‘old’.  The previous experiments have clearly shown that self-related information 
facilitates recognition memory, i.e. self-related old words are quicker and more accurately 
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recognised as ‘old’ compared to words not related to the self. The aim of the current 
Experiment 4 is to further elaborate these findings from memory recognition to recall, by 
combining the matching task used in Experiment 3, followed by a free-recall paradigm.   
The main difference between an old/new recognition task and a free-recall task is 
that with the former a participant can use external retrieval cues to help retrieve the 
relevant memory, which makes memory retrieval easier to achieve. This is not possible 
with free-recall, and the participant will be dependent on only internal cues to recall 
relevant information (Norman & Schacter, 2014). Since self-related information increases 
the binding of information into memory, the increased difficulty of the free-recall task on 
recollection when compared to the old/new task should result in a strong self-reference 
effect. Nonetheless, the advantage of self-related information on recall would become 
less discernible as the effect of repetition will become more apparent over time.  
Furthermore, the current experiment will build on the previous experiment on 
wordlist repetition.  In Experiment 3, it was shown that repetition does not add to the self-
reference effect, which resulted in equal retrieval of self-related and distant other-related 
words after three repetitions.  In the current experiment, memory was tested after each 
learning phase (the matching task), and this was repeated three times. Also, since the 
main aim of this experiment was to test the self-reference effect using free-recall, no 
emotional stimuli were used. Including emotions, plus extra repetition would have made 
the experiment too long. In Chapter 7, Experiment 6, a non-repetition version of this 
experiment is described. 
Based on the previous experiments, it was expected that self-related information 
would be learned faster than information related to a distant other, but after the last 
repetition, self-related information and distant other-related information would be 





Twenty participants took part in this free-recall experiment. However, 3 
participants were removed due to below chance level performance on the matching task.  
Three participants were male and 14 were female with a mean age of 20.88 years (range 
18–35 years).  
Material and procedure 
The wordlist contained neutral nouns using the same list generation procedure as 
Experiment 1 & 3. However, all words used in this experiment were neutral.  Similarly, the 
matching task was identical to Experiment 1 and had no catch trials. However, two new 
elements were added:  first, the overall procedure for the matching task was changed as 
the word-lists were divided into four word-lists containing 20 words each. These four 
word-lists were repeated four times in random order, which resulted in 16 blocks and 
created four time-windows which were used during the statistical analysis.  
After each set of 20 words, a short distraction task was presented where 
participants had to count backwards aloud for 30 seconds. After the distraction task, 
participants had one minute to recall words from the preceding matching task. During 
the free-recall task, participants were presented with a fixation cross in the middle of the 
screen and were instructed to recall vocally as many words as they can in any order they 
wished. Each time a participant recalled a word, the fixation-cross disappeared and 
reappeared after each word was pronounced. The reappearance of the fixation-cross 
indicated to the participants that they could recall the next word.  The responses were 
recorded and scored offline. After each block, the participant could take a self-paced 
break, and at the start of each block, the instructions were repeated. 
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Results 
As with Experiment 3, the four different time-windows were used to study any 
effect of repetition during the matching task. However, due to the changes in methods, 
it was now also possible to see the effects of repetition during the memory or free recall 
task. Therefore, both the matching and free recall tasks were analysed by a repeated 
ANOVA 2(perspective[self, distant other])×4(time[time-window 1,2,3,4]) design, and a 
Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple comparisons. Sample size is 17 which 
means the tests were under-powered. Although throughout this thesis a sample size of 
20 was seen as sufficient for reliably measure an effect of the self. However a general 
effect-size for a free-recall task is lower. Therefore, the current study is slightly under-
powered. This means that the results might miss a potential significant effect. However, 
like the previous experiments, this paradigm is again novel and thus it is difficult to predict 
an exact effect-size for the power analysis.  
Matching task 
The d’ data revealed a main effect of perspective as in Experiments 1 - 3, F(1, 16) 
= 16.510, p = .001, η2p = .508. Words linked to the self were more often correctly detected 
as matching to the label or not matching to the label than words not linked to the self. 
Furthermore, there was no main effect of time, F(3, 48) = 3.023, p = .069, but there was 
an interaction between time and perspective, F(3, 48) = 2.909, p = .048, η2p = .154, see 
Figure 26 and Table 15. This interaction was caused by a self-priority effect in signal 
detection for time-windows one (p <.001), three (p = .003), and a marginal effect in time-
window two (p =.055). However, no self-priority effect was observed in time-window four 
(p = .223).  
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Similarly, for the matched trials, the data of proportion correct responses found a 
main effect for perspective, F(1,16) = 15.856, p = .001, η2p = .498. More words related to 
the self were correctly judged as matching when compared to words linked to distant 
other. For the proportion of correct responses there is a main effect of time also, F(3,48) 
              
                                                                             Mean d’ matching task per perspective (Error bar = 
standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 
Figure 26.  d’ matching task, Experiment 4.  
Table 15. Experiment 4 d’, matching task.  d’ for each per time-window. Standard error in 
parenthesis. 
d’ 
Time 1 2 3 4 
Self 3.89 (0.29) 4.19 (0.20) 4.34 (.21) 3.95 (0.26) 
Other 2.47 (0.34) 3.57 (0.31) 3.46 (0.26) 3.49 (0.32) 



























= 4.234, p = .046, η2p = .209. Even though the pairwise comparisons show that the 
biggest difference occurs between time-window one and time-window two, this 
difference is not significant (p = .084). However, an interaction between time and 
perspective is observed also, F(3,48) = 3.934, p = .031, η2p = .197. This interaction was 
driven by significant differences between self-related words and words linked to a distant 
other for time-windows one, two and three (respectively: p < .001, p = .032, p = .005,), 
where words related to the self were more often correctly judged as matching with the 
label than words not related to the self. No significant difference between words related 
to the self and distant other were found for time-window four (p = .137). The non-
matched trials showed no difference in proportion correct responses for perspective, 
F(1,16) = 3.080, p = .098; time, F(3,48) = 2.651, p = .108; nor an interaction between time 
and perspective, F(3,48) = 1.656, p = .189. See Table 16 for the averages and standard 
errors of the proportion of correct responses.  
The median reaction time data for the matched trials only revealed a main effect 
of perspective, F(1,16) = 41.016, p < .001, η2p =  .719. Participants responded faster to 
words related to the self when compared to words related to distant other. No other 
significant effects were found, Fs: time = 1.072, p = .370; self × time = .217, p = .884; non-
matched time = .472, p = .703; non-matched perspective = .344, p = .566; non-matched 
perspective × time = 1.185, p = .326. See Table 17 for the median reaction times and 
standard errors.  
Table 16. Experiment 4 Proportion, matching task.  Mean proportion correct responses. Standard 
error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
 Time 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Self .95 (.03) .99 (.01) .98 (.01) .97 (.01) .92 (.02) .94 (.02) .96 (.02) .93 (.02) 
Other .82 (.04) .93 (.02) .90 (.02) .92 (.02) .84 (.05) .91 (.03) .95 (.01) .91 (.03) 
Average 0.885 0.96 0.94 0.945 0.88 0.925 0.955 0.92 
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Free recall task 
A direct comparison of the proportion of correct responses for the matching trials 
revealed a main effect of perspective, F(1,16) = 19.636, p < .001, η2p = .551. Participants 
recalled words related to the self more often than words related to a distant other.  A 
main effect of time was observed also, F(3,48) = 3.868, p = .015, η2p = .195, which was 
mainly the results of a marginally significant greater recall for time-window four when 
compared to time-window one (p = .050). 
As the Free-recall data was analysed using a 2(perspective[self, distant 
other])×4(time[time-window 1,2,3,4]) design, a potential learning curve could be 
examined. The results did reveal an interaction effect between perspective and time, 
F(3,48) = 4.086, p = .012, η2p = .203, see Figure 27 and Table 18. A follow-up paired 
comparison revealed that participants recalled more self-related words than distant 
other-related words for time-windows two (p < .001), and three, (p < .001). No such 
difference was observed for time-windows one (p = .075), and four (p = .095). 
Furthermore, when just looking only at the self-related words, there appears to be some 
effect of learning, F(3,48) = 3.854, p = .015, η2p = .194. Further analysis point towards a 
potential initial increase in recall between time-window one and time-window two (p = 
.002), time-window two and time-window three (p = .001), and time-window one and 
Table 17. Experiment 4 RT, matching task.  Median reaction time matching task. Standard error in 
parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
 Time 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 






























Average 1302.49 1269.30 1309.75 1269.4 1387.03 1352.98 1381.42 1385.83 
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four (p = .010). No other significant differences were found (time-windows: two and three, 
p = .135; two and four, p = .702; & three and four, p = .686). For the other-related words 
a significant difference in time was found as well, F(3,48) = 4.070, p = .012, η2p = .203. 
When comparing differences between time-windows, significant differences were found 
for time-window one and time-window four (p = .032), time-window two and four (p = 
.041), and between time-windows three and four (p = .015). The remaining differences 
between time-windows were not significant (time-windows: one and two, p = .744; one 
and three, p =.565; & two and three, p = .277). For the non-matched trials no main 
effects or interaction were found: perspective, F(1,16) = .120, p = .734; time, F(3,48) = 
2.443, p = .075; and perspective×time, F(3,48) = .883, p = .457.8 
8 No recency or primacy effect were observed, most likely this is because of the distractor task disrupting 
any mnemonic actively utilised by the participant. Also, repetition itself would act like a mnemonic which is 
possibly more efficient than the organisational strategy underlying recency or primacy.  
Table 18. Experiment 4 Proportion correct, free-recall task. mean proportion correct responses. 
Standard error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
 Time 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Self .24 (.02) .32 (.02) .35 (.03) .33 (.04) .18 (.03) .25 (.03) .22 (.02) .19 (.03) 
Other .17 (.03) .18 (.02) .16 (.02) .26 (.04) .17 (.03) .22 (.03) .23 (.03) .24 (.04) 







                                                                                       
Mean proportion correctly recalled items on the free-recall task. Mean recall displayed 
for perspective on the matched trials per wordlist repeat. (Error bar = standard error, 















































In this Experiment 4, it was determined whether the findings reported in earlier 
chapters could be replicated using a recall, rather than recognition memory paradigm. A 
direct replication of the previous experiments, just with a recall, rather than recognition, 
was not possible. This was because of practical limitations, which required the removal of 
emotion as a condition. Including emotion would make the memory workload for the 
participants too high, and the duration of the experiment too long. Therefore, this 
experiment focussed purely on self-related words and not emotion. This 16 block design 
where each block contained a matching task and a free-recall task allowed the data to 
be split up into four time-windows.  
Experiment 4 had a matching task, just like previous experiments. The results from 
this matching task were the same as reported for earlier experiments. Again there was a 
robust self-priority effect: compared to trials linked to a distant other, trials related to the 
self were more easily distinguished from noise, were more often correctly judged as 
matching with the label, and the participants were quicker in their matching decisions. 
This is all in line with the previous experiments (1-3), but in this experiment an influence 
of repetition was also found. For both the d’ data and the proportion of correct 
responses, the fourth time-window showed no significant difference between the self and 
distant other trials, whereas time-windows one, two, and three show the self-priority 
effect. This is at odds with the findings of the Experiment 3, which was a repetition 
experiment as well, but where no differences between time windows were observed.  
However, as stated earlier, there were some necessary methodological differences 
between the two matching tasks of Experiment 3 and the current Experiment 4. The 
matching task of Experiment 3 displayed all trials without disruption, and there was only 
a small break between each repetition. In the current experiment, the word-list was 
divided into four blocks, which were repeated three times. After each block, a distraction 
task followed and a free-recall task. Therefore, there was some time between each of the 
blocks, and this was repeated three times, possibly providing time to learn the task to 
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near ceiling level as both self and distant other words for the proportion of correct 
responses are above .92. Furthermore, in Experiment 3, all trials were displayed 
sequentially with a break every 100 trials, but no reminder of the instructions was 
provided. In the current experiment, a reminder of the instruction was provided before 
the start of each block. Furthermore, after each matching set, feedback was provided 
stating the percentage of correct responses. This was the same for every matching task, 
but with the increase of blocks and shortening of each matching block, there was an 
increased potential to learn the task. This, in turn, reduced the benefit of self-related 
words over repetitions. 
Interestingly, for the proportion of correct responses, when a time-window was 
compared with a preceding time-window, only the distant other-trials showed a 
significant effect of learning (i.e. a higher score for a subsequent time-window). This 
indicated that trials related to the self were learned faster or easier than the trials related 
to a distant other. Participants performed at maximum for the self-related words much 
quicker (time-window one) than trials related to a distant other (time-window four). 
Simply put, it takes some time for the distant other-trials to catch up to the self-trials. A 
similar effect is observed for the d’ data, albeit less extreme. Here a learning effect is 
found for the distant other-trials between time-window one and time-window two only, 
which is not observed for trials related to the self.  
The median reaction times did not show any effect of repetition but does reveal 
a self-priority effect. This indicated that the initial detection of self-relevant information 
drew the attention in a quick and automatic manner. The faster detection of self-relevant 
stimuli over stimuli not related to the self was not a taught response, and therefore 
repetition did not improve detection speed. The superior reaction time to self-relevant 
stimuli means that participants potentially detected the self-relevant information faster. 
In turn, this lead to more time for decision making, providing support for faster and more 
accurate detection of self-relevant information (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Sui et al., 2012). 
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The free-recall task displayed similar findings as the old/new recognition tasks of 
the previous experiments. However, unlike the previous experiments, the current 
experiment allowed a look into four time-windows of repetition in memory.  
Before discussing the findings, it should be pointed out that this particular 
memory experiment has a high memory workload and the nature of the encoding task 
(i.e. the matching task) in being an incidental learning task is far from optimal for learning 
items. The matching task itself does not require the memorisation of words, and 
therefore, the task distracts from encoding the words into memory. This makes the task 
fairly difficult, and on average, the participant recalls roughly five out of 20 items. This is 
in stark contrast with the old/new recognition task where the familiarity of the word itself 
was enough for a correct ‘old’ judgement. This means that in terms of difficulty, the 
old/new task was far easier for the participant.  
This difficulty is reflected in the first time-window where no self-reference effect is 
found. Although it appears that the self-related words were recalled more often than 
words not related to the self, this difference is not significant. In other words, even the 
added benefit of self-referential processing was not enough to overcome the difficulty of 
the task in the first time window. However, in time-windows two and three, a clear effect 
of self-reference emerged. These two time-windows clearly showed increased recall for 
words related to the self when compared to words related to a distant other. These results 
are in line with the results of Experiment 1-3 where an effect of self facilitated memory 
processes.  
The results indicated a much steeper learning-curve for self-related words. In the 
first time-window no significant difference in recall between self- and other-related words 
was found. However, in the second time-window there was a clear self-priority effect. 
This is the result of a significant increase between time-window one and time-window 
two for self-related words.  Such an increase in recall between time-window one and 
time-window two is absent for the other-related words. Only in the fourth time-window 
is a significant increase of correctly recalled items found for the other-related words when 
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compared to the earlier time-windows for the other-related words. This is in contrast with 
the self-related words where no difference is found between time-windows four, three, 
and two. The only significant differences found for the self-related words were for time-
window 1 compared to later time-windows. In other words, most of the learning occurred 
between time-window one and time-window three for the self-related words, whereas 
most of the learning occurred from time-window three to time-window four for the 
other-related words. In Experiment 5 of this thesis it will be shown that the learning curve 
of self-related items is not only steeper when compared to other-related words, but is 
more stable over time as well. 
With Experiment 4 the self-reference effect in old/new recognition can be 
extended to free-recall, showing a strong benefit effect of self on memory even when 
there are no external retrieval cues (M. A. Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Gutchess et al., 
2007; Kelley et al., 2002; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Leshikar et al., 2015; Symons & Johnson, 
1997). 
Interestingly, self-related information no longer facilitated recall by the fourth 
time-window. This finding is again similar to the findings of the previous experiment, 
where the words related to the self did not have a strong additive advantage with 
repetition. Together with the results of the current experiment and the result of 
Experiment 3, it can be concluded that repetition does not weaken the self-related items, 
but neither does it strengthen the memory of these items beyond the influence of 
repetition. The main benefit of self-relevant information lies with the fast and automatic 
processing of information, providing an initial boost to memory. Each repetition does not 
increase the self-value of an item, whereas each repetition does increase the 
memorability of the item regardless of self-relevance as the binding into memory 
becomes more stable after each repetition.  
To conclude, repetition does not influence the RT on the matching task, nor does it 
impact the accuracy of processing self-relevant information. It does however greatly 
impact the accuracy of processing distant other-relevant information during the 
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matching task, eventually bringing the accuracy to the same level of self-relevant 
processing. This indicates an attentional benefit of self-related information, but the self-
priority effect does not increase with repetition. In recall, information related to the self is 
recalled more often, but repetition brings information not related to the self to the same 
level of recall.  
With these behavioural experiments, some basic aspects of self-relevant information 
processing have been explored. The next two chapters will focus on elucidating the 
underlying neurological processes involved in emotional and self-related information 
processing. Chapter 6 will continue the investigation of the automaticity of the self as 
explored in this chapter. It will use a different paradigm then the matching task as it will 
investigate the effect of suppressing self-related information. Chapter 7 will tie all the 
previous experiments together and, like this chapter, use a free-recall experiment but 
now without repetition. This would also allow the further investigation and emotional self-
related information during very difficult encoding and recall conditions.  
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Chapter 6: 
Memory suppression & self 
Introduction 
The emphasis, up to this point in the thesis, has been on the processes involved 
in observable behavioural effects of emotion and self-related information on attentional 
and memory processes. The previous experiments repeatedly showed, a distinct effect of 
self-relevance on attention and memory, even though this self-relevance was arbitrarily 
assigned. This shows a potential top-down influence on bottom-up saliency of stimuli for 
information related to the self over information not related to the self. In other words, 
the arbitrary assignment of self to a specific colour results in a prioritisation of that colour 
over stimuli not related to the self.   
 This chapter and the next will present experiments which try to explore the neural 
correlates of the self-relevance and emotional processing that previous chapters have 
identified. Experiment 5 will further explore the automaticity of self-related information 
processing. Experiment 6 will be similar to the free-recall Experiment 4 but without 
repetition and will explore the neural correlates of emotion and self-related information 
processing with the matching paradigm. Both experiments will do this by using 
electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings while participants process material which varies 
in its self-relatedness. The overall aim is to explore the neural mechanisms involved in 
prioritising self-relevant and emotional information on attention and memory, using EEG. 
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In psychology, the neurophysiological underpinnings of behaviour are often 
studied using two mainstream techniques: functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI); 
and EEG. This chapter and the next will specifically focus on EEG research as this will be 
the method used in the subsequent two experiments. First EEG will be introduced 
together with the Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) method.  
Electroencephalogram 
The strength of EEG methods lies with the temporal resolution of this technique, 
as the activity of neurons can be measured, accurate to the millisecond level. EEG 
measures the postsynaptic potential generated by neurons in the brain. Although scalp 
EEG is not sensitive enough to measure the activity of a single neuron, a grouped 
activation of many neurons can be measured via electrodes placed on the scalp. Typical 
EEG experiments are primarily limited to the activity of the cortex of the brain as deeper 
brain regions may not be measured adequately.   
Event-related potentials 
Most EEG studies record event-related potentials (ERP), and an ERP is brain 
activity linked to a specific stimulus, event or action. A specific experimental condition is 
correlated with an ERP, and this is compared with a different (control) condition. 
Naturally, not only the ERP linking to the experiment is being measured and also picks 
up other, not-experiment related, EEG data. Furthermore, EEG is very sensitive to any 
muscle movement and surrounding electrical interference. For this reason, the brain 
activity needs to be measured by multiple trials. By averaging over many trials, the ERP 
is strengthened per trial (as it is constant) and any noise is averaged out (as it is random). 
In other words, increasing the number of trials increases the signal to noise ratio.  
An ERP component is often described by measuring the typical latency and 
polarity of the signal. For example, a P600 ERP describes a positive going deflection, of 
which the peak amplitude is generally around 600 milliseconds after stimuli onset. 
However, the peak amplitude of an ERP component is not fixed and can be variable, and 
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a P600 might peak as early as 500ms or as late as 800ms (Luck, 2014). The next few 
paragraphs will focus on introducing ERP components. The components described are 
often linked to attention and memory and are likely to be influenced by self-related and 
emotional information processing.  
Attention 
An early P200 with fronto-central distribution has been linked to initial word 
selection and is influenced by attention (Mangun & Hillyard, 1995; Peters, Suchan, Zhang, 
& Daum, 2005). Furthermore the P200 can be followed by a parietal occipital positive 
component (P250/P280) which reflects recognition or increased working memory load 
(Chapman, Gardner, Mapstone, Dupree, & Antonsdottir, 2015; Dunn, Dunn, Languis, & 
Andrews, 1998; Mangels, Picton, & Craik, 2001) and is potentially influenced by attention 
also (Talsma, Slagter, Nieuwenhuis, Hage, & Kok, 2005). Mangels et al. (2001) suggested 
that these anterior to posterior ERP components reflect an anterior to posterior 
attentional network proposed by Posner and Dehaene (1994). This attention network 
consists of medial frontal areas involved in directing attention and posterior parietal areas 
involved in engaging attention with the specific information to which the attention was 
directed, allowing for memory retrieval and recognition.  As the matching experiments 
of this thesis have repeatedly shown, self-related information influences attention. 
Because of this, it is expected that the early P200 components will be more pronounced 
for items related to the self, as attention is directed to self-relevant information. 
Potentially this might influence the P280 as well, as retrieval and recognition should be 
easier for self-related information.   
Another major EEG component is the P300. The P300 is a post-perceptual 
component, which means that the P300 is not influenced by the physical properties of a 
stimulus, but by a person’s response to the stimulus. It can be evoked irrespective of the 
sensory modality of a stimulus. Importantly, like the N1, the P300 is observed in a task 
that requires stimuli discrimination and the allocation of attentional resources (Curran, 
2004; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Gonsalvez & Polich, 2002). However, there is 
no clear consensus on the processes reflected by the P300. Generally, the P300 is thought 
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to reflect the updating of working memory and stimulus categorisation (Luck, 2014). This 
means that the P300 amplitude increases based on task demand (how difficult is it to 
categorise the stimuli) and stimulus frequency. Typically the P300 component is observed 
to emerge approximately 250-500ms after stimulus onset, generally reaching its peak 
around 300ms.  
The P300 consists of two distinct components, each with different topographic 
distributions. The P3a is believed to be more directly linked to stimulus evaluation via 
top-down attention allocation; its scalp topography suggests that it is generated by 
frontal lobe regions. The P3b, it is argued, reflects the subsequent consolidation and 
maintenance of the attended information into memory, its scalp topography suggests 
neural generators in the temporal-parietal regions (Polich, 2007). In his extensive review 
of the P300, Polich (2007) hypothesises that the way attention allocation and stimulus 
categorisation can occur is via the neural inhibition of ongoing processes, which is what 
is reflected by the P300. The direct inhibiting of distracting stimuli would allow easier 
processing of the focussed information and the updating of working memory.  
The P300 is arguably of particular interest for this thesis in terms of its association 
with memory consolidation and maintenance processes for attended stimuli. The P300 
can be explored as a potential neural marker of the process by which self-relevant 
information is enhanced in attention and memory, consistent with the behavioural effects 
we have found. As suggested by Sui & Humphreys (2015), the self functions as a hub that 
connects self-relevant information across domains. Therefore, if the self-related 
information influences attentional and memory processes, the P300 ERP component is 
likely to reflect this with a greater amplitude for self-related information processes. This 
is because even though self-related information is prioritised and processed more 
accurately (as shown by Experiments 1-4). This is possibly achieved by inhibiting ongoing 
neural processes and an orienting towards the self-relevant stimulus. Interestingly the 
P300 has been linked to inhibition of ongoing electrophysiological processes (Polich, 
2007). This could mean the inhibition of distracting information, but perhaps more 
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interestingly, this could reflect the inhibitory “circuit-breaker” of TPJ mentioned in the 
main introduction. In other words, the P300 might reflect the inhibitory processes linked 
to switching attention towards more salient information like self-relevant information. 
It is not completely novel to explore the P300 in terms of self-relevance 
processing. For example, the study by Zhou et al. (2010) revealed a larger P300 amplitude 
when pronouns were self-relevant compared to non-self conditions. In this study, the 
Chinese possessive pronouns ‘wo de’ (mine) and ‘ta de’ (his) were used in an oddball 
paradigm. ‘Wo de’ is seen as a self-related pronoun and ‘ta de’ and a non-self pronoun. 
Participants were shown a big circle (80% of trials), a small circle (10% of trials), the self-
pronoun (5% of trials), or the non-self pronoun (5% of trials). The participants had to 
respond to the small circle and not to the other stimuli. By comparing the self and non-
self pronouns directly, the ERP analysis revealed that the P300 amplitude was larger for 
the self pronouns than for the non-self pronouns. The authors conclude that the P300 is 
linked to the amount of attentional resources required. In other words, the larger 
amplitudes for self pronouns reflect the greater salience of the self pronouns. 
Furthermore, since high emotional stimuli evoke larger P300 amplitudes, the authors 
suggest that self-pronouns are more emotionally salient.  
The N400 can have an onset as early as 250m after stimulus onset and can extend 
to 500ms. The N400 usually peaks around 400ms after stimulus onset. The N400 is a 
negative deflection in the EEG signal often more pronounced when the semantic 
meaning of a word does not match with the sentence it is used in (Luck, 2014). Typically 
an N400 is linked to language processing, and it is suggested to revolve around the effort 
of integrating the semantic meaning of a word in preceding context (Hagoort, 2007), or 
the effort in retrieving meaning associated with a word (Kutas, Van Petten, & Kluender, 
2006).  
A study using EEG investigated how emotion influences self-related information 
processing, focussed on the self-positivity bias (Watson, Dritschel, Obonsawin, & 
Jentzsch, 2007). The goal of this study was to disentangle the possible confound in many 
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studies on self-relevant information processing: emotion.  In their EEG study, Watson et 
al. (2007) asked participants to make self-referential judgments about emotional words 
by deciding if the word was ‘like me’ or ‘not like me’. The ERP results showed a significant 
interaction between self-reference and emotion between 450ms and 600ms after 
stimulus onset at the midfrontal electrodes. Self-related negative words and non-self 
positive words showed a more negative-going deflection in the EEG signal when 
compared to self-related positive words and non-self negative words. The authors 
interpreted this as a N400 ERP and suggested that this interaction partially supports 
independent processing of self-related and emotional information. Since the results of 
Watson et al. (2007) showed a more negative N400 ERP for self-negative words 
compared to self-positive words, this might reflect a self-positivity bias as it is arguably 
easier to link positive words to the self compared to negative words.   
Like the behavioural Experiments 1-3 in this thesis, many ERP studies of human 
memory also use an old/new recognition paradigm. For these kinds of experiments and 
cued recall experiments, a frontal negativity is often found between 300-500ms, this ERP 
is called the FN400. The FN400 is generally linked to familiarity responses as measured 
in know versus familiar paradigms (Friedman & Johnson, 2000). Know versus familiar 
experiments are similar to old/new experiments but add another element. In the know 
versus familiar paradigm, a participant has to not just report an item as old or new but 
also indicate if the old item is either known or familiar. A familiar response would indicate 
a familiarity with the item but without any specific recollection of knowing when the item 
was learned or any other source memory material. The familiar response is, therefore, 
more subjective than the know response, which is the recall of the item including 
contextual details involving the recalled item. The FN400 is linked to the familiar response. 
Old items in an old/new experiment would show a reduced negativity modulated by the 
familiarity of the item.  
Memory 
As evident by the self-bias in free recall reported in the above study, and as shown 
in the behavioural data of this thesis, information related to the self is remembered more 
165 
frequently than information unrelated to the self. Like attention, memory processes can 
be investigated using ERPs. If the self influences memory, then it is likely to do so either 
during encoding of the new information or via the retrieval of already stored information. 
An ERP often linked to an old/new effect is the late positive component (LPC), 
which is observed over the parietal sites 400-800ms after stimulus onset. The LPC is 
greater in amplitude for the ‘old’ words than for the ‘new’ words. As such the LPC directly 
reflects recollection (Paller & Kutas, 1992; Rugg, 1995; Smith & Halgren, 1989). There is of 
course some difference between recognition tasks (i.e. old/new) and recall tasks (i.e. cued 
recall).  This difference is mainly a negative going ERP from 100-200ms over the left 
inferior prefrontal sites for the cued recall tasks. This likely reflects the need to link the 
provided cue with the target word (Friedman & Johnson, 2000).  
As with attention, remembering self-relevant information should be reflected in 
the ERPs related to memory processes. ERP literature on self-referential encoding and 
recall is however currently very limited, but two studies have used the idea of the self-
reference effect in memory.  
Dulas, Newsome, and Duarte (2011) studied which ERP components are involved 
in retrieving self-relevant information using an old/new plus source memory task, using 
younger and older adults. For this experiment, participants took part in an initial study 
phase, where they were presented with colour photographs of concrete objects. Each 
photo was depicted with a yes/no question. There were two conditions during the study 
phase and the yes/no questions related to these. One condition was a pleasantness 
condition for which the participants had to decide if the depicted photo was pleasant. 
Furthermore, the participants were instructed that they had to make the decision 
personal, e.g. “Yes, I do think apples are tasty”. In the distant other condition participants 
had to make a commonness judgement, e.g. “Yes, computers are common”. After the 
study phase, a variation of an old/new paradigm was presented. The participant had to 
decide if the presented photo was previously studied or not. Also, the participants had 
to make a source memory decision and tell if the photo was from the pleasantness or 
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commonness condition. The authors only provided ERP data for the test phase. 
The authors observed that the FN400 had an earlier onset time for young 
participants compared to old participants. Interestingly, where the onset of the FN400 is 
normally around 300ms, the authors report an old-new effect as early as 200ms after 
stimulus onset for the younger adults. The older adults still benefit from self-referencing, 
albeit with a slight delayed onset compared to younger adults (350ms) and the amplitude 
of the FN400 was reduced for the older adults. The authors suggested that this difference 
in FN400 ERP between younger and older adults show that both groups still benefit from 
self-referencing strategies, but the reduced amplitude for the older adults reflect the 
source memory impairments found in older adults.   
A later LPC ERP component was observed for both groups and both conditions. 
However, the magnitude of the LPC did not differ between the self and non-self condition 
for young adults. Interestingly, older adults do show an increased LPC for the self 
condition. Dulas et al. (2011) hypothesise that the older adults were able to create more 
detailed episodic memories, which was reflected by the enhanced LPC amplitude. Via the 
self-referential encoding task, the self could have acted as a hub (Sui & Humphreys, 
2015b) linking these details together and in doing so generate a more easily accessible 
memory trace.  Even though the LPCs did not differ between conditions for the younger 
adults, the scalp distribution for both groups was more bilateral for the LPC linked to the 
self, whereas LPC was more left-lateral for the non-self condition, suggesting possible 
different generators. The authors explain that this is possibly due to the nature of the 
task, as the non-self condition was more likely to engage semantic processing than the 
self condition. Taken together these ERP results indicate that self-referenced processing 
can improve recall similarly for young and older adults.  
Not all EEG research will show clearly identifiable ERP components. One EEG study 
on memory retrieval by Magno and Allan (2007), found a novel ERP component for self-
related information. In this experiment, participants were divided into two groups: an 
autonoetic (awareness of specific past experiences); and a noetic (self-knowledge 
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abstracted from past experiences) group. Participants in the autonoetic group were 
presented with a number of low-frequency words. Each word was preceded by the cue 
‘self’ or ‘friend’. If the cue was self, then the participant had to try and retrieve and 
describe a personal event related to that word. After which the participants indicated if it 
was a recollection or not. Similarly, when the cue ‘friend’ was displayed, the participants 
had to describe an event involving the word concerning their friend. For the noetic group, 
the setup was mostly the same, but now the participants had to recall a fact related to 
the word,  which either concerned themselves or a friend.  
The ERP results for both groups are interesting as the autonoetic group revealed 
a novel positive-going ERP component starting as early as 100ms after stimulus onset up 
to the end of the epoch at 1,944ms over the midline sites. The Noetic group also showed 
a positive ERP component over the midline site but had a later onset and shorter duration 
(800ms-1200ms) compared to the autonoetic group. Although the reason for this 
difference is currently unclear, one could postulate that autonoetic information is richer 
in self-related details and therefore is easier to link to the self and other self-related 
information. Even though the ERP components of this study are novel, it does show a 
clear difference between self and friend related processing. Furthermore, Magno and 
Allan (2007) suggest that the possible underlying generators, spanning the anterior and 
posterior medial cortex, are often linked to self-reference effects. 
As seen from the examples above, there are many ERP components linked to 
attention and memory that are susceptible to self and non-self stimuli. Naturally, these 
EEG components are generated by underlying brain structures. The next two experiments 
will focus on the components discussed above, plus some more specifically related to the 
paradigms which will be discussed later.  
Experiment 5: Think/No-Think paradigm 
In Experiment 3 and Experiment 4, the automatic and fast processing of self-
related information was investigated. The basic findings of these experiments were that 
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though a self-reference effect is robustly found in memory, further repetition of the self-
association pairings did not assist in strengthening the self-reference effect, or at least 
not under the parameters that we tested. Self-related information is learned faster and 
remembered more often than information not related to the self. However, this appears 
to be the result of an automatic and fast process that offers initial benefits, with faster 
learning and a steeper learning curve when compared to information linked to a distant 
other. It seems repeated exposure to self-relevant information does not strengthen the 
binding into memory more than repetition does eventually. In other words, repeated self-
related information memorisation is faster when compared to repeated distant other-
relevant information memorisation, as discussed in Experiment 3 and Experiment 4.  
However, the repetition paradigms of Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 only 
approached the automatic self indirectly. This was done by creating a situation where 
automatic and fast prioritising of self-relevant information is no longer as beneficial 
compared to a situation where information can only be learned once.  In this chapter, 
Experiment 5 will examine the automaticity of self-relevant information processing by 
comparing suppressed memories with non-suppressed memories. This manipulation is 
done using the think/no-think paradigm developed by Anderson and Green (2001).  
The concept of suppressing memories, which is central to the think/no-think 
paradigm, revolves around the idea that the memorability of information can be reduced 
over time. In this paradigm, memory is suppressed, so it is claimed, by actively trying to 
suppress conscious recollection during recall. The main mechanism of this suppression, 
according to Anderson & Green (2001), lies with executive control. In other words, our 
ability to override an automatic/habitual response (M. C. Anderson & Green, 2001; M. C. 
Anderson & Levy, 2009), See Figure 28 (part A). In memory, this would imply the inhibition 
(or suppression) of existing memories from recall. Several studies have shown the 
importance of inhibition in memory (M. C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Logan & Cowan, 
1984; Mayr & Keele, 2000), where one of the possible functions of inhibition is the 
inhibition of competing memories during retrieval. This inhibition reduces the 
169 
memorability of the inhibited items. The think/no-think paradigm is based on this concept 
of reducing memorability of information through inhibition.  
The classic think/no-think paradigm first performed by  Anderson and Green 
(2001) involved a word pair association task. The experiment started with an encoding 
phase. In this participants had to learn unrelated word pairs, consisting of a cue-word 
and a target-word. After learning the word pairs, the presentation of the cue word 
required the participant to recall the target word. After this, the second part of the 
paradigm was given, which involve the think/no-think manipulation. In this phase, cue-
words were presented, and participants had to either recall the target words (think) or 
actively suppress (no-think) the recollection of the target words. During this phase, the 
cue-words were presented sixteen times, after which a recall phase followed. 
Furthermore, not all words learned in the initial encoding phase were used in the 
think/no-think phase and were used as a baseline to measure the effect of the think/no-
think phase. The results showed that with each repetition, an increase of memory 
suppression was observed when compared to baseline for the no-think trials (see Figure 
28, part B). In comparison, words in the think trials were recalled more often compared 
to baseline.  The authors conclude that these findings support a mechanism that removes 
unwanted memories out of awareness and this possibly reduces the memorability of the 
unwanted information over a long time period. Anderson and Green (2001) suggest that 
the suppression of memory incorporates part of the executive processes involved in 
cognition, which can be exploited using the think/no-think paradigm.  
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In an EEG experiment, Bergström, Velmans, Fockert, and Richardson-klavehn 
(2007) used the think/no-think paradigm to study the underlying neurophysiological 
processes involved in suppressing memories. This experiment found a significant ERP 
effect during the think/no-think phase between 200ms – 300ms after stimulus onset with 
an interaction between the posterior and anterior sites. The think condition was reflected 
by a more positive deflection in the EEG at the frontal sites compared the no-think 
condition, whereas the parietal/occipital sites showed a more negative going signal for 
the think condition when compared to the no-think condition. These findings reflect a 
frontal selection positivity and a posterior selection negativity, respectively (Harter & Aine, 
1984; Kenemans, Kok, & Smulders, 1993). These ERPs are both involved in attentional 
selection where the frontal selection positivity ERP is linked to selected information 
compared to the ignored information. The posterior selection negativity ERP is found 
with stimulus-specific selection, with a more negative activity for selected stimuli. 
According to Bergström et al. (2007), these two processes reflect early strategic processes 
involved in conscious recollection, which could mediate the suppression of unwanted 
                                                                 A) An overview of stimulus linked to two responses. 
The solid line is the prepotent response and will be the default response unless the weaker response is 
strengthened or the prepotent response is blocked. B) The results of an experiment that showed 
significant suppression of recall compared to baseline. Figures are replicated without permission (M. C. 
Anderson & Levy, 2009).  
Figure 28. An example of suppressing recall.
Figure 28 has been removed from 
this thesis due to copyright 
restrictions
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memories. Furthermore, there was a difference between the think/no-think condition 
between 500ms and 800ms. This difference was a primarily left parietal positive going 
component starting around 452ms, and a right frontal negative component occurring 
later around 600ms. Both positive left parietal and negative right frontal components 
were greater for think learned words, when compared to no-think learned and think not 
learned words. Learned words in this paradigm means the words successfully learned 
during the encoding phase. The greater positive left parietal effect for the learned think 
condition is believed to reflect conscious recollection (Paller & Kutas, 1992; Rugg, 1995; 
Smith & Halgren, 1989) and is the same component often referred to as the parietal 
old/new effect (see introduction Chapter 1), but has been linked to cued recall as well 
(Rugg, Schloerscheidt, Doyle, Cox, & Patching, 1996). The authors concluded that the 
observed ERP differences between the think and no-think conditions show that voluntary 
inhibition of recollection is possible, and can be therefore used as an experimental 
manipulation to understand memory processes. However, their behavioural results did 
not reveal suppressed recall, and as such, the authors surmised that even if individuals 
inhibit recollection, this does not lead to actual forgetting per se.  
The findings of Bergström et al. (2007) have been largely replicated in an EEG 
study conducted by Mecklinger, Parra, and Waldhauser (2009). Though their results were 
similar, there were also some crucial differences with the earlier experiment. The study by 
Bergström et al. (2007) revealed an interaction between learnedness of the words and 
condition in the form of a greater parietal positivity for think learned words and not-
learned words. Because no difference was observed between learned no-think and not 
learned words, the authors suggested that words were equally unmemorable from words 
that were never learned to begin with. However, Mecklinger et al. (2009) found that there 
was a difference in parietal positivity amplitude between the think and no-think 
conditions for the not-learned words. The authors believe that more retrieval attempts 
were made in their experiment, as the parietal positivity was increased for the not-learned 
think condition compared to the no-think condition. Also, like in Bergström et al. (2007) 
a frontal selection positivity (reflected by a P200)  was linked to greater attention to the 
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colour used to indicate a think condition. Interestingly, Mecklinger et al. (2009) found a 
centro-parietal N200 as well, which was greater for the no-think when compared to the 
think condition. The N200 is often linked to inhibiting prepotent responses, and 
Mecklinger et al. (2009) therefore suggested that the N200 found in their study reflects 
the electrophysiological processes involved in successful memory suppression, an 
assumption which the authors tested in a follow-up stop-signal task.  
This stop-signal task used the same words and subjects as the think/no-think 
paradigm, and in this task the participants had to make an animacy decision of the words 
(i.e. does the word describe something animate?) by pressing one of two buttons. In 20% 
of the trials, participants were unexpectedly told to withhold their response. In other 
words, these 20% reflect trials in which a prepotent response needed to be inhibited. The 
ERP results showed that correctly inhibiting one’s response was linked to a centrally 
distributed N200 which was linked to the early mechanisms of inhibitory control, and a 
broadly distributed P300 potentially reflecting a post-inhibition evaluation process. 
Mecklinger et al. (2009) then compared the think/no-think experiment with the stop 
signal task and found that the N200 linked to inhibition of memories and the N200 linked 
to inhibition of prepotent motor responses were positively correlated, suggesting that 
the underlying neurophysiological processes of suppressing memory and inhibiting 
motor responses are similar in nature.  
As mentioned several times in this thesis (see Experiment 3 and Experiment 4), the 
processing of self-related information seems to be fast and automatic. Therefore, it is 
possible that inhibition would have a different effect on information related to the self 
when compared to information related to a distant other. If self-related information 
processing benefits from an automatic process, then inhibiting memories linked to the 
self would possibly be more effortful. Therefore, the think/no-think paradigm might be 
especially suited for testing the automaticity of the self, by linking the self or a distant 
other to specific word-pairs. Displaying a cue word of a self-related word pair should 
more easily allow for the recall of the connected target word when compared to the 
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other related word-pairs. The other-related words will, in turn, be more easily suppressed 
in the no-think condition when compared to the word pairs related to the self. 
Suppressed recall is compared with the recall from the baseline trails which were part of 
the encoding phase but was not part of the trials trying to suppress (no-think) or promote 
(think) recall.  
As the think/no-think paradigm involves cued recall this experiment will also 
examine the well-known electrophysiological correlates involved in encoding and recall 
of information, and how this is different for self-related information compared to 
information not related to the self. Based on the the EEG papers on the think/no-think 
paradigm discussed earlier, the P200, P300, FN400 and the LPC components are of 
special interest.  
The P300 has been linked to attention and memory processes as well, but also to 
self-relevant information processing (Caharel et al., 2002; Fischler, Jin, Boaz, Perry, & 
Childers, 1987; Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Herbert, Herbert, Ethofer, & 
Pauli, 2011; Holeckova, Fischer, Giard, Delpuech, & Morlet, 2006; Scott, Luciana, Wewerka, 
& Nelson, 2005; Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006; Zhou et al., 2010), which has been discussed in 
the introduction of Chapter 1.  As mentioned in the introduction the two components of 
the P300 (the P3a and P3b (Polich, 2007)) have been linked to both attentional and 
memory processes and are therefore possibly representative of attention to memory 
transfer. The P3a seems to be involved in early target discrimination, whereas the P3b 
ERP reflects the maintenance and processing of the attended information. This, combined 
with the findings of a P300 in self-related information research, makes the P300 a 
potentially interesting ERP component in all phases of the current think/no-think study.  
Another potentially interesting component is the FN400 or the midfrontal N400 
old new effect, so called because of the greater negative deflection in the EEG signal for 
‘old’ words when compared to ‘new’ words between 300ms and 500ms (Friedman & 
Johnson, 2000).  The FN400 is topographically different from the N400, which is usually 
has a more central parietal distribution, whereas the FN400 typically has a more anterior 
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central distribution. However, the exact relation between the FN400 and the N400 
remains unclear. Although the current think/no-think experiment does not contain a 
typical old/new phase, during the learning and recall phase the cue words would prime 
or generate familiarity with the target words which should generate an FN400 ERP 
component.  
Another ERP component linked to recollection is the LPC, a component which was 
first mentioned in this thesis in the main introduction of Chapter 1. Previous research has 
found that a positive ERP between 400ms and 800ms was linked to recollection (Allan & 
Rugg, 1997; Allan, Wilding, & Rugg, 1998; Curran, 1999, 2004; Curran & Doyle, 2011; 
Tsivilis, Allan, Roberts, Williams, & Downes, 2015), and not familiarity. As a consequence 
of improved memory for self-related items, the LPC was expected to be more positive 
for the self-related items when compared to the items related to a distant other. 
Experiments 4 and 5 showed that repetition allows for the recall of distant other-related 
items to “catch-up” with items related to the self and therefore it is expected that the LPC 
will only be more positive for the self condition after the first repetition, but for the second 
repetition, no difference between self and distant other is expected. This is because the 
repetition itself would lead to increased memorability. For the second repetition, memory 
would have improved for the other-related words as well, and as such the LPC for self-
related words and other-related words would be relatively similar. Based on the literature 
described in this thesis on self-relevance and the think/no-think paradigm, this study will 
investigate several ERP components, which are summarised in Table 19. 
In short, the goals of this chapter are threefold. The first is to further elucidate the 
influence of self-related information during learning and later retrieval. The second is to 
investigate if memories related to the self can be suppressed as easily compared to 
memories related to a distant other. Finally, the third goal is to reveal any specific 
electrophysiological processes involved or influenced by self-related information 
processing.  
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Table 19. Overview key ERP components and the processes the ERPs are correlated with. 
ERP Location Key words Predictions Literature 
P200 Central anterior 
 Attention,
 Conscious recollection
More pronounced for items related to the self 
(compared to other), as attention is directed 
to self-relevant information. 
Bergström et al., 2007; 
Mangun & Hillyard, 1995; 
Mecklinger et al., 2009; 
Peters et al., 2005 
N200 Central  Inhibitory control
More pronounced for items related to the self 
(compared to other), as inhibitory control 
would be more taxed for self-related items. 
Bergström et al., 2007 





More pronounced for items related to the self 
(compared to other), as retrieval and 
recognition is easier for self-related items. 
Chapman et al., 2015; 
Dunn et al., 1998; 
Mangels et al., 2001; 
Talsma et al., 2005 




 Attention to memory
transfer,
 Attention switching
More pronounced for items related to the self 
(compared to other), as self-related 
information is more salient, influencing 
attentional and attention-to-memory 
processes. 
Caharel et al., 2002; 
Fischler et al., 1987; Gray 
et al., 2004; Herbert, 
Pauli, & Herbert, 2010; 
Holeckova et al., 2006; 
Polich, 2007; Scott et al., 
2005; Sui et al., 2006; 
Zhou et al., 2010 
(F)N400 Midfrontal  Recognition,
 Familiarity
More pronounced for items related to the self 
(compared to other), as self-related items are 
processed more efficiently, leading to 
improved recognition/ familiarity. 
Friedman & Johnson, 
2000 
LPC Left parietal occipital  Recollection
More pronounced for items related to the self 
(compared to other), as self-related words are 
predicted to be recalled more easily, but only 
for the first repeat. 
Allan & Rugg, 1997; Allan 
et al., 1998; Curran, 1999, 
2004; Curran & Doyle, 




There were 21 participants in this study. However, the initial learning phase 
(explained in detail later) showed that not all participants were able to learn the target 
words. Five participants were rejected from the study for not being able to learn more 
than 40% of the target words. Thus, 16 participants were used in the behavioural analysis 
(eleven females, five males; age range: 21 – 60 years). However, a further four participants 
were removed from further analysis due to EEG artefacts. The data of the remaining 12 
participants were used for EEG analysis.  Of these participants, nine were female, and 
three were male. The average age of the participants was 29 years, ranging from 21 to 
60 years old. The participants could apply for this study by responding to an 
advertisement on a website for people living around Oxford UK (dailyinfo.co.uk). Each 
experiment lasted around two hours, and the participants received 12 Pounds for taking 
part.  
Stimuli 
For Experiment 4, neutral word-pairs were selected from the database of Warriner, 
Kuperman, & Brysbaert (2013). Of these 54 word-pairs, four were used as fillers and were 
used to explain the experiment to the participants, ten words were used as baseline word-
pairs, and the remaining 40 word-pairs were used throughout the experiment. Each word 
pair was presented on the middle of the screen and consisted of a cue word (on the left 
and a target word on the right, separated by a dash (‘-‘). The pairing of cue and target 
words were randomised across participants so that a word would have been both target 
and cue in the experiments and paired to different words. The pairing of words was semi-
random as very obvious word pairing where the cue words primes the target word (e.g. 
kitchen - table or sleep - tired) were avoided.  
177 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three main phases: a learning phase; a critical phase; 
and a final recall phase. The participants were seated in an electrically shielded darkened 
room in front of a 17” 60hz monitor, seated 60cm away from the screen. Responses were 
measured using a microphone, and the researcher checked the responses online for 
correctness and was seated in an adjacent control room.  
Learning phase 
The learning phase consisted of all 54 word-pairs (including four practice word 
pairs and the ten baseline words pairs) and consists of two sub-phases. In the first part 
(the study phase) the word-pairs were displayed in the middle of the screen in white on 
a grey background either the label “myself”, or the label “other” was displayed. The 
participants were instructed to memorize the word-pairs. The participants were also 
instructed that half of the words belonged to them, and the other half were linked to a 
distant stranger, someone they did not know. The participants were free to apply any 
mnemonic strategy that would help them to remember the word-pairs. The word pairs 
were shown on screen for 2500ms, followed by a blank grey screen lasting between 
1000ms up to 1250ms.  After all 54 word pairs were shown a test phase followed. In the 
test phase, only the label and cue word was displayed similar to the encoding phase, but 
the space with the target word was left blank. The participants were asked to recall the 
target word. The cue was displayed for 2500ms during which the participant had to try 
and remember the target word but not yet say it aloud. After a blank screen, the cue 
word reappeared but this time with a question mark in place of the target word, indicating 
to the participants to say the target word aloud if they recalled the target word. The cue 
and the question mark remained on the screen until a response was made or for 4500ms, 
after which the correct target-word was displayed for 1000ms. Each trial was again 
concluded with a blank screen. This setup was necessary to prevent muscle activity from 
disrupting the EEG data.  
In total, three or four blocks of the learning phase were displayed and each time 
the word order was semi-randomised to prevent any condition from being repeated 
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more than three consecutive times in a row.  The number of repeats depended on the 
learning capabilities of the participant. All participants received at least three blocks of 
the learning phase, but if the participant scored lower than 40% after third block, a  fourth 
block followed. If the participant was unable to recall more than 40% of the target words 
after four blocks, the participant was excluded from the rest of the experiment. See 
Figure 29, which is displaying both sub-phases of the learning phase.  


























blank = 1000ms – 1250ms 
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Critical phase 
During the critical phase, the 40 main word-pairs are used, and the filler word-
pairs were used to explain the task to the participant. The ten baseline word-pairs were 
not used in this phase of the experiment but were used to measure the influence of the 
critical phase in the final recall phase.  
Half of the word-pairs in the critical phase were linked to the think condition, and 
the remaining half were linked to the no-think condition. Each trial started by displaying 
a fixation-cross for 200ms, which was followed by one of the cue words in the centre of 
the screen.  However, unlike the other phases, the cue word was displayed in one of two 
colours, either yellow (RGB 255, 255, 0), or jade (RGB 0, 168, 107). Participants were 
instructed that each colour was linked to a specific condition, either the think condition 
or the no-think condition, and this was counterbalanced across participants. The cue 
word remained on screen for 3500ms during which the participant had to try to recall 
the target word when in the think condition, and in the no-think condition, the participant 
had to actively try to suppress the recall of the target word. The participants were told 
they could use any method to suppress the recall of the target word but were told that 
reading the cue word backwards was a good way to prevent the recall of the target word 
(M. C. Anderson & Green, 2001). Each trial was concluded with a blank screen. One block 
contained all 40 cue words, and a total of twelve blocks were used in the critical phase. 
The cue words were semi-randomly presented in each block, making sure that each 
condition was never repeated more than three times sequentially. After each block, the 
participant was offered a self-paced break. See Figure 30 for a schematic overview of 
the critical phase.   
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Final recall phase 
During the final recall phase, the participants had to try to recall all the target 
words and try to recall if the words were linked to themselves or to a distant other. The 
trials consisted of all the critical phase word-pairs and the baseline word-pairs, 50 word-
pairs in total.  
The final recall phase was very similar to the test phase during the learning trials 
although this time the label (“Myself” or “Stranger”) was not displayed.  Like the test 
phase, the cue word was displayed left to the fixation cross and a blank space to the right 
of the fixation cross for 2500ms, followed by an blank screen, and a response opportunity 
(maximal 4500ms or until response), which was again followed by an blank screen, and 
the trial finished by providing another response opportunity (maximal 4500ms or until 
response) where the participants were asked to recall if the word was linked to themselves 
or a stranger by saying ‘self’ or ‘other’ aloud. All recordings were recorded and scored 
live, although no feedback was provided during the final recall phase. See Figure 31 for 
an overview of the procedure.  
Figure 30. Procedure think/no-think paradigm, critical phase, Experiment 5. 
Blank = 1000ms – 1250ms 












               
Figure 31. Procedure think/no-think paradigm, final recall phase, Experiment 5. 










blank = 1000ms – 1250ms 
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EEG recording 
The EEG data were continuously recorded from a 64-channel electrode cap from 
Electrical Geodesic Inc.  The data was recorded with a band-pass filter from DC to 100Hz 
and was digitised at a sampling rate of 500Hz. Impedance level for each electrode was 
aimed to be below 50kΩ. Online recording was referenced to the vertex electrode. See 
Figure 32 for an electrode layout.   
Offline processing was conducted using Brainvision Analyser 2 (BVA2, Brain 
Products GMBH) and the electrodes were re-referenced to the average of the left and 
right mastoid. The data was filtered (IIR Filter) with a band-pass of 0.1Hz to 25Hz, plus 
50Hz Notch filter. An independent component analysis (ICA) was performed to identify 
any artifacts. ICA is a statistical procedure where linear independent sources can be 
identifies in the EEG signal. This makes ICA ideal to remove artifacts from the EEG data 
Figure 32. EEG 64-channel cap electrode layout, Experiment 5. 
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as most artefacts will be independent from each other. ICA was used to identify and 
correct horizontal and vertical eye movements.  
All trials were time-locked to cue word onset and epochs were created (-100ms 
to 2500ms), the 100ms before stimulus onset was used as the baseline; Trials that included 
severe muscle artifacts or other large disruptions in the EEG signal were removed from 
further analysis. Four participants had to be removed because too many trials had to be 
rejected due to unwanted artifacts. 
Although EEG was continuously recorded for the entire experiment, the final recall 
phase contains too few segments per condition and is therefore not included in the EEG 
analysis. Similarly, only block two and three were analysed in of the learning phase, as 
the first block resulted in too few recalled items to analyse using EEG. All data was split 
by conditions: perspective (self versus distant other) Time (repeat one and repeat two); 
and NoThink (think versus no-think). The data were further split into trials that were 
successfully learned or not successfully learned. This resulted in an average number of 
38.13 segments in the study phase, 38.33 segments in the test phase, and 113.98 
segments in the critical phase, for the correctly recalled items, over all blocks. 
Data analysis 
The data was potentially noisy and therefore the EEG data was analysed by 
applying the jackknife technique (Luck, 2014). Visual inspection of the EEG data revealed 
that waveforms were noisy, especially for a few participants. Applying the jackknife 
method allowed the application of conventional statistics to grand averages, which 
decreases the probability of a Type II error, whilst not increasing the probability of a Type 
I error (Luck, 2014). The jackknife technique works by creating leave-one-out grand 
averages of all participants. This resulted in twelve grand averages of the current dataset 
for each condition. Standard repeated ANOVAs were applied to these grand averages. 
Naturally, this inflated the F-values and these were corrected by dividing the F value by 
(N – 1)2.  All EEG analyses were run on a dataset created with the jackknife technique.  
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ERP waveforms in the learning phase were quantified based on prior research 
using several time windows and different scalp sites aimed to identify specific ERP 
component in both the learning and recall phase: anterior P200, 220ms – 270ms 
(electrodes Cz, E4, E6, E7, E54); posterior P280, 250ms – 300ms (electrodes E33, E34, 
E36, E37, E38); posterior  P300, 300 – 500 (electrodes E33, E34, E36, E37, E38); midfrontal 
N400, 300ms – 500ms (electrodes Cz, E4, E6, E7, E54); and the left posterior positivity, 
600ms – 800ms (electrodes E28, E31, E33, E34. E36). Furthermore, in the recall phase, it 
was observed that the left posterior activity occurred later and over broader temporal 
parietal scalp region, therefore a broader time-window was chosen: 1000ms – 2000ms 
(electrodes E19, E22, E23, E24, E25). Similarly the FN400 in the critical phase seemed to 
occur later as well, and therefore a later time-window was also used (600ms -1200ms). 
All data were analysed using ANOVA within-subject repeated measures and a Bonferroni 
correction was applied for multiple comparisons. However due to technical and 
methodological issues (explained in more detail later) the sample-size of this experiment 
in underpowered. Therefore the tests shown in the results section might not have been 




The behavioural data from the learning phase was analysed using a repeated 
ANOVA design: 2(perspective[self, other])×3(time[time-window 1,2,3]). During the test 
phase the proportion of correctly recalled words revealed a significant effect of learning 
over time via the main effect of time, F(2,30) = 143.505, p < .001, η2p = .905. This main 
effect of time reflects an increase in correct response accuracy over time after the first 
learning block to the second block (p <.001), and correctly recalled target words from the 
second learning block to the third learning block (p <.001). However, this increase in time 
is affected by perspective differently as highlighted by the significant interaction between 
perspective and time, F(2,30) = 10.420, p < .001, η2p = .410. Further analysis revealed that 
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there was no difference between self-related and distant other-related words in the first 
learning cycle (p = .669). Participants did score higher after the first repeat for the self-
related words when compared to the distant other-related words (p = .028). 
Furthermore, in their last repeat, participants recalled more target words related to a 
distant other than words related to the self (p = .033), see Figure 33, and Table 20.  No 
main effect of perspective was found, F(1,15) = 1.005, p = .332. 
Table 20. Test phase: means proportion correct recall. The mean proportion of correct recall 
per time-window and perspective for the test phase. Standard error in parenthesis 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Self .149 (.026) .563 (.052) .748 (.050) 
Other .141 (.028) .484 (.056) .787 (.051) 
                                                                                                               
 (Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001) 






























Final Recall phase 
There is no behavioural data of the critical phase as the participant did not have 
to respond, but for the final recall phase the baseline (words not shown during the critical 
phase) can be compared to the words from the critical phase. The data was analysed 
using a repeated ANOVA design: 3 (condition [baseline, Think, NoThink]) ×2(Perspective 
[Self, Other]) repeated design. This allows for a comparison between the words from the 
baseline and the Think/NoThink words, which should either a promotion of recall of the 
critical Think words when compared to baseline, and a suppression of recall of the critical 
NoThink words when compared to baseline. 
No main effect of condition F(2,30) = 1.772, p = .187, nor a main effect of 
perspective, F(1,15) = 2.357, p = .146, was found. However, an interaction effect between 
condition and perspective was observed, F(2,30) = 4.009, p = .029, η2p = .211. Upon 
exploring this interaction a significant effect of perspective was found only for the baseline 
words (p = .013). Participants remembered more self-related target words when 
compared to target words related to a distant other for the baseline words. No effect of 
perspective was found for either the think (p = .509) or no-think condition (p = 1.00).  
When comparing the think and no-think condition against the baseline condition, 
only the difference between baseline/distant other and think/distant other was 
significance (p = .010). Participants successfully recalled more target words from the 
think/distant other condition compared to the baseline/distant other condition. The 
difference between the no-think/distant other and baseline/distant other was not 
significant (p = .219). For the words related to the self, there was no significant difference 
when comparing to baseline think/self (p = 1.00), or no-think/self (p = 1.00). See Figure 
34 and Table 21 for an overview of the proportion correct recall.  
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Table 21. Final recall phase: means proportion correct recall. The mean proportion of 
correct recall per time-window and perspective for the final recall pahse. Standard error in 
parenthesis 
Baseline Think NoThink 
Self .788 (.067) .781 (.063) .788 (.050) 
Other .663 (.072) .800 (.065) .788 (.054) 
                                                                                                               
(Error bar = standard error, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001) 




























All ERP components in the learning phase were analysed using a repeated 
ANOVA design: 2(perspective[self, other])×2(time[time-window 1,2]). 
P200, central anterior (220ms – 270ms). A significant main effect of time was 
found, F(1,11) = 9.325, p = .011, η2p = .459. There was a larger P200 amplitude for 
repetition 1 when compared to repetition 2. Only a marginally significant effect was found 
between self and distant other, F(1,11) = 4.608, p = .055, η2p = .295. However this time-
window did reveal an interaction between time and perspective, F(1,11) =  9.133, p = .012, 
η2p = .459. This interaction was driven by a P200 activity for the self-related word-pairs 
for during the first repeat compared to word-pairs related to a distant other during the 
first repeat (p = .008). No significant difference was found for perspective during the 
second repeat (p = .101). This means that the positive ERP component for the self word-
pairs found during the first repeat was reduced in the second repeat (p = .002). See 
Figure 35 for the waveforms and scalp distribution per condition. There was no difference 
for the word-pairs related to a distant other between repeat one and repeat two (p = 
.306).  Also, all EEG data for the encoding phase is summarised in Table 22 Error! 
Reference source not found..  
P280 central posterior (250ms – 300ms). Only a marginally significant main effect 
of time was observed for the P280 time-window, F(1,11) = 4.737, p = .0521, η2p = .301. A 
marginally greater positive P280 activity was found for repeat one when compared to 
repeat two. No main effect was found for perspective, F(1,11) = 0.355, p = .563, and no 
interaction between self and time, F(1,11) = 1.879, p = .198.   
P300 central posterior (300ms – 500ms). For this time-window no main effect of 
time was found, F(1,11) = 1.066, p = .324, and no interaction effect was observed between 
time and self, F(1,11) = 1.001, p = .339. However, a main effect of perspective was found, 
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F(1,11) = 5.165, p = .0441, η2p = .320, where a larger P300 component was found for the 
self condition when compared to the distant other condition (see Figure 36).  
N400 midfrontal (300ms – 500ms). Similarly to the P300 time-window, the FN400 
midfrontal ERP component revealed an effect of perspective, F(1,11) =  5.783, p = .0349, 
η2p = .345. The words-pairs related to the self revealed a much weaker FN400 when 
compared to the distant other-related word-pairs. No main effect of time was found, nor 
an interaction effect between time and perspective (respectively, F(1,11) = 0.967, p = .347; 
F(1,11) = 1.038, p = .330). 
LPC Left parietal occipital (600ms – 800ms). For this late time window a more 
positive going ERP component was observed for self when compared to distant other, 
F(1,11) = 6.117, p = .031, η2p = .357. The difference between repeat one and repeat two 
was also significant, F(1,11) = 4.977, p = .047, η2p = .312. No interaction was found between 
perspective and time, F(1,11) = 0.131, p = .724 (see Figure 37).   
Table 22. Study phase: means EEG amplitudes. The mean EEG amplitudes during the study phase 
per time-window and perspective, for each suspected ERP component. Standard error in parenthesis 
and all values provided are in µV  
Self Other 
ERP Repeat 1 Repeat 2 Repeat1 Repeat 2 
P200 2.82 (.047) 0.81 (.054) 1.01 (.059) 1.20 (.044) 
P280 2.57 (.060) 1.54 (.053) 1.92 (.063) 1.83 (.050) 
P300 1.83 (.059) 1.69 (.062) 0.85 (.050) 1.62 (.066) 
N400 0.33 (.062) -0.57 (.048) -1.31 (.069) -1.20 (.079)
LPC 1.94 (.067) 2.80 (.075) 1.04 (.075) 2.08 (.067) 
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Upper panel (A) shows the EEG pooled waveforms from -100ms to 600ms, from electrodes 
Cz, E4, E6, E7, and E54. Highlighted area is the time-window 220ms – 270ms, marking a potential 
P200 effect.  Lower panel (B) shows the topographical maps with brain activity highlighted in 
the upper panel. The electrodes used in the statistical analysis are highlighted in the top-left 
topographical map.     
Figure 35. Study phase, P200 (220ms – 270ms), Experiment 5 
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Upper panel (A) shows the EEG pooled waveforms from -100ms to 600ms, from electrodes 
E33, E34, E36, E37, E38. Highlighted area is the time-window 300ms – 500ms, marking a 
potential P300 effect.  Lower panel (B) shows the topographical maps with brain activity 
highlighted in the upper panel. The electrodes used in the statistical analysis are highlighted in 
the top-left topographical map.     
SELF OTHER   B 
A 
Figure 36. Study phase, P300 (300ms – 500ms), Experiment 5 
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Upper panel (A) shows the EEG pooled waveforms from -100ms to 600ms, from electrodes 
E28, E31, E33, E34. E36. Highlighted area is the time-window 600ms – 800ms, marking a potential 
LPC effect.  Lower panel (B) shows the topographical maps with brain activity highlighted in the 
upper panel. The electrodes used in the statistical analysis are highlighted in the top 
topographical map.     





  B A 
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Test phase 
P200, central anterior (220ms – 270ms). No significant differences were observed 
in this time-window between perspective F(1,11) = 0.004, p = .952 and time, F(1,11) = 0.134, 
p = .721. No significant interaction between perspective and time was observed F(1,11) = 
0.018, p = .896.  
P280 central anterior (250ms – 300ms). Visual inspection of the waveforms 
revealed no posterior P280 during the recall phase. Instead there was a central anterior 
positive going ERP in this time-window, which was analysed instead. However, again no 
interaction was found between perspective and time F(1,11) = 0.238, p = .635, and no 
main effects: perspective, F(1,11) = 0.224, p = .645 ; time, F(1,11) = 0.635, p = .442.  
P300 central posterior (300ms – 500ms). Similar to the previous two time-windows, 
no differences were found in the P300 time-window. No effect was found of perspective 
(F(1,11) = 0.006, p = .939, no effect was observed of time (F(1,11) = 2.624, p = .134, and 
there was no interaction between perspective and time (F(1,11) = 0.325, p = .580.   
Sustained midfrontal negativity (600ms – 1200ms). No FN400 was present during 
the recall phase. However, a sustained midfrontal negativity from 600ms to 1200ms was 
present. This negativity was significantly different for time, F(1,11) = 51.531, p < .001, η2p = 
.824. This difference was caused by a larger negative activity the recall of word-pairs 
during the second repeat when compared to the word-pairs of the first repeat (see Figure 
38). No significant effect was found for perspective, F(1,11) < .001, p = .999, and no 
interaction between perspective and time, F(1,11) = 0.558, p = .818.  
Late Left parietal occipital (1000ms – 2000ms). Again a left parietal component was 
observed and like the mid frontal negativity, the left posterior positivity was sustained for 
longer. The broad time-window of 1000ms to 2000ms was chosen to reflect this sustained 
left parietal temporal positivity.  Again a significant effect of time was observed, F(1,11) = 
10.115, p = .009, η2p = .479. ERP linked to the words-pairs of the first repeat showed 
greater positive activity when compared to the word-pairs of the second repeat. 
Although no main effect of perspective was found, F(1,11) = 1.883, p = .197, there was a 
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significant interaction between perspective and time, F(1,11) = 5.756, p = .035, η2p =  .344. 
This interaction was driven by a significant difference between a more positive ERP for 
self, compared to distant other for the first repeat (p = .017). This difference between self 
and distant other is no longer significant during the second repeat of the word-pairs (p 
= .432). This was mainly because the greater positivity for self during the first repeat was 
significantly reduced during the second repeat (p = .003), see Figure 39. The difference 
between the first and second repeat for word-pairs linked to a distant other was not 
significant (p = .102). See Table 23 for an overview of the significant component found 
in the test phase.  
Table 23. Test phase: means EEG amplitudes. The mean EEG amplitudes during the Test phase per time-
window and perspective, for each suspected ERP component. Standard error in parenthesis and all values 
provided are in µV.  
Self Other 
ERP Repeat 1 Repeat 2 Repeat1 Repeat 2 
P200 1.49 (.051) 1.28 (.077) 1.48 (.052) 1.34 (.056) 
P280 1.80 (.058) 1.90 (.055) 1.29 (.078) 1.66 (.053) 
P300 1.75 (.053) 1.54 (.087) 2.01 (.076) 2.28 (.068) 
Sustained midfrontal 
negativity  
-0.14 (.052) -1.94 (.088) -0.25 (.060) -1.83 (.055)
Late LPC 2.73 (.043) 0.96 (.041) 1.55 (.061) 1.04 (.060) 
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Upper panel (A) shows the EEG pooled waveforms from -100ms to 2000ms, from electrodes 
Cz, E4, E6, E7, E54. Highlighted area is the time-window 600ms – 1200ms, marking a potential 
Sustained midfrontal negativity effect.  Lower panel (B) shows the topographical maps with 
brain activity highlighted in the upper panel. The electrodes used in the statistical analysis are 
highlighted in the top topographical map. 
Figure 38. Study phase, Sustained midfrontal negativity (600ms – 1200ms), Experiment 5 




                                                                                                                 Upper panel (A) shows the 
EEG pooled waveforms from -100ms to 2000ms, from electrodes E19, E22, E24, E25, and E30. Highlighted 
area is the time-window 100ms – 2000ms, marking a potential late LPC effect.  Lower panel (B) shows the 
topographical maps with brain activity highlighted in the upper panel. The electrodes used in the 
statistical analysis are highlighted in the top-left topographical map.     
Figure 39. Test phase, late LPC (1000ms – 2000ms), Experiment 5. 
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Critical phase 
The time-windows and region of interest for the critical phase followed regions 
and time-windows reported by Mecklinger et al. (2009) and Bergström et al. (2007), and 
aligned with the time-windows used thus far in this experiment. Furthermore, like the 
analysis used by Mecklinger and Bergström a comparison with not-learned and learned 
items is made. Although previous research by Bergström et al. (2007),  suggested a N200 
linked successful memory suppression, visual inspection revealed no negative deflection 
of the EEG signal around 200ms after stimulus onset.  
P200, central anterior (220ms – 270ms). No significant differences were observed 
in learnedness, F(1,11) = 0.009, p = .925; NoThink, F(1,11) = 0.354, p = .854; or perspective, 
F(1,11) = 0.071, p = .795. Furthermore, no interactions were observed either: 
learnedness×NoThink×perspective, F(1,11) = 3.517, p = .088; learnedness×NoThink, F(1,11) 
= 2.518, p = .141; learnedness×perspective, F(1,11) = 0.516, p = .488; or 
perspective×NoThink, F(1,11) = 2.555, p = .138.  
P300 central posterior (350ms – 450ms). Again no significant differences were 
found for any  of the conditions (learnedness, F(1,11) = 0.463, p = .510; NoThink, F(1,11) = 
0.010, p = .924; perspective, F(1,11) = 3.5189, p = .087) or their interactions 
(learnedness×NoThink× perspective, F(1,11) = 0.641, p = .440; learnedness×NoThink, 
F(1,11) = 2.136, p = .172; learnedness×perspective, F(1,11) = 0.002, p = .964; 
perspective×NoThink, F(1,11) = 0.975. p = .345).  
Parietal positivity (450ms – 600ms). This time-window revealed a significant three-
way interaction of learnedness×NoThink×perspective, F(1,11) = 5.157, p = .044, η2p = .319, 
indicating that the difference between learnedness and NoThink was not the same for 
perspective. A closer look revealed that in the no-think condition a greater positive 
activity was present for not-learned self-related words when attempting to recall the 
target words compared to not-learned distant other-related words when trying to 
suppress recall (p = .012). Furthermore, there was also a significant difference between 
the not-learned nothink words and the not-learned think words (p = .021) for the other-
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related words. This difference did not occur for not-learned items related to the self (p = 
.174). For the not-learned think words, there was no significant effect of perspective (p = 
.126), see Figure 40 and Figure 41.  No such differences are observed for the learned 
trials: for the think trial no effect of perspective (p = .301); for the nothink trials no effect 
of perspective (p = .405); for the self trials no difference between think and nothink (p = 
.434); and for the distant other trials no difference between think and nothink (p = .324). 
Anterior negativity (600ms – 800ms). A significant effect of the NoThink condition 
was found in the 600ms-800ms time window, F(1,11) = 5.145, p = .0445, η2p = .319. The 
ERP showed a greater negative deflection for the think trials (-1.386µV), when compared 
to the no-think trials (-0.756µV), see Figure 42.  No other main effects were found for 
either perspective, F(1,11) = 0.635, p = .443; or learnedness, F(1,11) = 0.023, p = .883. Like 
the previous time-windows, no interactions were observed either 
(learnedness×NoThink×perspective, F(1,11) = 0.061, p = .810; learnedness×NoThink, 
F(1,11) = 1.428, p = .257; learnedness×perspective, F(1,11) = 1.467, p = .251 ; 
perspective×NoThink, F(1,11) = 0.441, p = .521). See Table 24 for an overview of the 
significant ERP components found during the critical phase. In Table 25, all ERP results 
of this chapter are summarised.  
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Table 24. Critical phase: means EEG amplitudes. The mean EEG amplitudes during the critical phase 
per time-window and perspective, for each suspected ERP component. Standard error in parenthesis and 
all values provided are in µV 
Learned Not Learned 
Think NoThink Think Nothink 
ERP Self Other Self Other Self Other Self Other 
P200 1.38 (.03) 1.22 (.04) 1.96 (.05) 1.63 (.05) 1.43 (.05) 2.13 (.09) 1.67 (.06) 1.13 (.09) 
P300 1.77 (.06) 1.63 (.05) 2.23 (.07) 1.84 (.06) 2.33 (.10) 2.43 (.10) 2.38 (.08) 1.78 (.09) 
Parietal 
Positivity 
2.02 (.07) 1.76 (.06) 2.07 (.07) 1.99 (.05) 2.20 (.10) 2.82 (.10) 2.77 (.09) 1.98 (.08) 
Anterior 
Negativity 
-1.20 (.04) -1.26 (.05) -1.05 (.06) -0.88 (.03) -1.22 (.08) -1.87 (.08) -0.45 (.06) -0.65 (.06)
Figure 40. Critical phase, Three-way interaction Parietal Positivity (450ms – 600ms), 







Think NoThink Think Nothink








Figure 41. Critical phase, Parietal (450ms – 600ms), Experiment 5.   Upper panel (A) shows the EEG 
pooled waveforms from -100ms to 800ms, from electrodes E33, E34, E36, E37, and E38. Highlighted area 
is the time-window 450ms – 600ms, marking a potential parietal positivity effect.  Lower panel (B) shows 
the topographical maps with brain activity highlighted in the upper panel. The electrodes used in the 
statistical analysis are highlighted in the top-left topographical map.     
  B 
A 
-3µV       0        3 µV 
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Figure 42. Critical phase, Anterior Negativity (600ms – 800ms), Experiment 5.   Upper panel (A) 
shows the EEG pooled waveforms from -100ms to 800ms, from electrodes E33, E34, E36, E37, and E38. 
Highlighted area is the time-window 600ms – 700ms, marking a potential Anterior Negativity effect.  
Lower panel (B) shows the topographical maps with brain activity highlighted in the upper panel. The 
electrodes used in the statistical analysis are highlighted in the top-left topographical map.     
Think No-Think B 
A 
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Table 25. Summary of the ERP components findings and predictions. 
ERP Location Key words Predictions Results 




More pronounced for items 
related to the self (compared to 
other), as attention is directed to 
self-relevant information. 
Study phase: Time×Perspective, greater 
P200 for self for repeat 1, no difference 
between self and other for repeat 2.  
Test phase: No differences. 
Critical phase: No differences. 
N200 Central  Inhibitory control
More pronounced for items 
related to the self (compared to 
other), as inhibitory control 
would be more taxed for self-
related items. 
Not observed 





More pronounced for items 
related to the self (compared to 
other), as retrieval and 
recognition is easier for self-
related items. 
Study phase: Marginally significant effect 
of time, where a greater effect of repeat 
2 was found compared to repeat 1. 
Test phase: No differences. 
Critical phase: No differences. 








More pronounced for items 
related to the self (compared to 
other), as self-related 
information is more salient, 
influencing attentional and 
attention-to-memory processes. 
Study phase: Main effect of perspective, 
with a more pronounced P300 for self-
related words. 
Test phase: No differences. 
Critical phase: No differences. 
(F)N400 Midfrontal  Recognition,
 Familiarity
More pronounced for items 
related to the self (compared to 
other), as self-related items are 
processed more efficiently, 
leading to improved 
recognition/ familiarity. 
Study phase: Main effect of perspective, 
a more pronounced N400 was found for 
other-related words. 
Test phase: No N400, but a sustained 
midfrontal negativity was present: Main 
effect of time, with a greater negativity 
for repeat 2 compared to repeat 1. 






More pronounced for items 
related to the self (compared to 
other), as self-related words are 
predicted to be recalled more 
easily. 
Study phase: Main effect time with 
greater positivity for repeat 2 than 
repeat 1; main effect of perspective with 
greater positivity for self than other. 
Test phase: a late LPC was found with a 
Time×Perspective difference, there was 
a clear self-reference effect for repeat 1 
which was absent during repeat 2. 






More pronounced for items 
related to the self (compared to 
other), as self-related words are 
predicted to be recalled more 
easily. 
Study phase: Not observed. 
Test phase: Not observed. 
Critical phase: 
learnedness×NoThink×perspective, see 











Study phase: Not observed. 
Test phase: Not observed. 
Critical phase:  Main effect of the 
NoThink condition, with a greater 
negative deflection for the think trials 
compared to the no-think trials. 
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Correlations 
It also remain possible that some of the ERP components found during the 
learning phase are correlated with each other as some component are likely related. 
Therefore, a correlation analysis was performed as well of which the results can be found 
in Table 26 for the study phase and in Table 27 for the test phase.  
For the test phase, the P280 strongly correlates positively with the P300, and the LPC. 
During the test phase, the P200 positively correlated strongly with the P280. Lastly, the 
P300 showed a strong positive correlation with the Late LPC during both the test and the 
study phase.  
An attempt has also been made to correlate the ERP components found during the 
learning phase with the behavioural results observed during the test phase. These results 
are summarised in Table 28.   
Table 26. Study Phase ERP component correlations 
P280 P300 FN400 LPC 
P200 .08 -.03 .24 -.20 
P280 .74** .19 .67* 
P300 .504 .871** 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)
Table 27. Test Phase ERP component correlations 
P280 P300 Sustained 
Negativity 
Late LPC 
P200 .89** -.06 .45 .25 
P280 .21 .28 .28 
P300 -.15 .62* 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)
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As can be seen, the proportion of correctly recalled items positively and strongly 
correlated both the P300 and the LPC of the study phase. Only the items during the 
second repeat showed a strong positive correlation with the P300 of the test phase.   
Lastly, the ERP components found during the critical phase could potentially be related. 
Therefore a correlation analysis was performed on these ERP components as well, see 
Table 29. The P200 showed a strong positive correlation with the P300, and Parietal 
Positivity, but a strong negative correlation with the Anterior Negativity. The P300 was 
very strongly and positively correlated with the Parietal Positivity.  
Table 28. Test Phase ERP component correlations with proportion correctly recalled during the 
testing phase. 
Study Test 





Self_repeat1 -.29 .33 .66* .46 .73** -.13 .07 .54 .09 .28 
Other_repeat1 -.12 .10 .59* .49 .66* .05 .22 .35 .11 .04 
Self_repeat2 -.43 .39 .72** .40 .84** -.08 .16 .67* -.01 .32 
Other_repeat2 -.32 .47 .74** .42 .82** -.03 .26 .65* -.08 .30 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed)
Table 29. Critical Phase ERP components correlations 
P300 Parietal Positivity Anterior 
Negativity 
P200 .85** .86** -.67* 
P300 .95** -.37 
Parietal Positivity -.50 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed)





The behavioural results show that initially self-related words are learned faster and 
are recalled more often than words related to a distant other. However, with repetition 
of the cue-target words during the learning phase, this facilitatory effect of self on 
memory disappears. After the second learning cycle, no more difference in recall is 
observed between self and a distant other. These results are similar to those of 
Experiment 3 and Experiment 4, both of which contained a repetition element also. 
Therefore the conclusion remains the same: the benefit of self-related words during recall 
does not add to the effects of simple repetition. Self-related words are recalled more 
accurately initially but are ‘caught-up’ by distant other-related words after two 
repetitions. However, despite ‘catching-up’, after the delay of the critical phase, the 
baseline words showed a clear facilitatory effect of self-related words on memory. In 
other words, during the learning phase, the distant other-related trials might have 
‘caught-up’ with the self-related trials, but the distant other-related words are encoded 
into memory less strongly compared to self-related words, as the next section will show. 
Overall, it is interesting that the correlation analysis showed that the proportion correct 
for all condition were positively correlated with the P300 and the LPC, both of which have 
been connected to encoding and recall (Gonsalvez & Polich, 2002; Paller & Kutas, 1992). 
Although all items correlated strongly and positively with these components words 
related to a distant other during the first repeat showed the weakest correlation, but 
during the second repeat the correlation between self- and other-related items were 
similar.     
Final recall phase 
The main purpose of Experiment 5 was to investigate if the automaticity of self-
related processes could be influenced by suppressing the recall of self-related words, as 
done in the think/no-think paradigm. Previous research found that memory could be 
suppressed by forcefully redirecting one’s thoughts away when primed for a memory. In 
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other words, by not thinking of the memory over several repetitions, the to-be-recalled 
information would be suppressed. However, no direct evidence for suppression was 
found, as recall of words related to a distant other or words related to the self were not 
decreased compared to baseline for the no-think trials, compared to the think trials. 
Although the distant other-related words of the think condition were recalled significantly 
more often when compared to the baseline words, this is most likely the result of 
forgetting of the baseline distant other-related words, whereas the distant other-think 
words were repeated in the critical phase and thus remembered more often. In fact, even 
the no-think distant other related words approach significance in favour of remembering 
more words compared to baseline distant other-related words. This forgetting of the 
distant other related words did not happen for the self-related baseline words as no 
difference was observed between baseline self-related words and self-think and self-no-
think words. Together these results show the robustness of self-related words in long-
term memory and failed to reveal any form of suppression in the no-think trials in all 
conditions.  
It should be noted that, since the initial publications of suppression of memories 
by executive control (M. C. Anderson & Green, 2001; M. C. Anderson & Levy, 2009), 
several studies have reported that they have been unable to replicate the results of 
suppression using the think/no-think paradigm (Bulevich, Roediger, Balota, & Butler, 
2006; Hertel & Calcaterra, 2005; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). However, despite also not 
replicating the behavioural results of Anderson and Green (2001) the EEG studies of 
Bergström, Velmans, Fockert, and Richardson-klavehn, (2007) and  Mecklinger, Parra, 
and Waldhauser (2009) did find ERP correlates linked to intentional forgetting (P200, 
N200, P300, and LPC). It was exactly these ERP components the current experiments 
aimed to replicate for the words related to a distant other, but not for self-relevant words 
as these were speculated to be automatically processed too fast to be able to be 




The free recall Experiment 4, where during the matching task, the self-priority 
effect disappeared after three repetitions, only showed that the matching judgment was 
no longer faster and more accurate for the self-related trials compared the distant other-
related trials. As the matching task is not a specific encoding task, no conclusions could 
be drawn beyond the improved attention for self-related items. The current study phase 
does allow an examination of encoding via the EEG data. However, due to the nature of 
the study phase and the methodological limitations involved, not just encoding, but recall 
occurred at the same time. This is because of the repetition element within this 
experiment. Since the first block did not contain enough correctly recalled items, only the 
second and third block were used in the EEG analysis. This means that repetition, and 
therefore potential recognition or recall, is already present with the first repetition. In 
other words, the presenting of the cue and target words during the study phase would 
result in recognition (from the first block) while also attempting to study (or encode) the 
cue and target word pair.  
The ERP findings in the study phase showed a central anterior P200 ERP, which 
was more pronounced for the self-related words when compared to words related to a 
distant other but more interestingly this effect interacted with time. This interaction 
revealed that although there is a more positive ERP activity for self-related words at first, 
the greater positivity disappears with further repetition. As predicted, this finding can 
reflect additional attentional processes directed towards self-related information 
(Mangun & Hillyard, 1995; Peters et al., 2005) for the first repetition. The second repetition 
no longer shows this enhanced P200 for self-related items. The experiments involving 
repetition in this thesis (Experiment 3 and Experiment 4) have shown that the benefit of 
self-related information is ‘caught-up’ after two repetitions, these result possibly indicate 
that self-related information no longer benefits from increased early attentional 
processing with repetition. As seen in earlier studies the P200 observed in this experiment 
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is followed by a later P280 (Chapman et al., 2015; Dunn et al., 1998; Mangels et al., 2001), 
which possibly indicates an attention to memory process.  
This anterior to posterior ERP could reflect the involvement of attentional 
networks proposed by Posner and Dehaene (1994). In this experiment, the self-related 
information initially captures attention, which leads to an increased P200. This attended 
information is then engaged further to help memory retrieval or recognition. This stage 
of information processing might be similar regardless of perspective, and therefore, no 
difference in ERP’s was found between self and distant other-related information in the 
P280 time window. Like the previous two components, the P300 found in this study has 
also been investigated to examine attentional and memory processes (Polich, 2007). 
The P300 found during the study phase was more positive for self-related 
information when compared to distant other-related information. This greater positivity 
for self-related information could reflect the greater saliency of self-relevant information. 
The P300 has been linked to target discrimination, and like the P280, it is involved in the 
maintenance of attended to information (Polich, 2007).  Interesting here is that self-
related information increased the amplitude of the P300 component associated with 
inhibitory processes for self-relevant information which the TPJ mentioned in the self-
relevance network is proposed to do (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), and research has 
linked the P300 to the parietal cortex and the TPJ specifically as a potential generator of 
the P300 (Linden, 2005). The TPJ, in turn, is part of the DMN which is highly implicated in 
self-relevant information processing (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Qin & Northoff, 2011; 
Spreng & Grady, 2009; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009). It is also interesting is that the P300 
is related to the LPC as shown by a strong positive correlation. This helps highlight that 
the P300 could be involved in encoding information into memory as previous research 
as suggested (Polich, 2007). 
After the P300, a negative going signal was observed around 400ms after word-
pair onset, this midfrontal FN400 was more sensitive (greater negativity) to distant other-
related information compared to information related to the self. With the link of familiarity 
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or memory recognition to the FN400 (Friedman & Johnson, 2000), it is possible that the 
greater negativity found for distant other-related information is due to the increased 
difficulty in encoding distant other-related information compared to self-related 
information. However, if this is true, then an interaction with time would be expected as 
distant other-related words are recalled more often during the last repeat than self-
related words. However, no such interaction was observed. It is possible that due to the 
increased binding of self-relevant information the recollection of self-related words is still 
less effortful, although this does not lead to an increase in recall per se. This could indicate 
that despite the ‘catch-up’ of distant other-related information, the self-related 
information is still processed more easily, however, more research is required. In short, 
there may be two distinct neural processes involved with self- and distant other-related 
information processing: a sustained effortful process related to distant other-related 
information as reflected by an enhanced N400 for word-pairs linked to a distant other; 
and an enhanced P200 and P300 for self-related information.  
The last time-window investigated during the encoding phase was the LPC which 
has been connected to recollection (Allan & Rugg, 1997; Allan et al., 1998; Curran, 1999, 
2004; Curran & Doyle, 2011; Tsivilis et al., 2015).  As predicted, a larger LPC was found for 
both time and perspective. However, the expected interaction with time was not found. 
This is probably because this phase was an encoding task with both cue- and target-
words presented on screen, allowing for easier encoding, and recollection from the first 
block. Together these results show a clear engagement of attention and memory-related 
electrophysiological processes as reflected by the P200, P300, FN400, and the LPC during 
the test phase, with self- and distant other-related information clearly differentiated.  
Test phase  
It is important to realise that with the first repetition of the test phase, the 
participant would have seen the cue- and target-words four times already. This could 
explain why, by the time the first repeat for the recall phase appears, no differences are 
observed for perspective. The late sustained mid frontal negativity showed a more 
negative activity for the second repeat compared to the first repeat. As mentioned In 
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introduction of this chapter, the FN400 is a measure of familiarity and recognition. As 
such, the familiarity of the word-pairs after the second repeat should be more 
recognizable and familiar than words from an earlier repetition, resulting in a more 
enhanced FN400.  
The last component to be analysed in the test phase was the late LPC. For this 
ERP, a similar pattern was revealed as the early P200 ERP during the study phase. Namely, 
a greater left parietal positivity was observed for self-related information compared to 
information related to a distant other, but only for the first repetition. The greater 
positivity for self-related information disappears with the second repetition. As 
mentioned before, the LPC is linked to recollection, and typically a more positive LPC is 
linked to successfully recalled items. In this sense, a more positive LPC for self-related 
information could reflect easier recollection of self-related information. However, this 
does not explain why, during the second repetition, the LPC for the self is 
indistinguishable from distant other-related information. Unless the ‘catching-up’ of 
distant other-related information to self-related information as suggested earlier in this 
chapter, is reflected by the LPC (i.e. recollection of both conditions is equally easy). 
Conjointly, this effect mirrors the behavioural finding, as self-relevant information is no 
longer recalled more often with the second repetition. As with the P200 during the 
learning phase, the late LPC during the test phase is no longer sensitive to self-relevant 
information after the first repeat. Possibly reflecting that self-relevant information is no 
longer more salient compared to distant other-relevant information.  
Critical phase 
In the critical phase, an attempt was made to suppress memories. The aim of the 
current experiment was to see how self-related versus distant other-related information 
processing would impact these NoThink ERPs. The current study was modelled after 
earlier research, which reported a link between frontal selection positivity (P200) and 
attention to think, within the think/no-think paradigm. This earlier research also found a 
central parietal N200 which was believed to be associated with inhibition for the no-think 
trials, a P300 evaluation process, and a greater LPC for learned words regardless of 
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NoThink condition (Bergström et al., 2007; Mecklinger et al., 2009).  This is likely because 
The LPC component found in the current study is not the same as in previous research 
as no difference was found between the think and no-think learned words. In the current 
study, a difference was only observed between a more positive LPC for distant other-
related think words compared to no-think words, but only for the not-learned trials. 
Similarly, for the not-learned words in the no-think condition, words related to the self 
were linked to a more positive going LPC compared to the not-learned no-think words 
related to a distant other. However, it is not surprising that no effect of perspective was 
found for the learned words as the learning phase already showed that after two 
repetitions the effect of self is abolished. This means that by the time the critical phase 
starts (which is essentially more repetition), self and distant other-related information are 
recalled equally.  
It was unexpected that, unlike the previous studies (Bergström et al., 2007; 
Mecklinger et al., 2009), no ERP differences between think and no-think trials were found 
for the learned words. In other words, the study failed to replicate the basic ‘signature’ of 
the think/no-think paradigm. Why is this? One possibility is that it is due to the high 
percentage of correctly learned (76%) words in our paradigm, versus 55% (Bergström et 
al., 2007) and 68% (Mecklinger et al., 2009). This meant it was possibly more difficult to 
suppress the recollection of the target words upon presentation of the cue word. 
However, since there was no way of ensuring that participants followed the given 
instructions during the critical phase, it is also possible that participants did not perform 
the no-think task correctly.  
Nonetheless, the difference with the parietal positivity between perspectives for 
the no-think not-learned words remains interesting. A parietal positivity was found for 
the not learned self-related words, for both the think and no think condition. If the 
amplitude of the parietal positivity is interpreted as reflecting retrieval attempt difficulty, 
then no difference was found for the self-related not learned words between the think 
and no-think trials. This means that for the self-related words, both the think and no-
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think trials resulted in an attempt to retrieve the target word. These retrieval attempts 
were much reduced (I.e. a reduced parietal positivity) for the distant other-related no 
think not learned words when compared to the distant other-related think not learned 
words. This suggests that a retrieval attempt was made for the think trials, but the retrieval 
attempt of the no-think trials was less strong. Tentatively, it is, therefore, possible that the 
retrieval attempts for the self-related words were equally persistent, which in turn could 
support the notion that self-related information processing is an uncontrollable 
automatic process.  For the learned trials, this effect does not occur because repetition 
strongly encoded the words-pairs equally for both perspectives, which made suppression 
equally difficult for both conditions.  
Finally, an ERP effect was found in the shape of an anterior negativity. This 
negative deflection of the EEG signal was observed for the think trials and not for the no-
think trials. The anterior negativity probably reflects the different cognitive requirements 
for the think and no-think trials. For the no-think trials, the participant was encouraged 
to read the cue word backwards to aid in suppressing the recall of the target word, 
whereas the think condition required the participant to remember the target words and 
keeps the target word in mind until the next phase. The greater negativity found could 
be similar to the sustained negativity observed in the recall phase, meaning that the 
anterior negativity found in the critical phase potentially reflects post-retrieval 
processing/maintenance of the recalled target word.   
The correlations analysis showed that the ERP components found (P200, P300, 
parietal positivity, & anterior negativity) seem to be related as they were all strongly 
correlated. The exceptions seems to be that the anterior negativity is not correlated with 
the P300 or the parietal positivity. However, this could reflect the possibility that the P300 
and the parietal positivity are more involved in memory processes.  
The main limitation of Experiment 5 is the inefficacy of the think/no-think 
paradigm, at least under the conditions tested in this study.  One major limitation of this 
experiment is the lack of suppression compared to baseline for the no-think trials. Both 
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ERP and behavioural data revealed no effect of suppression. The main aim of this 
paradigm was to show that recall of target words could be actively suppressed. The aim 
of Experiment 5 was to explore if this suppression would happen for self-related trials. It 
was expected that since self-related information processing is automatic, suppression 
would be more difficult if not impossible. Therefore, not finding any form of suppression 
of target words severely limits the interpretation of the results.  It should be noted that 
several behavioural studies other studies have also been unable to replicate the putative 
memory suppression effect in the think/no-think paradigm (Bulevich et al., 2006; Hertel 
& Calcaterra, 2005; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). However, this study not only failed to replicate 
the behavioural aspect but also no modulation of the ERPs associated with the memory 
suppression manipulation was found. Thus this study also failed to replicate the findings 
of two separate ERP studies of the think/no-think effect (Bergström et al., 2007; 
Mecklinger et al., 2009). 
The failure to replicate the think/no-think manipulation could be argued to be a 
consequence of low statistical power. Arguably this study was underpowered in having 
relatively few participants (N=12). There are a number of reasons for the arguably low N. 
Firstly, several participants did not complete the study because they could not reach the 
40% recall rate of the word-list after four repetitions. Unlike many psychological studies, 
most participants were recruited from around Oxfordshire and were not university 
students. Although this is better for generalisation purposes, these participants were no 
longer used to memorising information to the same degree university student can be 
expected to be. Furthermore, although intelligence was not measured, the general 
population’s intelligence is likely to be lower compared to university students. 
The EEG system itself was arguably unsuited for this experiment. The system used 
involves an older technology which is poor at proving clear data across the duration of 
long (i.e. more than 30 minutes) experiments. The impedance levels tend to rise fairly 
quickly after this (due to the EEG relying on water-based conductance to control 
impedances (rather than a gel-based system). This undoubtedly resulted in more noise 
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in the signal the longer the experiment lasted.  This meant that many trials had to be 
removed due to poor signal. The removal of EEG trials resulted in not enough EEG trials 
for several participants to have an acceptable signal to noise ratio (less than 20 segments). 
Everything combined, the participants’ attrition rate was roughly 50%. Therefore, it was 
decided that is was not feasible or practical to continue this experiment with more 
participants. A major redesign of this paradigm is required to make this a valid approach. 
As discussed later, the suppression paradigm is also not replicated very robustly by other 
researchers and a lack of behavioural evidence for suppression makes the interpretation 
of the EEG signals more difficult. It has been argued that EEG components can show 
suppression attempts even if it does not result in actual suppression in the behavioural 
data (Bergström, Velmans, De Fockert, & Richardson-klavehn, 2007).   
Conclusion 
Despite the limitation, the results did allow for insight into the automaticity of the 
self as possible retrieval attempts seemed to be present in the think condition with distant 
other-related words, compared to the no-think condition. Moreover, this difference was 
not observed for the self-related words. This possibly suggests a similar level of retrieval 
attempts of the self-related words for the think and no-think not learned trials. Less 
intense retrieval attempts were present for the no-think not learned distant other-related 
trials when compared to the think not learned distant other-related trials. However, 
further research is required to further substantiate this.  
Furthermore, the memory encoding and subsequent recall have been able to 
elucidate the robustness of self-referenced information as it seems to not suffer from the 
same level of forgetting when compared to information related to a distant other. 
Moreover, this research has replicated the findings of Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 and 
showed a steeper learning curve for self-related words of which the ceiling is reached 
faster than distant other-related words. More importantly, the ERP findings help support 
the previous and current conclusion during encoding of an early benefit for self-relevant 
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information (P200), greater attentional/memory saliency for self-relevant information in 
general (P300, FN400), but distant other-related information does “catch-up” (LPC).  
With this Experiment 5, an attempt was made to examine the automaticity of the 
self-related processes via memory suppression and repetition. However, this research 
question does require a deviation from the methods used in most of this thesis. 
Therefore, the last EEG experiment will study the underlying electrophysiological 
mechanism of the matching task combined with a free-recall experiment. Compared to 
Experiment 5, Experiment 6 will be a more focussed experiment. Where the think/no-think 
paradigm was interesting to examine if suppression of self-related words was possible, 
the EEG system was not suited for this type of (long) experiment, as discussed earlier. 
Experiment 6 therefore focusses on the matching task used in the previous chapters 2, 4 
and 5. The matching task is much shorter and more controlled compared to the think/no-
think paradigm. This should allow for a more focussed investigation of the relevant ERP 
component found in this chapter. Also, Experiment 5 did not use emotional words, and 
therefore, in Experiment 6, emotional words are once more used in the matching task, as 
this would allow for an EEG analysis on emotional self-relevant information. In short, the 
next chapter will allow for a more direct investigation of the underlying 
neurophysiological mechanisms of the matching task, and the replication of the earlier 
matching task experiments (Experiments 1a-d, 3, & 4). Furthermore, by using repeating 
blocks with free-recall the next chapter will draw together the findings of the previous 
chapters on repetition (Experiment 3 and 4) and the self-reference effect. Lastly, since the 
redundancy gain (Experiment 2) showed super capacity, an increase of recall difficulty 
might help show the benefit of emotional self-related information. Using free-recall, the 
potential influence of self-related information will be maximised. This would allow for the 
possibility to see if emotional self-related information will be recalled more compared to 




Self, emotion & free recall 
Introduction Experiment 6 
This Experiment 6 aimed to explore the neurophysiological processes involved in 
the matching task paradigm, used in this thesis. Furthermore, this experiment would use 
free-recall as the follow-up memory task, similar to Experiment 4.   
The preceding experiments (Experiments 1c-1d and 2) suggested an influence of 
emotion on self-related information, especially the redundancy gain study. Experiment 2 
showed that super-capacity (i.e. the presence of integration) does exist for self-relevant 
positive words. Nonetheless, despite the observed super-capacity, positive self-related 
words were not recalled more often than just positive/stranger or self-related/neutral 
words alone.  
For this reason, the influence of self-related positive words is examined in this 
Experiment 6.  The paradigm used for the current experiment was similar to Experiment 
4. However, unlike Experiment 4, all words are presented only once without repetition.
The main goal for this free-recall version is to increase the memory workload for the 
participant.  The reason for this is that an increased memory load may allow for the self-
reference effect to emerge, more clearly. Furthermore, in the previous chapters, it was 
found that self-related words and emotional words interact. Nonetheless, emotional self-
related words were not recalled more often than self-related words or emotional words. 
However, the redundancy gain experiment did show super-capacity, and therefore, 
emotional self-relevant words should lead to better recall. It is possible that with a more 
difficult memory task, the observed super capacity would results in better memory 
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performance for emotional self-related word compared to emotional words or self-
related words by themselves. With old/new experiments and cued recall experiments, the 
cue helps prime recollection or recognition of the to-be-remembered items. Therefore, 
the memory workload is lower for these cued experiments when compared to an 
unstructured and un-cued free-recall task. By increasing the memory load and increasing 
the difficulty of the recall task, it is predicted that super-capacity of positive self-related 
words will be translated into more recalled items than self-related or emotional words 
alone. Moreover, since this is an EEG experiment, the underlying electrophysiological 
correlates will also be examined in order to shed additional light on these cognitive 
processes.  
The matching paradigms used in this thesis (or the original perceptual matching 
paradigm (Sui et al., 2012)) have not been used combined with EEG methods before. 
Therefore this novel approach examined if early attentional processes are influenced by 
self-relevant information.  All matching experiments in this thesis provide support for a 
clear self-priority effect directing attention towards self-relevant information compared 
to information not related to the self.  
The earliest ERP components linked to attention are the P1 and N1 (Luck et al., 
1994; Mangun, Buonocore, Massimo, & Amishi, 1998). The P1 is a positive deflection in 
the EEG signal roughly 100ms after stimulus onset, whereas the N1 is a negative going 
signal with a roughly similar onset time. Both are potentially generated in the lateral 
extrastriate cortex (Eimer, 1998; Mangun, Hillyard, & Luck, 1993), and reflect early stages 
of visual-perceptual processes. In other words, a P1 and N1 are present in the EEG signal 
when visual information is processed. The amplitude of the P1 and N1 vary according to 
visual properties (e.g. colour intensity or motion), but attention too influences the 
amplitude of these ERP components. The P1 component is suppressed at non-target 
locations and reflects the attentional “cost” of having to switch to the target location. 
Furthermore, the processes reflected by the P1 are possibly only needed when a target 
and distractors are highly similar (Luck et al., 1994). The N1 component is also amplified 
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when attending the target location, especially when selecting between different stimuli. 
The N1 therefore, possibly reflects a discriminatory process (Vogel & Luck, 2000).  
Most studies focus on the self-priority effect using the participants’ own names 
(Fischler et al., 1987; Holeckova et al., 2006) and faces (Caharel et al., 2002; Scott et al., 
2005; Sui et al., 2006) as stimuli. As discussed in Chapter 1, these stimuli are highly learned 
and very familiar to the participant, and therefore the effect measured in these studies 
might not reflect the self only, but to some degree familiarity as well. Consequently, it is 
not clear what conclusion can be drawn regarding the effect of self on these early 
components based on the evidence available. Indeed, to this author’s knowledge, two 
studies reported an effect of self-relevant information on an early ERP component related 
to attention (Keys & Brady, 2010; Liu et al. 2016). Both of these studies, however have 
used paradigms which conflate self-relevance with familiarity. Keyes and Brady (2010), 
found an enhanced posterior N170 amplitude, and at the fronto-central site an enhanced 
vertex positive potential amplitude when participants were presented with their own face, 
compared to a face of a stranger or friend. Also using faces as stimuli, Liu, He, Rotsthein, 
and Sui (2016), found an increased N1 ERP component for self-related faces. This N1 
correlated with a later observed P300 component related to the self.  
As mentioned in the introduction of the previous chapter, the P200 is influenced 
by attention, and therefore the main expectation in this Experiment 6 is a modulation of 
the P200 by self-relevant information compared to information not related to the self. At 
this stage (as the behavioural data suggests in Experiments 1-2), emotional information is 
not yet processed as the words have yet to be interpreted. As suggested by Herbert, 
Herbert, and Pauli (2011) emotional words can be reflected by a more negative 
(compared to neutral) ERP between 200ms-300ms and 300ms-400ms, with pleasant self-
related words showing a larger positive ERP around 450ms-600ms (LPP) compared to 
neutral words. This suggested an early self and emotional identification before an 
integration between self-relevant emotional information occurs. An important difference 
between the experiments of Herbert et al. (2011) and the current experiment is that the 
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meaning of the word is processed more slowly than self-relevance as only colour 
recognition is required to make a matching judgement. The task of Herbert et al. (2011) 
had participants actively reading the words, whereas in the matching task of the current 
experiment it is not necessary to read the word in order to make a successful matching 
judgement. Therefore, emotion is not task-relevant, but as the emotional valence of the 
words is not part of the matching judgement, it is not disruptive for the matching task. 
However, the words themselves are high-priority as participants know that there is a free 
recall task following the matching task, and emotion may increase the perceptual saliency 
and memorability of the words (Mather & Sutherland, 2011). 
An ERP component often linked to attention and emotional information 
processing is the early posterior negativity (EPN). Compared to neutral items, emotionally 
arousing stimuli are reflected by a more negative going EPN. The onset of the EPN can 
be as early as 150ms with a peak amplitude between 250ms and 300ms (Schupp, Flaisch, 
Stockburger, & Junghöfer, 2006). It is believed that the EPN does not just exclusively 
reflect emotional processing, but possibly also selective attention to specific stimuli 
features (like emotion, or colour). In cases of emotional stimuli, this would be the 
detection and selection of emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. However, the 
EPN is a probably not just linked to arousal but to selective attention. For example, in a 
study on attention and emotion, the role of the EPN was studied in a non-emotional 
attention task (Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003).  In this task, participants had 
to count the number of checkerboard images presented in the centre of the screen that 
contained either a white or black rectangle.  These task-relevant images were presented 
sequentially with emotional pictures (pleasant, neutral or unpleasant) in random order. 
Their results showed an increased EPN for emotional pictures, which showed that since 
the attention task could be performed without processing the emotional pictures, 
emotion would still be selectively processed during the early stages of stimuli processing. 
Another component of interest for emotional information processing is the P300. 
This component has been described in the previous chapter as a component of interest 
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for self-related information and is most commonly linked to oddball experiments where 
the P300 is associated with perceived unexpectedness. In general, the P300 is thought to 
reflect the allocation of attention. Unexpected items could potentially be behaviourally 
relevant. Therefore one’s attention is directed towards unexpected stimuli by inhibiting 
ongoing attentional processes. Similarly, self-relevant information is behaviourally 
relevant, and this results in the allocation of attentional resources to self-relevant 
information over information not relevant to the self. Naturally, the same is true for 
emotional information (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Mezulis et al., 
2004; Sedikides & Green, 2004; Taylor, 1991; Vuilleumier, 2005; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 
2006). As it is known that emotional information (similar to self-relevant information) 
automatically captures attention, the P300 very likely plays a role in this reallocation of 
attention to potentially behaviourally relevant emotional information.  
Another ERP component linked to emotion is a late positive potential with a 
centro-parietal distribution around 400ms-600ms (Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010; 
Schupp et al., 2006). This is often referred in the emotion literature as the late positive 
potential (LPP), and it shares temporal and spatial similarities with the late positive 
component (LPC) discussed later as a component reflecting working memory processes. 
This late positive potential in emotion research is more enhanced when viewing 
emotionally arousing stimuli (Schupp et al., 2004). As discussed in Chapters 1-4, emotion 
and self-related information both seem to influence attention and memory, and this 
interplay between emotion and self has been studied in EEG research as well.  
Herbert, Herbert, Ethofer, and  Pauli (2011) also investigated the influence of 
emotion on self-relevant information processing using EEG. In their study, they compared 
the effect of self on emotional pronoun-nouns. In this study, participants were presented 
with pleasant, unpleasant and neutral nouns which were displayed together with the 
pronoun ‘my’ or ‘his’, or the definite article ‘the’. These pronoun-nouns were presented 
in three separate blocks, and after each block a free-recall test followed. During each 
block, participants were asked to read the pronoun/article-nouns silently, and during the 
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free recall session participants were asked to remember the pronoun/article-noun pairs 
of the preceding phase and rate each on perceived valence and arousal. ERPs were 
measured during the reading phase and revealed that the amplitude for the emotional 
words between 200-300ms and 300-400ms was greater and more negative when 
compared to neutral words. A similar distinction was observed for the pronoun-nouns 
when compared to the article-nouns in the same time-windows. According to the 
authors, this suggests that during early visual processing, the general aspect of the 
information is identified (i.e. emotion and self-related) before integrating and specifying 
said information. Furthermore, this occurs separately for emotional and self-related 
information.  The distinction in ERPs between self and distant other became apparent at 
250-350m, and 350-550ms at frontal sites and these differences were greater for the
unpleasant self-related pronoun-nouns. Pleasant self-related pronoun-nous revealed 
larger positive amplitudes 450-600ms (LPC) after stimulus onset over more centro-
parietal sites.  Not only does it seem that self-related pleasant and unpleasant nouns are 
processed at different times, but source localisation also suggested different generators 
for the ERP components. The unpleasant self-related nouns had neural sources in the 
medial prefrontal gyrus and the anterior cingulate cortex, whereas the pleasant self-
related nouns ERP component was generated in the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus 
and the posterior cingulate cortex.  Although ERPs were not recorded for the free recall 
phase, Herbert et al. (2011) show that positive self-related nouns are recalled more often 
than distant other nouns. The authors propose that the superior recall for positive self-
related words and the neurophysiological differences support a self-positivity bias for 
incoming information. Although the LPP is often linked to high arousal emotional 
information processing, LPP is has been linked to information processing associated with 
working memory (Schupp et al., 2006). The LPP is similar to the LPC, and the term LPC 
will be used in this chapter.  
Taken together, there is some overlap between the ERPs linked to emotion, and 
the ERPs linked to self-relevant information processing. Both are expected to influence 
our attention and memory processes. For example, the LPC is often linked to emotion, 
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but it is more likely linked to working memory processes, which is modulated by 
emotional valence and arousal. Therefore, the ERP components do not measure emotion 
or self-relevance per se, but their influence on attentional or memory processes reflected 
by the ERP components. Like emotion, self-related information influences the LPC. 
However, the LPC is linked to recollection, and as such, the influence of self on 
recollection can be measured. In this Experiment 6, the EPN and LPC will be examined, 
and the early attentional processes mentioned in Experiment 5 (like the P300 mentioned 
earlier) will be examined also. The EEG analysis of the current study will only be reported 
for the matching task, as the costs of increasing the difficulty in recall resulted in too few 
segments for EEG analysis of the free-recall task due to large individual variation in 
memory recall.  
Therefore, the purpose of the current study is to examine the effect of self-
relevant positive information during a free recall task with a high memory workload. It is 
predicted that due to the increased difficulty, an interaction between perspective and 
emotion will be found. This interaction will be driven by a greater difference between 
self-related words and distant other-related words for the positive trials when compared 
to the difference between self and distant other for neutral trials. In other words, it is 
predicted that the self-reference effect will be greater for positive words compared to 
neutral words. The behavioural findings of the matching task will be like all previous 
experiments using the matching task in this thesis. However, the novel addition of EEG 
will aim to investigate the early (emotional) self-related information effects on attention. 
Specifically, the N100, P200, P300, EPN and LPP/LPC will be investigated.  
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 21 participants (12 female, 9 male; mean age 25.76, range 18 - 39) took 
part in this study. However, for the EEG analysis, one participant had to be removed 
because too few segments remained after artifact rejection (overall less than 15 segments 
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per condition). This left 20 participants (12 female, 8 male; mean age 25.55 years, range 
18 – 39 years) for the EEG analysis.  
Stimuli & procedure 
The stimuli were selected in the same way as described in Experiment 1d. In total, 
one training block of 10 trials and 15 experimental blocks, each containing 28 trials were 
created. Like Experiment 1d, the wordlists contained neutral and positive words, and half 
of each was linked to the self or a distant other by linking a specific colour to each 
condition.  The procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 4. Each matching block 
was followed by a distractor task, which in turn was followed by a free recall task. After 
each block, the participant was able to take a self-paced break. The total length of the 
experiment was around 45 minutes, excluding EEG setup.  
EEG recording and analysis 
The EEG was recorded using the same EEG system, EEG procedure, and EEG data 
analysis as the previous EEG Experiment 6. All trials were time-locked to stimulus onset 
and epochs were created of -200ms to 1000ms. Separate epochs were created for 
matching and non-matching trials each containing self-relevant/positive words, self-
relevant/neutral words, distant other-relevant/positive words, and distant other-
relevant/neutral words. The epochs were further split up in correct trials and incorrect 
trials. Based on the literature, the following time-windows and electrodes were used: 
N100, 140ms-200ms (electrodes Cz, E4, E6, E7, E54); posterior P200, 170ms – 220ms 
(electrodes E33, E34, E36, E37, E38); Anterior P200, 220ms – 270ms (electrodes E2, E3, 
E6, E8, E9, E11); EPN, 270ms – 320ms (E33, E34, E36, E37, E38); and the LPC, 450ms – 
1000ms (electrodes E31, E33, E34, E36, E38, E40). All data is analysed using Repeated 
ANOVA design: 2 (perspective[self, other]) x 2 (emotion[positive, neutral]). A Bonferroni 
correction is applied for multiple comparisons. G*Power showed that with the general 
robust effect-sizes linked to the matching task and the Free recall experiment of 
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Two main effects are revealed in the d’ analysis: perspective, F(1,20) = 37.273, p 
<.001, η2p = .651; and emotion, F(1,20) = 6.101, p = .023, η2p = .234. Participants correctly 
identified match and non-matched trials for the words linked to the self, compared to 
distant other. Participants were also better with positive words than with neutral words in 
identifying a correctly or incorrectly matched label and colour, see Figure 43. No 
interaction between perspective and emotion was observed, F(1,20) = .109, p = .745. 
For the proportion of correct responses for the matched trials only a main effect 
was found for perspective, F(1,20) = 31.835, p < .001, η2p = .614. Again participants 
correctly matched label and colour for the self-related words when compared to distant 
other-related words. There was no main effect for emotion, F(1,20) = 2.405, p = .137, and 
no interaction between emotion and perspective, F(1,20) = 0.062, p = .807. For the non-
(Error bar = standard error,* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001). 
***
Figure 43. D’ matching task for all conditions, Experiment 6. 
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matched trials no significant differences were found: perspective, F(1,20) = 1.828, p = .191; 
emotion F(1,20) = 1.008, p = .327; perspective×emotion, F(1,20) = .516, p = .481. 
The last measurement analysed for the matching task was the median reaction 
times. For the matched trials participants were significantly faster in making a matching 
judgement for the self-related words when compared to the words not related to the 
self, F(1,20) = 45.664, p < .001, η2p = .695, see Figure 44. There was no significant 
difference between positive words or neutral words, F(1,20) = .516, η2p = .025, and there 
was no interaction between perspective and emotion, F(1,20) = .003, p = .960. See Table 
30 for an overview of the means and standard errors for the matching task. 































For the matched trials, participants freely recalled more words that were linked to 
the self than linked to a distant other, F(1,20) = 25.618 p < .001, η2p = .562. Participants 
also recalled more positive words than neutral words, F(1,20) = 28.057, p < .001, η2p = 
.584, Furthermore, a significant interaction was observed also, F(1,20) = 4.421, p = .048, 
η2p = .181. A follow-up analysis revealed that self-related positive words were more often 
recalled than self-related neutral words (p < .001).  A similar effect was found for words 
related to a distant other where more positive words were recalled than neutral words (p 
= .032).  However, for only positive words, an effect of perspective was found as self-
related words were significantly more often recalled than positive words linked to a 
distant other (p <.001). However, for the neutral words, no effect of perspective was 
found, (p = .067). See Table 31 for an overview of the proportion correctly recalled items 
for the free recall task.  
Table 30. Experiment 6, Matching task.  Proportion correct and median RT for the matched and non-
matched trials, and mean d’. Standard error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
D’ 
Correct RT Correct RT 
Self .884 (.015) 1417.13 (50.46) .833 (.022) 1565.20 (51.93) 2.35 (0.17) 
Other .785 (.026) 1615.82 (52.51) .811 (.019) 1611.24 (54.95) 1.82 (0.16) 
Positive .843 (.021) 1523.49 (52.13) .827 (.020) 1582.32 (50.04) 2.17 (0.17) 
Neutral .827 (.019) 1509.46 (48.41) .817 (.019) 1594.04 (53.99) 2.00 (0.15) 
Self/Positive .893 (.015) 1424.55 (52.01) .834 (.023) 1549.29 (50.03) 2.42 (0.17) 
Self/Neutral .875 (.016) 1409.71 (51.95) .833 (.022) 1580.95 (57.56) 2.28 (0.17) 
Other/Positive .792 (.031) 1622.43 (57.58) .820 (.023) 1615.36 (54.44) 1.91 (0.19) 
Other/Neutral .778 (.025) 1609.21 (50.27) .802 (.020) 1607.12 (57.81) 1.72 (0.15) 
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For the non-matched trials only a significant main effect of emotion was observed, 
F(1,20) = 14.493, p = .001, η2p = .420. Positive words were more often recalled (7.929) 
than neutral words (5.786). No main effect of perspective was found, F(1,20) = .025, p = 
.877, and no interaction between perspective and emotion, F(1,20) = .356, p = .558.  
EEG results 
Only the EEG results of the matching task are provided. The number of words 
recalled was not sufficient in all conditions to create enough segments to reliably 
distinguish ERP signals and therefore, recall-related EEG analyses were not carried out. 
Furthermore, since it is difficult to interpret the non-matched trials, only the matched 
trials are analysed, see Table 32 for the means and standard errors of the ERP 
components discussed below.   
N100, central anterior (140ms – 200ms). Only a significant main effect was found 
for perspective, F(1,19) = 7.401, p = .014, η2p = .280. The ERP waveforms were more 
negative in this time-window for words related to the self (-2.452µV) compared to the 
Table 31. Experiment 6, Free-recall task.  Mean number of correctly recalled words over all blocks. 
Standard error in parenthesis.  
Matched Trials Non-Matched trials 
Self 9.07 (0.86) 6.81 (0.62) 
Other 6.36 (0.74) 6.91 (0.75) 
Positive 9.17 (0.93) 7.93 (0.71) 
Neutral 6.26 (0.65) 5.79 (0.66) 
Self/Positive 11.10 (0.98) 7.71 (0.71) 
Self/Neutral 7.05 (0.90) 5.91 (0.78) 
Other/Positive 7.24 (1.01) 8.14 (0.90) 
Other/Neutral 5.48 (0.61) 5.67 (0.80) 
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ERPs linked to a distant other (-1.934µV), see Figure 45. Neither a main effect of emotion 
was found, F(1,19) = .613, p = .443, nor an interaction between self and emotion, F(1,19) 
= .073, p = .790. 
Parietal positivity (450ms – 1000ms). Again only a significant result was achieved 
for perspective, F(1,19) = 17.683, p < .001, η2p = .482. Words related to the self were had 
a more positive going ERP after 450ms (3.569µV) than words linked to a distant other 
(2.788µV), see Figure 46. No main effect of emotion was found, F(1,19) = .131, p = .721, 
and no interaction effect between emotion and perspective was found either, F(1,19) = 
1.092, p = .309.    
No significant finding were observed for the following observed ERPs: P100, lateral 
occipital (170ms – 220ms) perspective, F(1,19) = .030, p = .865; emotion, F(1,19) = .292, p 
= .595; perspective×emotion, F(1,19) = .258, p = .617; P200, central anterior (220ms – 
270ms) perspective, F(1,19) = .086, p = .773; emotion. F(1,19) = 2.057, p = .168; 
perspective×emotion, F(1,19) = .251, p = .622; P300, central anterior (270ms – 320ms) 
perspective, F(1,19) = .271, p = .609; emotion. F(1,19) = .751, p = .397; 
perspective×emotion, F(1,19) = .229, p = .638. 
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Table 32. Means of the EEG signal Matching task. Mean EEG signal for each ERP 
component. Standard error is given in parenthesis and all values provided are in µV. 
Positive Negative 
ERP Self Other Self Other 
N100 -2.50 (.654) -2.05 (.657) -2.41 (.603) -1.81 (.498)
P100 2.31 (.666) 2.09 (.508) 2.29 (.506) 2.42 (.696) 
P200 1.76 (.535) 1.70 (.508) 1.89 (.497) 2.15 (.497) 
P300 3.07 (.641) 2.79 (.521) 3.16 (.641) 3.20 (.663) 
Parietal positivity 3.51 (.581) 2.99 (.575) 3.63 (.558) 2.59 (.416) 
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                                                                                                            Upper panel (A) shows the EEG 
pooled waveforms from -200ms to 1000ms, from electrodes Cz, E4, E6, E7, and E54. Highlighted area is 
the time-window 140ms – 200ms, marking a potential N100 component.  Lower panel (B) shows the 
topographical maps with brain activity highlighted in the upper panel. The electrodes used in the statistical 
analysis are highlighted in the top-left topographical map.     




Upper panel (A) shows the EEG pooled waveforms from -200ms to 1000ms, from electrodes Cz, E4, E6, 
E7, and E54. Highlighted area is the time-window 450ms – 1000ms, marking a potential parietal positivity 
component.  Lower panel (B) shows the topographical maps with brain activity highlighted in the upper 
panel. The electrodes used in the statistical analysis are highlighted in the top-left topographical map.     
B 
A 




The main goal of this research was to investigate the effects of positive emotion 
on self-relevant information processing under high memory load during free recall. 
Furthermore, EEG was used to examine the underlying electrophysiological processes 
involved in the prioritisation of (emotional) self-related information.   
The behavioural findings of Experiment 6 revealed a self-priority effect during the 
matching task. Participants were more precise in distinguishing signal from noise (d’). 
Moreover, participants’ responses were not only more often correct on self-related trials 
but were also faster when compared to words not related to the self. Unlike the results 
from Experiments 1a-d, emotion was found to significantly increase d’.  Based on the 
previous experiments (Experiments 1a-1d, Experiment 3) containing emotional words, it 
was suggested that in the matching task, the (emotional) meaning was not needed to 
make a matching response. This was because emotion did not seem to influence the 
matching judgement. Since the matching judgement is based solely on the colour and 
the label, a matching response could be made as soon as the colour was identified. As a 
consequence, emotion did not impact the matching task.  It is important to point out that 
neither the reaction time data nor the proportion of correct responses showed an effect 
of emotion on the matching task. This suggests that the effect of emotion is not as robust 
as the findings on perspective across all measurements. However, it remains possible that 
this version of the matching task had more power to find an effect, as there were more 
trials in this experiment. Also, the matching task was spread over 15 blocks and the 
instructions were repeated at the beginning of each block, which possibly helped with 
learning the task. A final possible explanation is that participants would know after the 
first block that the task demand of the free recall task was high, on average a participant 
recalled only 4.5 words from the matching task per block. This required participants to 
pay more attention to the words, which possibly delayed the overall response slightly. 
The average RTs of Experiments 1a-d and Experiment 3 (self = 976ms; distant other = 
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1155ms) compared to the average of the current Experiment 6 (self = 1417ms; distant 
other = 1615ms) does seem to support this.  
The increased task demand of this experiment might have an unexpected 
circumstance to show an effect of positive emotion on attention. However, like 
Experiment 3, which also found an effect of emotion on the matching task, the d’ measure 
includes the non-matched trials. As discussed before, it is difficult to interpret the non-
matching trials as the label and colour mismatch makes it difficult to know if the trial was 
self-relevant. This is because the label itself can possibly be enough to elicit a self-priority 
response. In other words, if the colour of the word is linked to a distant other but the 
label is linked to the self, which of these two determine if the trial is self-relevant or distant 
other-relevant?  
If the d’ measure is used as clear measurement of self-relevance, then Experiment 
6 directly supports the claim that emotion affects attention (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; 
Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Mezulis et al., 2004; Sedikides & Green, 2004; Taylor, 1991; 
Vuilleumier, 2005; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006).  Furthermore, the apparent beneficial 
effect of emotion in our task can be explained within the ABC-theory (Mather & 
Sutherland, 2011). This theory states that emotional arousal enhances the processing of 
high priority events driven by bottom-up perceptual salience and top-down goal 
relevance.  As the words were of high-priority (needed to be remembered in the free 
recall task), emotion helped increase the perceptual salience of the words, which is 
reminiscent of how self-related items are prioritised.  Together, perspective and emotion 
help orientate attention towards goal-relevant information and in doing so, allow for 
improved consolidation into memory as is shown by the results of the free recall task. 
Nonetheless, emotion is not consistent across the different measurement as participants 
were not faster in responding during positive trials.  
One of the benefits of using a free recall task is that there are no cues that help 
prime recall. The act of recalling is made a purely mental task. This makes the task of 
recalling information more difficult, but at the same time, this allowed this experiment, 
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together with a high memory load, to push participants’ memories to the limit. It was 
predicted that this increase in difficulty would help elucidate the role of emotion on self-
relevant information processing.  
The results of the free recall experiment did reveal a main effect of perspective 
and a main effect of emotion showing that self-related words and positive words were 
recalled more often. More interesting is the interaction between perspective and 
emotion, which is not like the interaction observed in the previous experiments that 
combined the matching task with an old/new recollection task. Where the previous 
experiments (Experiment 1c-1d and Experiment 3) showed an interaction between 
emotion and perspective, this interaction was mainly caused by a self-reference effect for 
neutral words and an effect of emotion for distant other-related words. Therefore, the 
difference between self and distant other was smaller for the positive words, compared 
to the neutral words. This led to the conclusion that self and emotion influence memory 
separately but together not more than each condition alone. In other words, there 
appears to be a ceiling effect, in the sense that recall is not improved for the combination 
of self and emotional items beyond the separate effect of emotion or self-relevance on 
memory. However, it was not clear that if the influence of emotion and self-related 
information simply reached a task-related maximum, which was the same for the 
combination of emotional self-relevant information. This seemed to be reinforced by the 
findings of Experiment 2 where the redundancy gain version of the matching task did 
show super-capacity (i.e. positive emotion and self-related information together led to 
more efficient processing of information). The interaction of the current Experiment 6 
showed that self-related positive items were recalled more often than positive distant 
other-related words or neutral self-related words. This showed that recall does benefit 
from a combination of self-related and positive words when the memory task is more 
difficult.   
These finding of a greater self-reference effect for positive words, compared to 
neutral words are more consistent with the results of Gutchess, Kensinger, Yoon, and 
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Schacter (2007), and Leshikar, Dulas, and Duarte (2015). These two studies did reveal an 
effect of positive emotion on self-related information processing but used an encoding 
task that had participants actively judge if emotional traits described them or not. In the 
discussion section of Chapter 2, it was discussed that this way of encoding possibly results 
in less distraction for positive words compared to negative words as it is easier to link 
positive information to the self (Mezulis et al., 2004). This would, in turn, lead to more 
enriched encoding for self-related positive words.  Since emotion was not directly linked 
to the self in Experiments 1a-1d such enriched encoding could not occur. Even though in 
this Experiment 6 emotion is still not linked directly to the self in the matching task, the 
RT does appear to be slower in this version of the matching task when compared to 
earlier versions. As said before, this is possibly because of the increased number of blocks 
and because the participants know how difficult the free-recall task is, which forces them 
to focus on the words more. This makes the reading of the words more active compared 
to the more passive reading of the words in the previous matching task versions. This 
increase in attention for the words would lead to more enriched encoding , more so for 
self-relevant positive words as it is easier to link positive information to the self (Mezulis 
et al., 2004), than neutral self-related words, positive distant other-related words, and 
distant other-related neutral words.  This combined with the greater difficulty makes self-
related positive words more memorable than other conditions. This is further highlighted 
by the lack of self-reference effect for neutral words and the medium effect size of 
emotion for distant other-related items.  This shows that self-related neutral words or 
positive distant other-related words are not as often recalled as positive self-related 
words during free recall.   
EEG results 
The EEG analysis revealed only two significant main effects of the matching task: 
a more pronounced central anterior negative deflection in the EEG signal between 140ms 
and 200ms for the self-related words compared to words related to a distant other, which 
is interpreted as a N100; and a more positive ERP for self-related words compared to 
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distant other-related words between 450ms to 1000ms occipital parietal sites, interpreted 
as a LPC.  No effects of emotion were found in the ERPs during the matching task.  
The N100 is linked to early visual processing and is believed to reflect 
discrimination processes (Vogel & Luck, 2000). In the current experiment, a greater 
central anterior N100 was linked only to self-related information, and it is therefore likely 
that the automatic capture of self-related information and the increased attentional 
processes for self-related information is reflected by the increased N100. A second 
difference in the ERPs was found after 450ms where an LPC was found with greater 
positivity for self-related words compared to words related to a distant other. These 
findings are in line with the previous chapter’s Experiment 5. The LPC reflects the 
maintenance of the attended information allowing for encoding into memory (Dien, 
Spencer, & Donchin, 2004; Gevins, Smith, McEvoy, & Yu, 1997).  Taken together, the two 
ERP processes might reflect the initial automatic capture of attention by self-related 
information (N100) and the maintenance of the attended information (LPC) into memory. 
No effect of emotion was found in the EEG analysis. However, this might be due 
to the nature of the matching task for which the emotional value of the word is not 
relevant to the task. Nonetheless, after the initial matching judgement, the emotional 
valence should impact the ERPs, especially with the behavioural findings of the matching 
task, which show an effect of emotion on self-related words. The ERPs are time-locked 
to the onset of the word plus label, and at that time the colour of the word is of key 
importance, not the emotional meaning of the word.  The later processing of the 
emotional valence of the words could then be masked by ongoing ERPs. For example, it 
is possible that the EPN is not measurable because it is overlapping with the P300 elicited 
by the matching task. Therefore, the matching task might not be suited (in its current 
form) to study the ERPs of emotional self-related information processing as the ERPs 




Although the behavioural findings showed an effect of positive self-related 
information processing, there are methodological limitations to this matching task to 
examine the role of emotion on self-related information processing clearly. Nonetheless, 
the main goal of having a memory experiment with high memory workload was 
successful. Participant found it very difficult to recall the words freely. Because a free-
recall task recall depends purely on the strength of the memories, the full benefits of self-
related positive words were shown. More self-related positive words were recalled than 
words from any other condition. This was possible because of the increased binding into 
memory for positive self-related information. 
The behavioural finding of the matching task was partially supported by the EEG 
findings. The matching task revealed two ERPs which are thought to reflect early 
attentional discrimination processes and a later component believed to be involved in 
the maintenance of attended information into memory, with greater amplitudes for self-
related items. Taken together, this suggests that, compared to distant other-related 
information, self-related information is prioritised at early attentional stages, and the 
attended information is maintained and encoded into memory more efficiently than 
distant other-related information.  The next chapter will focus on a general discussion of 
the whole thesis, where experimental findings will be tied together, and the broader 





This chapter will start by revisiting the specific aims of this research project. This is 
then followed by a summary of the findings of the nine experiments and their 
interpretations. The limitations of these experiments is then discussed. Continuing from 
this, several suggestions for future research will be proposed, and the broader 
implications of the research will be discussed. This chapter will then conclude by making 
some statements regarding the status of self and emotion in attention and memory 
based on the findings of this thesis. 
Review of aims 
The aims of this thesis were to examine the influence and interdependence of 
emotion and self-related information on attention and memory. The motivation for this 
research was that many previous studies studying the self-reference effect in the domain 
of memory tended to conflate self-reference with familiarity. For example, names and 
faces of the participants are often used when studying the effects of self on information 
processing. However, these kind of stimuli are not just self-relevant, they tend to be highly 
familiar also in relation to the non-self relevant stimuli used as controls (e.g. the faces or 
names of strangers). Furthermore, the influence of emotion on self-relevant information 
processing was unclear. Therefore, a concrete goal of this thesis was to study the effect 
of emotion and self-relevance with the aim of exploring any putative independent and 
interactive effects on attention and memory. A study by Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012 
demonstrated that there is a reliable effect of self-related information on perceptual 
processing. They found that arbitrarily linking self to a geometric shape would lead to a 
 
240 
prioritisation of that shape compared to shapes not linked to the self. Furthermore, by 
arbitrarily linking the self to a stimulus, this perceptual matching paradigm controlled for 
possible confounds of familiarity that stimuli with inherent self-relevance (e.g. one’s own 
name or face) would possess.  
It is well known that attention tends to influence memory encoding and therefore 
memorability itself (Baddeley et al., 1984; Craik et al., 1996). It, therefore, seemed 
reasonable to look at how the attentional effects of self-relevance have implications on 
later memorability. For this reason, the matching task of Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012) 
was adapted in a novel way for use in conjunction with a memory task (using recognition 
memory, cued recall, and free-recall). This was done by arbitrarily linking the self to a 
colour, and using (emotional) words as stimuli instead of geometric shapes (Experiment 
1-4, & Experiment 6). Moreover, since self-related information processing is deemed to 
be a fast and automatic process (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Moors & De Houwer, 2006), 
this aspect of self-related information was also examined. In this thesis, this was examined 
by adding repetition of the word-list used in the matching paradigm, keeping same 
perspective associations (Experiment 3, & Experiment 4). Another approach used in this 
thesis was by attempting to suppress memories (Experiment 5). The goal of this approach 
was to explore the automaticity of self-relevant information processing. This was achieved 
by observing if self-related memories are as easily suppressed as memories related to a 
distant other.  
The final aim of this thesis was to elucidate the underlying neurophysiological 
processes involved in self-related and emotional information processing in attention and 
memory, using EEG methods (Experiment 5, & Experiment 6). These research aims were 
the basis of nine experiments across six chapters, which are summarised below.  
Summary Experiments 
In total, nine experiments were conducted to examine the influence of self-
relevant information on attention and memory, together with emotion. Most of these 
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experiments tried to link the established self-priority effect (e.g. Alexopoulos et al., 2012; 
Cherry, 1953; Sui et al., 2012) with that of the self-reference effect (e.g. Brown & Kulik, 
1977; Conway, 2005; Symons & Johnson, 1997). This was achieved via a novel adaptation 
of the perceptual matching paradigm by Sui, He, and Humphreys (2012). 
In most of the experiments in this thesis, a robust effect of perspective was found 
in attention (i.e. a self-priority effect).  The often found self-priority effect showed that the 
matching task used in this thesis, reliably measured a facilitation effect of self-relevant 
information on attention. However, no effect of emotion was found on most of the 
matching tasks. Only by making emotion part of the response (redundancy gain 
Experiment 2) or by increased power (Experiment 3, & Experiment 6), was an effect of 
emotion found on the matching task. It is likely this was because emotion was not part 
of the response required on the matching task (matching judgement) as participants only 
had to compare the label and the colour of the word. This meant that the matching 
response was possibly already initiated before the semantic meaning of the word (and 
therefore the emotional value) was processed.    
In most experiments, the matching task was followed by an old/new task. Where 
most matching tasks did not show an effect of emotion, all old/new tasks do show an 
effect of emotion. Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b both revealed a main effect of 
emotion and a main effect of perspective. This meant that words which were 
experimentally manipulated to be associated with the self in the matching task were later 
correctly recognised more often than words that had not been linked to the self. The 
processing of positive and negative words during the matching phase increased the 
likelihood of later retrieval compared to neutral words. Indirectly, this provided further 
evidence that emotion had been processed during the matching task. Since no 
interaction between perspective and emotion was observed, it appears that self and 
emotional stimuli influence recognition memory separately.  
To further investigate the influence of emotion, Experiment 1c and Experiment 1d 
used negative and positive trait-words. Emotional trait-words were used because traits 
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should be more applicable to either the self or a distant other. The matching task again 
revealed a significant self-priority effect, and no effect of emotion.  
However, the memory data for the trait experiments (Experiment 1c and 1d) were 
different from the noun experiments (Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b). The effect of 
perspective only occurred for the emotionally neutral trait words. For the emotional trait 
words (positive or negative) the effect of self was no longer found. This was expressed in 
an interaction between perspective and emotion in the old/new task. In other words, for 
the self-related words there was no effect of emotion on memory, which was present for 
the words related to a distant other. Furthermore, when looking only at the emotional 
trait-words there was no effect of perspective, which was present for the neutral trait 
words.  
These results seem to indicate that perspective and emotion both influenced 
memory, but the effect of perspective and emotion are not cumulative. However, this 
does not mean that the presence of emotion and self are non-additive as it is possible 
that there was a ceiling effect of some kind. The best performance was around 70%, and 
therefore there still was room for improvement. Nonetheless, emotion and self-
relatedness improve recognition, but both combined did not result in even greater 
memorability per se. Possibly this was because the words though emotionally valenced, 
were not specifically emotionally self-relevant.  
Experiment 2 studied the effects of redundant information to try to elucidate the 
interaction between emotion and self-related information further. This required several 
novel adaptations to the matching task to allow the measuring of redundancy gain 
between self-relevant and emotional information. In this experiment, participants were 
asked to give the same button press for emotional words and self-relevant words. The 
results showed that when a word is both emotional and self-relevant, participants 
respond faster compared to a self-related word or an emotional word. In other words, 
there was super-capacity (i.e. integrated processing between self-related and emotional 
information) between self-relevant and emotional information, during the matching task. 
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Interestingly, this super-capacity was not translated into better memory for emotional 
self-relevant words, indicating that emotion and self do interact, but the effects are not 
cumulative for recognition. This means that emotional words and self-relevant words 
were correctly recognised equally often as words that were both emotional and self-
relevant.  Possibly this is due to the nature of the matching task as the words were only 
self-relevant by association and not directly linked to the word. Conversely, the emotional 
meanings of the words were not linked to the self-relevance of the words’ colour. Indeed, 
this has been suggested as the very reason for not finding an effect of emotion in the 
matching tasks of Experiments 1a-1d, where the matching response was made as soon 
as the colour was detected.  
Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 employed an extension of the matching paradigm. 
This was done by having repeated blocks of-of the same wordlist. Repetition of stimuli is 
known to improve memorability (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Ebbinghaus, 2013; Hintzman & 
Block, 1971). Therefore, the extent of self-association effects on memory can be 
determined by repeated association. Furthermore, this manipulation allowed us to track 
the time course of repeated perspective association and the effect of repetition of the 
word stimuli on memory.  
Experiment 3, was very similar to Experiment 1b with the exception of added 
repetition of the wordlist. The perspective associated with the words was kept the same 
for each repetition (i.e. the colour of the words did not change, nor did the instructions 
that linked self or distant other to a specific colour). The procedure of the matching task 
was otherwise exactly the same as Experiment 1b. Like all matching paradigms, 
Experiment 1b also found an effect of perspective. Self-related words were again 
prioritised compared to words not related to the self. Interestingly, where none of the 
previous matching experiments found an effect of emotion, Experiment 3 did find an 
effect of emotion. This possibly suggests that self-related negative words were prioritised 
less than neutral self-related words. However, this finding is only found for the d’ measure 
and not for proportion correct responses and not for the reaction time data.  Since the 
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d’ measure included the non-matched trials, the interpretation of the perspective and 
emotion interaction is difficult. This is because the self-relatedness of the trials in the non-
matched condition is not clear (e.g. when the label is linked to the self, and the colour of 
the word is linked to a stranger).  
No effect of repetition was found on the matching task, meaning that the effect 
of self was the same for all time-windows during the matching task. This lends some 
further support to the assertation that the semantic meaning of the word (and therefore 
the emotional meaning) is not fully processed when the matching judgement is initiated. 
In other words, only the colour of the word impacts the matching judgment during the 
matching task.    
However, after the repetitions, an old/new memory task was administered. 
Nonetheless, despite showing a strong self-priority effect during the matching task, a 
self-reference effect for the old/new task was absent. Only a main effect of emotion was 
found in this experiment. This suggests that self-relevant information processing has an 
initial benefit in memory, but eventually, simple repetition will allow non-self-related 
words to be equally memorable as self-relevant information. It is likely that the initial 
effects of self steepen the learning curve for self-related words but plateaus out, at a 
similar level as other mnemonic strategies, such as repetition. Especially since repetition 
itself has no effect on increasing the self-relatedness of a word. Emotional words are still 
remembered more often after repetition compared to neutral. This is likely because 
emotional meaning of the word does get processed (after initiation of the matching 
response) and repetition does strengthen the memorability of words (Craik & Lockhart, 
1972; Ebbinghaus, 2013; Hintzman & Block, 1971).  
For Experiment 4, the old/new task was replaced by a free-recall task. This allowed 
for a memory test to follow after each matching task block of 20 words. According to the 
data of Experiment 4, the self-reference effect is still initially present in time-window two 
and three but disappears in the fourth time-window. Although a ceiling effect is not 
present, a peak in learning curve seems to be occurring much faster for self-related 
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words. This is reflected by a significant increase in the number of words recalled after the 
first time-window and after the second time-window for the self-relevant words. 
However, after this initial fast increase, the number of words recalled remains roughly 
around the same level for subsequent time-windows. For the words related to a distant 
other, the reverse occurs as initially there is no difference between the first two time-
windows, but there is for the last and penultimate time-window.  
Taken together, the data suggests that the peak in a learning curve is reached 
faster for words related to the self when compared to words not related to the self. Self-
related words might help improve overall efficiency, but not beyond the normal learning 
curve present for each task. Therefore repetition does not seem to promote a self-
reference effect as shown by previous research as well (Symons & Johnson, 1997). It is 
possible that binding of information via the self is fast and robust, but further repetition 
does not lead to stronger binding into memory.  
The automaticity of the self was further investigated with Experiment 5. Experiment 
5 used a different experimental approach to the self-reference effect in memory, called 
the think/no-think paradigm. Using the think/no-think paradigm, it was shown that 
actively suppressing the recall of an item decreased the probability of later recall (M. C. 
Anderson & Green, 2001; M. C. Anderson & Levy, 2009).The main purpose of this 
experiment was to examine if the supposed automatic process of self-related information 
processing could be actively suppressed compared to distant other-related information.  
Participants were shown a list of cue-target words-pairs in the study phase, which they 
had to memorise. After the study phase, the test phase followed where participants were 
shown the cue word only had to remember the (unrelated) target word. The wordlist was 
presented three times. Unlike the previous experiments (Experiment 1 – 4), this allowed 
insight into the learning speed of self-related words during the encoding phase. After 
learning the words, a critical phase followed where participants were asked to either 
suppress the target word after being presented the cue word or remember the target 
when presented with the cue word. The word list was repeated 15 times. After the critical 
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phase, the participants were again presented with the cue words and were asked to 
remember the associated target words. This performance could then be compared with 
words not included in the critical phase (i.e. the baseline).  
Even though this experiment did not reveal an effect of suppression with the 
think/no-think paradigm, it did show that self-related information was learned faster and 
with less forgetting over time than distant other-related information. The effect of 
repetition of self-related words seems to be caused by a steeper learning curve of self-
relevant information, but eventually, the same level of recall was reached by distant 
other-related information, but with a more shallow learning curve. Therefore, it appears 
that self-related information is learned faster, but up to a maximum. Repetition did not 
result in better memory for self-related words compared to words linked to a distant 
other. In other words, items related to a distant other, “catch-up” to words related to the 
self as each repetition also results in stronger binding into memory. However, the baseline 
measure of the think/no-think paradigm showed that this binding into memory seems to 
be more robust and less prone to forgetting for the self-related words compared to the 
words related to a distant other.  
The finding of words related to a distant other being learned slower but eventually 
to the same level as self-related words were supported by the EEG data. In the study 
phase, the data showed an initial greater P200 component for self-related words after 
the first repeat, compared to distant other-related words. This effect was not present for 
the second repeat. ERP differences for all repeats showed a P300 for self-related items 
which indicated the top-down reallocation of attention towards self-relevant information. 
This possibly reflects an inhibitory process involving the TPJ by inhibiting ongoing 
attentional processes and reorienting towards self-relevant information. Furthermore, 
during encoding an increased midfrontal negativity (FN400) for distant other-related 
items, compared to self-related items, showed that self-related information is processed 
with greater ease or efficiency than distant other-related information. Also, a more 
pronounced LPC for self-related items compared to distant other-related items was 
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found in the study phase.  This possibly reflected greater memorability for self-related 
items.  However, an expected interaction with time (distant other-related items “catching-
up”) was not found. Interestingly, during recall in the testing phase, this interaction was 
observed. Results revealed a more positive going LPC for self-related items, compared 
to distant other-related items, but only after the first repeat. During the second repeat, 
no difference between self- and distant other-related items were found, possibly 
reflecting the “catching-up” of distant other-related items with self-related items after the 
first repetition. The “catching-up” possibly reflects increasingly more robust memory 
traces after each repetition.  
During the critical phase of Experiment 5, there were two clear markers associated 
with the manipulations. First, there was a greater anterior negativity for the think 
condition, when compared to the no-think condition. This component possibly reflects 
the different cognitive demands from the think versus no-think conditions. Secondly, a 
more positive LPC was found during the think/no-think phase for not learned distant 
other/think compared to not learned distant other/no-think trials. This possibly reflects 
the greater retrieval attempt for the not-learned distant other related words during the 
thinking trails, compared to the not learned distant other/no-think trials. This difference 
between think and no-think for the not learned words was not present for the self-related 
trials. This possibly suggested that for the non-learned self-related words, retrieval 
attempts were equal for think and no-think trials. Altogether, Experiment 5 showed faster 
learning of the wordlist for self-related words when compared to distant other-related 
words, which is supported by the underlying electrophysiological signals. The final study 
of this thesis, Experiment 6, investigated the EEG responses associated with the matching 
task and followed the more traditional experimental set-up used of this thesis.  
Experiment 6 put together many of the elements found in the studies in this thesis. 
This experiment consisted of a matching task which was divided into 15 blocks of 28 
words. Each block was followed by a free-recall task. Experiment 6 builds on the finding 
of emotion and self-related information reported in Experiments 1a-1d, and Experiment 
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2.  In particular, the redundancy gain experiment of Experiment 2 showed that positive 
self-related information should be processed more efficiently together than self-related 
information and emotion apart. A major finding of Experiment 6 was the identification of 
an early ERP component linked to the matching judgement of the matching task. This 
early central anterior component (N100) was more pronounced for self-related 
information compared to distant other-related information. This showed that early 
attentional processes are prioritised towards and more sensitive to self-related 
information compared to distant other-related information.  This was reinforced by a 
later ERP component (LPC) which was more positive for self-related information than for 
distant other-related information and this possibly reflected the processing of the 
attended information into memory.  
 The behavioural findings of Experiment 6, again showed a clear self-priority effect 
for the matching task. Furthermore, like Experiment 3, there was an effect of emotion for 
the matching task. Possibly, there was an increase in power when compared to the other 
matching experiments of this thesis. Similarly to the repetition Experiment 3, this effect 
was only found for the d’ measure. Again, this limits the interpretation of the finding as 
the d’ includes the non-matched trials. For the old/new task, an interaction between 
perspective and emotion was found. Positive self-related words were remembered more 
often than neutral self-related words or positive distant other-related words. Taken 
together, Experiment 6 expands on the findings of Experiment 1a-1d, Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3 in showing an interaction between emotion and self-relatedness on 
memory. Possibly this is because of the increased difficulty of the free-recall task 
compared to the memory recognition task. With a free-recall task, there are no cues to 
facilitate recall, and this potentially highlights any influence of emotion and self on recall. 
Bringing it all together 
 The most consistent finding of this thesis is that every chapter that used the 
matching paradigm found a clear effect of the self. This shows that the adapted 
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perceptual matching paradigm of Sui, He and Humphreys (2012) is very robust in 
producing a self-priority effect. Using the different approaches summarized in the 
previous section, it has become clear that self-related information is prioritised over 
information not related to the self. In other words, self-related items appear to be more 
salient. This increased saliency results in a more prioritised attentional processing. Not 
only does this allow to process the prioritised information more efficiently, it also allows 
for better encoding. Furthermore, the ERP data supports the view that self-related 
information is prioritised as a self-priority effect was linked to several ERP components 
(most notably the N100).  However, as efficient as the matching task is in highlighting the 
beneficial effect of self-related information, the effect of emotion on attentional processes 
were not as clear in most experiments. Nonetheless, when taking special care to insure 
that the participants’ responses included the effect of emotion (the redundancy gain 
Experiment 2), a clear interaction between positive emotion and self-related information 
was found. 
As discussed in the introduction (Chapter 1), previous literature found that emotional and 
self-related information interact. More precisely, positive emotions are thought be more 
easily linked to self-related information and negative emotions are more difficult to link 
to self-related information (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Fredrickson, 1998; Grol et al., 2014; 
Mezulis et al., 2004; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006). The general viewpoint of this thesis 
therefore was that emotion strongly influences how self-related information is processed 
but emotion alone does not explain the beneficial effects found for self-related stimuli as 
several studies had found (Gutchess et al., 2007; Leshikar et al., 2015; Stolte et al., 2016). 
The concept that emotion and self-related information processing are two interacting 
but ultimately separate systems was further strengthened with the findings of Experiment 
2, via the redundancy gain paradigm. Experiment 2 showed super-capacity for emotional 
self-related words during the matching task. In other words, during attentional 
processing, there was integration between self-related and emotional information. This 
integration lead to faster processing of emotional self-related information compared to 
stimuli only related to the self or emotional stimuli. Taking all the matching paradigms 
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together, it can be concluded that there is a clear effect of self on prioritising self-related 
information during attentional processes and that although self and emotional 
information is processed by separate systems, they do interact. Based on the experiment 
chapters with the matching task, it can be concluded that this interaction between 
emotion and self-related information leads to an increase in efficiency in attentional 
processing. However, this might only be because the emotion was task relevant (Mather 
& Sutherland, 2011). Therefore, it remains interesting to see how emotion would impact 
self-related information processing when not task-relevant. Nonetheless, the main 
finding of the matching task is that if further replicates and strengthens the finding of 
previous literature (e.g. Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Cherry, 1953; Sui et al., 2012) on a self-
priority on attentional processing. That being said, finding a self-priority effect was not 
the only goal of this thesis as one of the main goals was to link an initial self-priority effect 
of attention to a subsequent self-reference effect in memory.  
This goal of attaining a self-reference effect in memory following a self-priority effect in 
perceptual attention was achieved in every experiment of this thesis. A self-reference 
effect was observed most old/new recognition task, the cue-recall used in the think/no-
think experiment and in the free-recall tasks. This beneficial effect of self-related 
information on memory was in line with the predictions made in the introduction of this 
thesis (M. A. Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Kelley et al., 2002; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Rogers 
et al., 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997). In a divided attention study, Turk et al. (2013) found 
that this advantage of self-related items on memory disappeared when attention was 
divided. Suggesting that attention is required for any benefit of self on memory. However, 
in Experiment 4 and 5 a self-reference effect was not always followed by a self-reference 
effect even when attention was fully on the encoding (i.e. matching) task. This suggests 
that despite an initial benefit of the self, repetition by itself does not influence self-related 
information per se. However, other-related information is affected by repetition and 
therefore “catches-up” with self-related information. The EEG chapters (Experiment 5 and 
6) have further supported these findings by showing increased EEG activity for the ERP 
components linked to memory for self-related items, when compared to other-related 
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items (e.g.  LPC). Nonetheless, Experiment 5 also showed that words related to the self 
are more stable in memory and recalled more accurately over a longer period of time 
compared to words not linked to the self.  
Furthermore, all experiments that contained a manipulation of emotion (Experiment 1a-
1d, 2, 3, &6) showed a positive effect of emotion (both for negative and positive emotions) 
on memory. A possible explanation of this effect was that for a memory experiment the 
emotional meaning of the word would increase saliency of the word and was therefore 
task-relevant (Mather & Sutherland, 2011; Sakaki et al., 2014). The effect of emotion on 
memory remained when, in Experiment 3, repetition caused the self-reference effect to 
disappear. This again suggests a difference in processing of emotional stimuli and self-
related stimuli. Where repetition of self-related information does not further increase the 
salience of the stimuli beyond a fast, automatic initial gain, emotional stimuli seems to 
increase in saliency when compared to emotional neutral words regardless of repetition. 
Despite a clear finding of emotion, a clear interaction between self-related information 
and emotional information remained absent until the last experiment (Experiment 6). 
Despite showing a significant interaction in several memory tasks, all earlier experiment 
showed a cumulative effect of self and emotion. This cumulative effect showed a main 
effect of emotion and self-related words, but emotional self-related words more not 
significantly different than either emotional words or self-related words alone. It 
appeared that emotional self-related words could not help improve memory more than 
each of its part could. In other words, a maximum of improvement was already reached 
via emotion alone or self-related information alone. However, with Experiment 6, this 
maximum was much more difficult to reach because of the increase in task difficulty. This 
allowed for a clear indication of an interaction between self and emotional information. 
This further expands the findings of the redundancy gain paradigm (Experiment 2) which 
found super-capacity for emotional self-related words but no clear superior effect on 
memory by emotional self-related words.   
 
252 
In short, this thesis has shown that the self-priority effect clearly leads to a self-reference 
effect and while emotion interacts with self-related processes, emotion and self-related 
information processes are clearly distinct processes. These findings clearly support the 
concept of an ‘integrative’ self (Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). As discussed in the 
introduction, Sui and Humphreys (2015b) see the self as a way in which different bits of 
information are linked together across cognitive domains. This thesis has repeatedly 
shown that self-related information, when prioritised when first encountered also leads 
to improved memory for those items. This too might be reflected in the EEG research as 
a P300 was found when actively encoding words in Experiment 5. This is interesting 
because the P300 has been linked with attention to memory processes (Polich, 2007), 
and the P300 in this experiment was more pronounced for self-related items when 
compared to other-related items.  
Several models have been suggested by previous literature to explain the underlying 
neurophysiological mechanisms involved in the apparent beneficial effect of self on 
attention and memory. The next section will link the (ERP) findings of this thesis with those 
models discussed in Chapter 1.   
Link to models of the self 
In Chapter 1, several models of self-relevant information processing were 
discussed, namely the integrative self (Sui & Humphreys, 2015b), the SAN model 
(Humphreys & Sui, 2016), and the SMS (M. A. Conway, 2005). It should be noted that the 
methods used in this thesis are limited in terms of what they can actually tell us about the 
structure of the underlying brain networks. In this sense, they do not, in any way, 
constitute a direct test of this, or other models.  However, despite this, some inferences 
can be made from the results we have. 
The findings of this thesis are broadly in line with the predictions of the SAN. To 
reiterate, the SAN consists of three components that form a neural network: an attention 
network, self-representations; and a bottom-up communication process (Humphreys & 
Sui, 2016). In some respects, the behavioural data were fairly consistent in this thesis. In 
  
253 
particular, all experiments have shown a distinct self-priority effect. This clearly 
demonstrated an advantage of self-related information in directing one’s attention. 
Furthermore, in the matching task, this advantage of self-related information was 
achieved by linking an arbitrary colour to the self with simple instructions. This link of an 
arbitrary colour to the self arguably shows an interaction between top-down and bottom-
up processes as the colour of the word is possibly primed by self-relevance. The EEG 
data of Experiment 5 and 7 also help inform the SAN model. EEG for the matching task 
showed clearly that early N100 components were linked to the self, which shows that 
early discrimination attentional processes were influenced by self-relevant information. 
Furthermore, a P200 has been linked to self-relevant information processing together 
with a P300. Both components are believed to reflect mechanisms associated with 
directing and maintaining attention to presented information. Lastly, similar to what the 
data from this thesis suggest, the SAN proposes that the self is a distinct function in the 
brain and the self-relatedness of information is processed at a low level in the brain, i.e. 
the self is not some higher and separate cognitive function, but is possibly a basic aspect 
of brain function which is incorporated within multiple other cognitive processes.  
 The basis of the SMS is the interconnectedness between memory and the self (M. 
A. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The SMS is proposed to aid coherence between the 
self and current/future goals by maintaining and creating highly goal-relevant memories. 
Arguably this process involves promoting self-relevant information, thus increasing the 
saliency of self-relevant memories. As the SMS is thought to monitor self-related 
information in order to maintain a coherent self, some form of top-down selection of 
self-related information must take place. Via the working self of the SMS, self-related 
information can be linked to attended information, either internally with memory retrieval 
and maintenance or externally with the processing of sensory information. This thesis has 
demonstrated that self-related information is processed faster and more accurately. More 
relevant to the SMS is the finding that memories related to the self are remembered more 
easily and are less subject to forgetting. This finding can be explained with richer self-
related information that is more salient than information not related to the self. These 
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findings were further supported by the EEG results of Experiment 5 with an enhanced 
(late) LPC for self-related information, compared to distant other-related information. 
This enhanced LPC possibly reflects richer memories of self-relevant information. Also, 
an enhanced P300 for self-relevant information compared to distant other-relevant 
information showed a reallocation of attention towards self-relevant information.   
Bridging the influence of self on attention and memory together is the model  of a neural 
network of the self-as-object (Sui & Gu, 2018), which adds to the concept of an integrative 
self (Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). The idea of the integrative self suggests that information 
related to the self binds together across cognitive domains, which increases the saliency 
of self-relevant information. This binding of self-relevant information also possibly 
increases the stability of the information over time. This is demonstrated in Experiment 5, 
where less forgetting for self-relevant information is observed compared to distant other-
related information. Furthermore, this thesis has consistently shown that self-related 
information prioritised by attention is later also remembered more often. Like the SAN, 
the self-as-object neural framework consists of three interconnected components: a core 
self system involved in internal self versus distant other judgements; a cognitive control 
system related to external information processing; and a salience node which focusses 
on emotion and reward. The data from this thesis has shown some support for these 
three interconnected components. For example, in the matching tasks, an internal link is 
made between a colour and the self. This influences the perception and attention toward 
external stimuli which could be primed to be perceived as self-relevant which causes the 
now self-relevant stimuli to be prioritised over distant other-related stimuli via increased 
saliency.  
Limitations  
Some limitations have already been highlighted in each chapter relevant to the 
respective experiments. However, there are two broader limitations inherent to the 
research described in this thesis.  
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There are some limitations linked to EEG research in general. First is the question 
of causality, which currently remains unanswered as EEG research is correlational in 
nature. Second is the difference between self and emotional information processing. This 
thesis has shown that these are possibly two different processes affecting attention and 
memory in a similar way. However, the current EEG analysis has been unsuccessful in 
showing this difference. Possibly this lack of differences might be because of the 
similarities in the processes influenced by self and emotion. For example, the P300 which 
reflects the reallocation of attention to goal-relevant stimuli via inhibition would be similar 
for both emotion and self-relatedness. Nonetheless, how these two processes influence 
the P300 should be different, which should, in turn, be reflected in the neurophysiological 
networks involved. The EEG analysis used in this thesis is unable to detect such networks, 
but different analyses do exist, which could help solve this problem. Both the limitations 
of causality and underlying networks can be addressed in future studies or reanalyses, 
and two examples are given in the future studies section.  
Arguably foremost, there is a general limitation of ecological validity in the 
paradigms, using in this thesis. Naturally, the main reason for selecting the paradigms 
was to control for possible confounding factors such as familiarity. The arbitrary linking 
of the self to a colour helped to control for confounds such as familiarity and assisted in 
further isolating and examining self-related processes. Nonetheless, this does come with 
a trade-off of losing ecological validity. Naturally, more ecological valid paradigms can 
be used, but this would inevitably introduce noise when trying to measure self-relevant 
information processing. For example, previous research have used faces and names to 
generate a self-priority effect (Alexopoulos et al., 2012; Cherry, 1953; Shapiro et al., 1997; 
Tong & Nakayama, 1999), or studied the self-reference effect by asking participants to 
link traits to themselves and compare this to semantic processing (M. A. Conway & 
Dewhurst, 1995; Kelley et al., 2002; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). However, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, this possibly creates confounds such as familiarity, or other forms of enriched 
encoding beyond the influence of the self. Another way to increase ecological validity is 
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by giving or removing items that participants think are theirs in variations where 
ownership is manipulated (S. J. Cunningham et al., 2008; Turk et al., 2011).  
Nonetheless, this paradigm can be used to investigate attentional and memory 
processes. Throughout this thesis, a clear self-priority and self-reference effect have been 
demonstrated. Furthermore, with the robust findings of this paradigm and relative ease 
of administering this to a wide population range means that emotion and self-relevant 
information processing can easily be studied under many different scenarios. An example 
of this is provided in the next section on future research suggestions, where among 
others, a clinical study is proposed.  
Future Studies 
In this section, some ideas for future research will be suggested. Some of these 
suggestions are different kinds of analyses which would require only minimal adaptations 
of the paradigms used in this thesis. However, other suggestion builds on the research 
of this thesis but would require more substantial adaptations of the paradigms.  
Phase synchronisation 
Phase synchronization is based on the idea that neurons are part of a network, 
and these neurons influence each other via inhibitory and excitatory signals. These 
inhibitory and Excitatory communications between neurons generate rhythmic activation 
or inhibition patterns (Buzsáki, 2006), which are called neural oscillations. Also, 
frequencies in several regions can correlate with each other; this is called phase 
synchronization (Fell & Axmacher, 2011).  
The aspects of neural oscillations are especially interesting for research on the self 
and how self-relevant information is prioritised of information not related to the self. If 
the self is a hub connecting different levels of processing in the brain, this should be 
reflected by increased communication between neural networks and previous research 
has shown specific phase synchronisation linked to self-relevant information processing 
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(Mu & Han, 2010). The results of Mu and Han (2010) show that higher frequencies were 
involved in self-referential judgement and that lower frequencies were involved in 
discriminating between positive and negative emotions when referenced to the self. This 
suggests that the relevance and emotional components of self-reference processes are 
mediated by separate neural networks. These concepts could be applied to the current 
research to further investigate the neural networks involved during the matching task and 
subsequent recall. 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation 
As mentioned earlier, one of the limitations of the EEG methods, in general, is the 
correlational nature of EEG. Via transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), where a 
magnetic pulse directly disrupts ongoing brain activity, causality can be tested directly. 
Via TMS a localised magnetic pulse can be introduced to a specific area in the brain via 
a magnetic coil placed against the scalp of a participant. This magnetic pulse creates an 
electric current in neural networks, which activates the neurons in the targeted area.  The 
general idea behind TMS is fairly straightforward. If a specific area in the brain is 
responsible for a specific measurable behavioural finding, then activating the neurons in 
that area would disrupt the observed behavioural findings. These disruptions in behaviour 
are the direct consequence of the induced electric current that effects excitatory and 
inhibitory neuronal connections of which the effect spread transynaptically. In short, via 
TMS you can introduce noise into neural information processing. Often the measurable 
behavioural effect is a reduced reaction time for a specific task.   
  In a TMS experiment by Lou et al. (2004), the medial parietal region was 
stimulated to disrupt ongoing neural activity whilst participants were performing a self-
reference task. The task was, again, a trait-word judgement task. In this particular 
experiment, participants either judged how well a trait-word applied to themselves, their 
best friend, or the Danish Queen. During a subsequent retrieval phase, participants had 
to indicate if the trait was judged in the initial task to fit them or their best friend. During 
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an earlier PET scanning session, using a similar task, the authors identified brain regions 
involved in self-referencing and found that the medial parietal/posterior cingulate region 
was interacting with the right inferior parietal cortex and mPFC, suggesting it is possibly 
involved in self-referenced information retrieval. For the TMS experiment, a magnetic 
pulse was administered during the retrieval phase at one of three regions: Occipital pole, 
medial parietal region, and anterior to the vertex. During the retrieval phase, each trait-
word was presented one at the time and the TMS pulse was administered with different 
latencies of: 0, 80, 160, 240, and 480ms. The results demonstrated that TMS impaired the 
self-reference effect at the medial parietal cortex with a latency of 160ms. This lead the 
authors to conclude that the lateral parietal cortex plays an important role in the self-
reference effect as it connects the inferior parietal cortex with the mPFC, which, as 
mentioned earlier, is involved in self-referencing in memory. Furthermore, as part of the 
DMN the inferior parietal cortex is closely connected to other brain regions involved in 
processing self-relevant information (e.g. ACC and PCC).  
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, many studies link the mPFC to the processing 
of self-relevant information. However, in a TMS study very similar to the one described 
in the previous paragraph, the self-reference effect was not disrupted via stimulation of 
the mPFC (Lou, Luber, & Lisanby, 2010). Where in the previous study (Lou et al., 2004) 
the Parietal midline regions (precuneus) were targeted for TMS, this time the left and 
right parietal cortex (AG) and mPFC were targeted, again with different latencies. TMS to 
the mPFC had no effect on the self-reference effect, but TMS to both left and right 
parietal cortex did. However, TMS to the parietal cortex did not influence the self-
reference affect in the same way for the left and right sites. TMS to the right parietal 
cortex revealed similar results as the previous experiment at a latency of 160ms, although 
the effect of TMS did last longer than when the precuneus was stimulated. The left parietal 
cortex showed an effect of TMS at all latencies (80-480ms), even to the point of reversing 
the self-reverence effect for the 160ms interval. Lou et al. (2010) suggest that the lack of 
effect from the mPFC might be because the mPFC is specialised in processing different, 
albeit sill self-related, information. The authors refer to the work of Kwan et al. (2007) 
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where a self-positivity effect was reduced after TMS to the mPFC.  This implies that the 
mPFC is more involved in the affective components of self-relevant information, whereas 
the parietal cortex is more involved in self-referential processing. Together these results 
suggest a role for the DMN in processing self-relevant information, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. In principle, TMS can be applied to the current experimental set-up without 
major changes to the methodology.  
Clinical study with self-related information processing 
The findings of this thesis could be applied to a more clinical investigation of self-
related information processing, and beyond further elucidating the processes involved, it 
could potential directly influence and aid people with memory difficulties, especially 
knowing that the DMN is involved in self-referential processing. 
As mentioned during Chapter 1, the DMN is a network of brain areas which have 
been proposed to be implicated in self-referential processing (Qin & Northoff, 2011; 
Spreng & Grady, 2009). The network includes the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the 
medial, lateral and inferior parietal cortex and the precuneus posterior cingulate cortex. 
The DMN shows consistent task related de-activation and is more active at rest. 
Cognitively demanding tasks generally result in greater deactivation of the DMN (Singh 
& Fawcett, 2008). However, the opposite is true when the task involves self-referential 
processing (Mitchell, 2006). Patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) have been found to 
have reduced connectivity in the DMN (Yao et al., 2014). This suggests the brain network 
associated with self-related processing might be compromised in these patients. In PD a 
decrease of DMN functionality is linked with cognitive impairments (Lewis, Dove, Robbins, 
Barker, & Owen, 2003; van Eimeren, Monchi, Ballanger, Strafella, & Eimeren, 2009; 
Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009).  
Within the PD population over a third of the patients additionally suffer from 
dementia (J. L. Cummings, 1988).  Despite severe memory impairments, self-awareness 
and self-reference seem to be relatively intact in patients who suffer from dementia 
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(Gross et al., 2004). The study by Gross et al. (2004) study showed that patients suffering 
from dementia could learn to recognize self-relevant pictures when compared to other 
pictures not relevant to the self.  
It is notable that in some Alzheimer’s patients, the self-reference effect seems to 
help improve recall (Kalenzaga & Clarys, 2013; Rosa, Deason, Budson, & Gutchess, 2014). 
In the study by Kalenzaga and Clarys (2013), Alzheimer’s patients displayed a self-
reference effect but only for negative words. Alzheimer’s patients did not rate themselves 
negatively, but, other people seem to perceive them more negatively. Kalenzaga and 
Clarys (2013) suggested that the negative perception of Alzheimer patients could 
generate a more negative self, which could explain the negative emotion self-reference 
effect. Normal controls, in general exhibit a positive emotion self-reference effect 
(Mezulis et al., 2004).  Therefore, it is possible that despite the memory impairments, the 
beneficial treatment of self-related information is still largely intact. An intact self-
referential processing network can, in turn, help facilitate memory. However, some 
research on Alzheimer’s patients shows a reduced self-reference effect (Genon et al., 
2014; Wong et al., 2017).  
Nonetheless, it is possible that self-referential treatment of information could 
facilitate memory in patients with PD. Future research could aim to evaluate self-related 
effects in general and how self-based processing of information can enhance memory of 
patients with PD.  Using EEG whilst having participants perform self-based matching and 
memory tasks could help show if patients with PD show normal self-referential processing 
and compare the EEG finding with normal controls. One component of interest in this 
EEG is the P300 component, which has been linked to self-referential processing 
(Knyazev, 2013). For example, higher P300 amplitudes are recorded when participants 
view their own names (Fischler et al., 1987; Holeckova et al., 2006) or faces (Ninomiya, 
Onitsuka, Chen, Sato, & Tashiro, 1998; Sui et al., 2006)  when compared to the names 
and faces of others.  Furthermore, we will analyse changes in DMN activities in the theta, 
alpha, and beta frequency bands of EEG, which are typically associated with the DMN 
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and self-referential processing (Knyazev, 2013). Although the basics of the matching task 
and memory task combination discussed in this thesis can be used, since dealing with a 
clinical population several methodological changes would have to be made (e.g. the 
experiment must be shorter as patients with PD get tired much faster, healthy controls 
must be added, and cognitive assessments would have to be performed).   
Conclusion  
The experiments in this thesis have shown clear evidence for an effect of self on 
attention and subsequent memory. This, on its own, is not novel. Earlier work starting 
with the perceptual matching task of Sui et al. (2012) has shown a clear effect of self on 
attention on a similar task. Nonetheless, the matching task used in this thesis was a novel 
adaptation of the original matching task, which could now be used as an encoding task 
as well. This familiarity-controlled encoding of self-relevant information and its later recall 
is novel and allowed for a clear insight into the prioritising effect of self-relevant 
information on attention and consequently more accurate later recall. The effect of 
emotion during the matching task is less clear, although there does seem to be an 
indication of prioritisation of emotional information (Experiment 6). 
Nonetheless, combining the findings of Experiments 1a-1d, Experiment 2, 
Experiment 3, and Experiment 6, emotion appeared to influence the memorability of an 
item, and since word salience was beneficial to the participants’ current goal (i.e. to 
remember words for the memory tasks) emotion increased the likelihood that a word 
was recalled during a later memory test. Furthermore, since Experiment 2 revealed a 
super-capacity for words that were both positive and self-related, it is likely that emotion 
and the self influence attention and memory via different underlying processes, which 
was further exemplified by Experiment 3, and Experiment 6. Experiment 3 showed that 
repetition abolished the self-reference effect in memory without influencing the 
facilitatory effect of emotion on memory. Furthermore, Experiment 6 revealed that 
potentially with increased memory load, self-positive words are recalled more often than 
self-related or emotional information.  
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The EEG results of Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 supported these behavioural 
findings. A N100 was directly linked to early discrimination attentional processes where a 
larger N100 was linked to self-relevant information. An enhanced P200 and P300 showed 
that self-related information is overall more efficiently processed than distant other-
related information. Also an FN400 revealed that distant other-related information was 
potentially more laboursome to process than self-related items, as shown by an increased 
FN400 for distant other-related words. Lastly (late) LPCs showed that self-related items 
were linked to increased recollection as the LPC was more positive for self-related words 
than distant other-related words.  
In short, this thesis suggests that emotion and self both help prioritise information 
by directing our attention towards more salient information via top-down/bottom-up 
control mechanisms. This prioritised information is then recalled more easily and remains 
in memory for longer than information not related to the self or neutral valence 
information. Self-relatedness and emotion influence attention and memory arguably in a 
similar way but are distinctly separate processes that, when occurring together in a single 
item, can increase the efficiency of that item’s processing. Both emotional and self-
relevant information increase the saliency of information, which leads to an increase in 
attentional resources being used. This allows for prioritised information processing of 
potential goal-relevant information. In turn, increased attention leads to increased or 
more efficient encoding into memory. This alone improves later recall, but with the 
greater integrative binding of self-related information, self-relevant information is easier 
to retrieve from memory.   
The finding that self-relevant information improves attention towards and 
memory for stimuli is an important one. The robustness of the effects across experiments 
suggests that these effects may well translate into more cognitively natural, ‘real life’ 
situations. It suggests that in order to improve memory for stimuli, it is useful to link it to 
the self in some way. By making the stimulus self-relevant, it is more likely to focus 
attention and memory processes, leading to richer encoding of the stimulus and better 
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recognition and recall. This finding is important both as a potential everyday mnemonic 
technique and as a possible intervention for clinical groups for whom memory problems 
are a significant feature.   
In the previous section (future research), a study was proposed that will test self-
related information processing in PD patients with dementia. Patients with dementia can 
be helped to improve their memory using a self-reference memorisation technique. For 
example, by linking important information to themselves (via for instance a photo of 
themselves, or something else which is highly self-relevant), the memorability of that 
information could be improved (Gross et al., 2004). In this way, one can take advantage 
of the automatic self- processes which facilitate memory, as identified in this thesis.  
Knowledge of how emotion and self are prioritised by attention can be applied to 
non-clinical populations as well. By personalising information (using positive self-related 
stimuli), that information becomes salient. In the current matching paradigm, a simple set 
of instructions is enough to link the self to a specific colour and increase the saliency of 
that colour compared to a colour not linked to the self. Although non-experimental 
settings are much more complex, linking the self to important scenarios or messages 
would prioritise that information. This could help ensure that vital information is attended 
to, and processed with priority. For example, using personalised signs (containing self-
relevant information) could possibly make people more aware of the signs. Self-reference 
effects could also be utilised by the advertising industry. A major goal of advertising is to 
have a memorable brand. Much advertising in the modern world occurs on the internet. 
This allows considerable flexibility and bespoke targeting of the advert to the end user. 
Companies can easily draw on the database of personal information available to produce 
on-line advertisements which contain self-relevant positive information. By doing so, our 
results suggest this would make the advert more likely to prioritise attention and thus 
make the brand or brand symbol, more likely to be later recognised and recalled. 
To conclude, the processing of emotional and self-relevant information is distinct, 
but both are fast and automatic processes which help increase the saliency of information 
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relevant to one’s goals. Even though emotional and self-related information processing 
starts out as two separate processes, they can interact to potentially further increase the 
efficiency of information processing.   
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30. pigeon -ford 
31. plain-entire 
32. potted-middle 
33. pottery-spot 
34. powder-counsel 
35. print-hull 
36. putt-lamp 
37. quail-comb 
38. rail-wool 
39. round-civil 
40. seating-winter 
41. shade-glance 
42. sheet-lounge 
43. soil-desk 
44. stew-area 
45. steward-aisle 
46. study-cushion 
47. symbol-level 
48. third-abbey 
49. tile-shirt 
50. tomato-ceiling 
51. tutor-press 
52. wall-straw 
53. weekly-dozen 
54. will-carrier 
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Experiment 6 
Positive nouns 
 
1. accelerate 
2. action 
3. adore 
4. adrenaline 
5. adventure 
6. affection 
7. alive 
8. amazing 
9. ambitious 
10. animation 
11. anticipate 
12. arcade 
13. astonished 
14. awake 
15. award 
16. awesome 
17. barbecue 
18. bargain 
19. beautiful 
20. birth 
21. blonde 
22. bonus 
23. bravery 
24. brewing 
25. brilliant 
26. caffeine 
27. cash 
28. celebrate 
29. cheerful 
30. christmas 
31. cinema 
32. climax 
33. comedy 
34. conception 
35. confetti 
36. create 
37. curious 
38. dance 
39. daring 
40. dazzling 
41. delightful 
42. desire 
43. diamond 
44. discover 
45. dollar 
46. eager 
47. ecstasy 
48. embrace 
49. enchanting 
50. endurance 
51. energetic 
52. enjoyment 
53. euphoria 
54. excited 
55. exercise 
56. exotic 
57. expansion 
58. expertise 
59. fancy 
60. fantastic 
61. festive 
62. fireworks 
63. flirt 
64. fortune 
65. freedom 
66. frisky 
67. gallant 
68. generous 
69. genius 
70. glory 
71. gold 
72. gourmet 
73. graduation 
74. grin 
75. happy 
76. hilarious 
77. hire 
78. honeymoon 
79. horny 
80. incredible 
81. innovation 
82. inspire 
83. intimate 
84. invent 
85. jackpot 
86. jazz 
87. joke 
88. joyful 
89. kiss 
90. laugh 
91. legendary 
92. lick 
93. lottery 
94. lust 
95. magic 
96. marry 
97. martini 
98. meteorite 
99. mindful 
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100. miracle 
101. mission 
102. money 
103. musical 
104. naked 
105. naughty 
106. nintendo 
107. nude 
108. orgasm 
109. outgoing 
110. outing 
111. overcome 
112. overjoyed 
113. party 
114. passion 
115. payday 
116. penny 
117. penthouse 
118. perk 
119. playful 
120. pleasure 
121. positive 
122. powerful 
123. praise 
124. pregnant 
125. pretty 
126. pride 
127. prize 
128. profitable 
129. prosper 
130. proud 
131. qualify 
132. quest 
133. reasoning 
134. rejoice 
135. reward 
136. rich 
137. riches 
138. romance 
139. running 
140. safari 
141. sale 
142. satisfy 
143. saucy 
144. score 
145. sensual 
146. sexy 
147. snuggle 
148. sparkly 
149. speed 
150. spicy 
151. spring 
152. star 
153. stimulate 
154. stunning 
155. success 
156. succulent 
157. summer 
158. superpower 
159. surf 
160. surprise 
161. sushi 
162. swim 
163. talent 
164. tempting 
165. tequila 
166. thrill 
167. thrive 
168. tickle 
169. trampoline 
170. treasure 
171. triumph 
172. vaccine 
173. value 
174. vibrant 
175. victory 
176. voyage 
177. weekend 
178. winner 
179. witty 
180. youthful 
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Neutral nouns 
1. abbey 
2. accordion 
3. acre 
4. advice 
5. aisle 
6. apron 
7. area 
8. armchair 
9. await 
10. backdrop 
11. basic 
12. basin 
13. basket 
14. bathroom 
15. bedside 
16. beige 
17. binoculars 
18. biography 
19. botany 
20. broth 
21. bulletin 
22. bunch 
23. butler 
24. calendar 
25. canvas 
26. card 
27. cargo 
28. ceiling 
29. center 
30. ceramics 
31. chair 
32. channel 
33. civil 
34. click 
35. clip 
36. comb 
37. compass 
38. conference 
39. continue 
40. cooker 
41. counsel 
42. counter 
43. crayon 
44. cross 
45. curtains 
46. department 
47. desk 
48. dishwasher 
49. document 
50. dozen 
51. dryer 
52. dune 
53. duster 
54. editorial 
55. entire 
56. equipment 
57. external 
58. eyebrow 
59. flipper 
60. flooring 
61. foam 
62. fold 
63. footing 
64. format 
65. fortnight 
66. foundation 
67. freezer 
68. funnel 
69. furniture 
70. geography 
71. gradual 
72. grotto 
73. ground 
74. habitat 
75. hairdryer 
76. hairspray 
77. hall 
78. holder 
79. hole 
80. housing 
81. indicator 
82. ingredient 
83. item 
84. ivory 
85. ladle 
86. lamp 
87. lawnmower 
88. lens 
89. level 
90. list 
91. listing 
92. lofty 
93. mantle 
94. match 
95. mention 
96. middle 
97. midst 
98. mill 
99. mini 
100. misty 
101. mitt 
102. name 
103. napkin 
104. naval 
105. newspaper 
106. noon 
107. norm 
108. north 
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109. notch
110. occasional
111. outline
112. overall
113. padded
114. parallel
115. parchment
116. pardon
117. patch
118. pause
119. pavement
120. pebble
121. pendulum
122. philosophy
123. phrase
124. pickled
125. plausible
126. plume
127. pole
128. pottery
129. powder
130. practice
131. prairie
132. print
133. proper
134. quote
135. rail
136. relevant
137. resolve
138. respond
139. rinse
140. round
141. sample
142. scenario
143. seat
144. sentence
145. sequence
146. sheet
147. shelf
148. shirt
149. shoe
150. solid
151. specific
152. spot
153. station
154. stew
155. stir
156. straw
157. strings
158. study
159. suede
160. suit
161. surface
162. symbol
163. table
164. telegraph
165. terrain
166. theme
167. threshold
168. title
169. token
170. toothpaste
171. translate
172. trolley
173. trousers
174. typewriter
175. usage
176. vault
177. wallpaper
178. washer
179. workings
180. yawn
